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Hostages of Violence
AIM Pristina, March 9, 2001
The strong condemnations that followed the latest escalation of violence in and around the village of Tanusevci, on the border between Macedonia and Kosovo, were partly a result of Macedonia's fragile position. Internal weakness and not so good relations with its neighbors when Macedonia's nationality is concerned, greatly influence the country's stability. Unrest in this country would affect all its neighbors, and the conflict would not be containable. This is why the preservation of peace in Macedonia is an absolute priority of the international community. This, of course, implies respect for the principle of inviolability of borders by the use of force, which is a precondition for stable international relations.
This is what all Albanians and their representatives should bear in mind, despite the dissatisfaction with the position of their fellow countrymen in Macedonia and Serbia, or with existing borders. In the case of Macedonia, the international community views the country's stability as a precondition for preserving peace. From this viewpoint it is obvious that laying the blame on the Albanians in this conflict could have dangerous consequences not only for those of them living in Macedonia, but for those living in other regions as well, especially in Kosovo. This is why all of them should take great care to behave rationally and bear all such implications in mind.
This cautious approach, however, should not disregard the causality of all events in this part of the Balkans. The political process in Kosovo has been stalled since last autumn. This is how long the completion of a package of economic laws has been delayed, and since the beginning of this year many uncertainties have accompanied the drafting of a temporary constitution, after which elections at the level of Kosovo should be scheduled. Business is completely uncertain, and widespread social unrest should not be ruled out in the near future. And in the background there lingers a question that everybody keeps asking themselves: What will happen with Kosovo and what will its status be?
After several weeks, Belgrade and Skopje ended their negotiations on territorial disputes and the interstate boundary. The topic of these negotiations were territorial disputes on the border between Macedonia and Kosovo as well. It is well known that both Macedonia and Serbia aspire to expand in this region. During the latest negotiations, which produced a border agreement, it was rumored in Kosovo that Macedonia demanded major corrections of the border in the region of Kacanik, with 10 villages, and in the region of Dragas, with some 20 villages. Since UNMIK took over administration of the Dragas region, there were occasional clashes and removal of border signs. There were exchanges of fire near the village of Tanusevci, which lies on the border with Kosovo. It is not known, however, whether this region was also the a matter of territorial dispute and arrangement.
Before and after these events, simultaneously with preparations for the talks, occasional and frequently severe clashes in the Presevo Valley continued. A new cycle of violence erupted in Kosovo a little earlier, claiming the lives of ethnic Albanians, Serbs, and people of other ethnic origin alike. The perpetrators of these crimes, like in the past, have not been discovered. An explosion in which a bus transporting Kosovo Serbs from Serbia to Kosovo was destroyed marked the culmination of tensions continuously building up on the Kosovo-Macedonia border and in the Presevo Valley.
Looking at events from this perspective, one question unavoidably comes to mind -- who are the people directing the events from the shadows? In major diplomatic centers, in Belgrade and in Skopje, the finger is immediately pointed at ethnic Albanians. In a flood of condemnations of Albanian extremism and terrorism, all Albanians, and particularly those from Kosovo, have been denounced as the instigators of riots in neighboring countries and of violence in Kosovo. A recent regional summit held in Skopje depicted the Albanians as the major destabilizing element in this part of the Balkans. This view was shared by EU High Representatives Javier Solana and Chris Patten as well. They threatened to stop aid to the Albanians, and isolate them and Kosovo, and for the first time questioned the establishment of the so-called substantial autonomy envisaged by U.N. Resolution 1244. At a donors meeting held later in Pristina it was clearly said that if the violence in Kosovo did not end and if the region was not stabilized, donors should not be expected to approve any funds for the reconstruction and development of Kosovo.
The ethnic Albanian representatives in Kosovo failed to fully comprehend the seriousness of the situation. First of all, they did not understand that in deciding to intervene in Kosovo, NATO strategists had in view the danger of the conflict's escalation. NATO troops were deployed in all countries surrounding Kosovo, with the aim of establishing some sort of presence in Serbia as well, via the Presevo Valley. Who understood this, also understood that the time of resolving problems through force of arms is over. NATO is also fully aware that the causes of various conflicts have not been eliminated, but the resolve to cool crisis hot spots through agreements and political compromises is firm, almost absolute. Certain harsh qualifications targeting the attitude of some ethnic Albanian groups in Kosovo and around it are partly due to NATO's position. There are also those who believe that their criticism of Albanians should be seen as a support to Kostunica and a sort of compensation for the NATO attacks of 1999.
