QUESTIONS FROM TETOVO.A Macedonian Interior Ministry spokesman told journalists on 14 March that the security situation is "horrible." He added that "we have information that new flashpoints [of violence] could appear throughout the country" at any time. London's "The Guardian" wrote the next day that Macedonia appears "to be on the brink of civil war." These very serious developments serve to raise a series of questions regarding Macedonia's future in the short, medium, and long term.
The first question that comes to mind is: just who are these insurgents who have emerged in recent weeks to threaten the stability of probably the most strategically sensitive country in the Balkans? Their political wing says they want full equality for the 23 percent Albanian minority with the Macedonian majority and the restructuring of Macedonia as a federation of two equal peoples -- all of which is a non-starter for the Macedonian leadership. But are the rebels of the National Liberation Army (UCK) a cohesive group, or are they a collection of diverse elements that may or may not coordinate their activities? To what extent do ex-guerrillas and money from Kosova play a role? Is the Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja, and Bujanovac (UCPMB) active in exporting violence across the border? And is there a link between the insurgents (and their apparently well-stocked arsenals) and the notorious bands of smugglers and drug traffickers for which western Macedonia has long been known?
A further question is: what support do the insurgents enjoy among the population? A few thousand nationalist supporters turned out in Tetovo on 14 March to applaud the sounds of gunfire in the hills, but that does not of itself suggest a groundswell of support for a violent insurrection that would put lives and property in jeopardy.
It will be particularly interesting to see what the Macedonian authorities will do. Will they act quickly to isolate the rebels without polarizing society along ethnic lines? Will they move decisively to address long-standing Albanian grievances regarding civil, cultural, and economic rights, including access to government jobs and Albanian- language higher education? Will former President Kiro Gligorov and others in the opposition play a responsible role in the crisis, or will they attempt the wrongfoot the government for partisan political ends?
This leads to a series of questions regarding developments in the medium term. Is it possible that a full-scale civil war could actually break out? Could Skopje become another Sarajevo or Mostar? Who would stand to gain from a major insurgency? Surely even the most hardened Albanian nationalist is aware that no mainstream party in Albania, Kosova, or Macedonia is prepared to support the insurgents, to say nothing of the international community (see "RFE/RL Balkan Report," 23 February 2001). Macedonia has its problems, but it looks like an oasis of prosperity to a traveler coming in from Albania. Macedonia's Albanians have their grievances, but these pale compare to what the Kosovars endured for over a decade. One of the two leading Macedonian Albanian parties is in the present government, and its rival was in the last one. This adds up to much more access to political power than the Kosovars had under Milosevic or the Albanians of the Presevo Valley have now.
And if Macedonia degenerates into civil war, what will be the effects on the region? The political and economic development of Albania and Bulgaria will most likely be adversely affected, and the jitters will probably extend to Greece and Turkey as well. Investors could be scared away from the Balkans as a whole, dealing a severe blow to the EU's Balkan Stability Pact, not to mention the EU's efforts, and those of others, aimed at conflict prevention and mediation. Finally, a panicked international community might turn up the pressure on Montenegro not to declare independence, even if a referendum shows strong support for it.
And might not there be some in Belgrade who would see growing turmoil in Macedonia as favorable to Serbian interests? They could argue that a frightened Macedonian government would become a strategic ally against a "greater Albania" (even though no mainstream Albanian party anywhere endorses that concept). They could also say that NATO's inability to control the movements of rebel bands has been demonstrated, and that the alliance should leave the job to Belgrade and Skopje. Most importantly, international attention would become focused on "Albanian extremists and terrorists" and not on the extent to which Serbia's leaders and political culture have truly broken with the ways of the past.
Finally, the prospect of civil war in Macedonia raises additional questions for the long-term future of the Balkans. What does it say about the future of multi-ethnic states in the region if Macedonia splits apart, despite careful attention by the international community over the years on behalf of a united and multi-ethnic Macedonia? Might a full-blown insurgency in Macedonia give credence to those who argue that many of the countries of the region will be unable to escape from a cycle of poverty, instability, and violence? And what would that suggest about the future of poorer post-communist states as a whole?
(Patrick Moore)
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