Be it as it may, the qualifications in question should be approached with soberness. The Albanians are faced with numerous internal problems. At the same time, it is highly unlikely that they would speedily and easily resolve their centuries long disputes with the neighboring peoples and countries. Their discord with the West, therefore, could prove very dangerous. It is not enough for Kosovo representatives to make statements. Making vague, ambiguous statements is even worse. Such a dissonant attitude is mostly the result of serious Albanian political shortcomings. Even when trying to be in tune with the West, Albanian politicians sound like a untuned instrument, and appear to be anything but serious officials ready to come to grips with their problems.
Thus the image of Albanians as an element of insecurity in the Balkans has re-emerged. Janush Bugajski is known to all those who regularly follow the Albanian-language press. In his latest column for a local paper he said: "Albanian representatives should not only clearly condemn the latest violence, but should come forth with a proposal for a new Balkan structure that would be welcomed by their neighbors and by all centers in the West. Their silence and vagueness in this critical period will be widely perceived as an agreement with armed groups and a proof of their hidden agenda for creating a Greater Albania. What is urgently needed is a joint declaration of all Albanian leaders from Pristina, Tirana, Skopje, and Podgorica."
Kosovo politicians should urgently take steps towards mutual cooperation and adopt a platform laying down their unified views on conditions in Kosovo and plans for its future. International factors would also like to know in what way the Albanians plan to realize their ideas, who is in charge among them, and with whom they should speak. Such cooperation will reduce tensions among the ordinary people and would limit the struggle for power to normal proportions. Efforts aimed at establishing normal conditions would also relax relations with Serbia and other ethnic communities. No matter how small, the easening of tensions would contribute to suppressing ethnic violence. By adopting unified views, ethnic Albanian representatives would convincingly carry out their tasks of politically isolating the criminals and extremists in their ranks. Simultaneously, they would be able to continue cooperation with Albanian political forces outside Kosovo. If they did what they are supposed to do, they would have the right to criticize the West's biased attitude towards various aspects of the Albanians' position in the region, and UNMIK's futile hesitation in administering Kosovo.
The vagueness that marks the political positions of the Kosovo politicians and their proven incapability surfaced during the recent events on the border. They repeated their regular statements calling for the crisis in the Presevo Valley to be resolved peacefully, supported the demands of Macedonia's Albanians that their position should be resolved inside the country's institutions, and condemned the use of violence. The most prominent place in these statements, however, was given to explanations saying that the main source of the current clashes lies in decades of discrimination against ethnic Albanians in Serbia and Macedonia. It appears that they are suggesting that the violence, after all, is just. All Albanian parties and politicians described as unacceptable the Serb-Macedonian agreement involving the part of the border in Kosovo. It should be noted that ethnic Albanian parties in Macedonia were not unified in condemning this agreement. Before it issued a press release against the violence on the border several days ago, Albania had been nothing more than a passive observer. This was partly due to the conviction that Albania did not have much influence on ethnic Albanian politicians outside its borders.
It appears that compared with politicians and their organizations, Albanian news media and the so-called independent public were somewhat more convincingly promoting views critical of violence, and warnings of its danger for Kosovo and the surrounding region. The rhetoric used by Albanian parties and politicians was not soft either, but it somehow lacked convincingness and appeared reserved. There is a possibility that they lack the courage or desire to tell unpleasant things to their supporters. And this does not mean that voters support violence. An overwhelming majority of Albanians, especially in Kosovo, is tired of violence and wants peace. There is, however, a number of those who would not feel good if told the whole truth. For instance, they would not like to hear that except for Kosovo, which could become independent, other parts inhabited by ethnic Albanians would have to remain in Serbia and Macedonia. They would not be pleased to hear, although they could comprehend it, that this cannot be changed, and that the ethnic Albanians there would have to use political means to struggle to better their position as an ethnic minority.
It is nothing new that Albanian politicians are incapable and lack civic and political courage. It is also nothing new that they display opportunistic patriotism, and can calculate well when their personal and other interests are in question, particularly the struggle for power. Whether they are aware or not of the consequences of such an attitude and activities, they objectively hinder the process of normalization in Kosovo and risk being declared suspicious, and even to be accused of keeping secret ties with armed Albanian groups which continue to create unrest and confusion in Serbia and Macedonia.
Fehim Rexhepi
(AIM)
senden