April 8, 2001

Risking a New War in the Balkans

By RICHARD HOLBROOKE

One down (sort of). Two to go.

It is, of course, big news that Slobodan Milosevic, the man who started and lost four wars in the Balkans, has been arrested for violations of Yugoslav law — although for full justice to be done he must face the War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague. As the American who probably spent the most time with him, primarily in the negotiations that ended the war in Bosnia, I am deeply gratified that his active role in history seems to have come to an end.
    But the same cannot yet be said for Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic. The continued freedom of these men — one the racist leader of the Bosnian Serbs, the other a hands-on mass murderer — has undermined Western policy. These men, especially Mr. Karadzic, remain central to opposition to a single, multiethnic Bosnia. The reluctance of NATO and the United States to even attempt to arrest them is the single thing that has distressed me most about Western policy since the Dayton agreement in 1995.
    If Mr. Karadzic is apprehended, and I believe he is vulnerable, the implementation of Dayton will be far more effective. Ironically, American military leaders — who have much to gain from Mr. Karadzic's arrest, because it would speed the withdrawal of nearly 5,000 American troops — have been most reluctant, citing the risks and the difficulty of coordinating with the French, in whose sector he usually hides.
    The failure to arrest these two men is a signal instance of how inaction can itself be a policy decision, and one with consequences. The arrest of Mr. Milosevic resulted from American pressure — specifically, legislation requiring cooperation with the Hague tribunal as a condition for further aid. Secretary of State Colin Powell's announcement after the arrest that the United States would continue aid was appropriate, but it only defers the big decisions hanging over American policy in the Balkans. Deferral, however, is a tactic, not a real policy.
    If the United States does not lead events, it will be led by them. One cannot play for time with policy reviews and "assembling the team." History is continuous and does not hold still for Senate confirmation hearings. Recent actions by Macedonian Albanians and Bosnian Croats are, in part, reactions to a new administration perceived as more passive in the Balkans. This perception is inspiring separatists to try to push back the gains of the past five years. A fifth Balkan war has thus begun in Macedonia, and Washington faces challenges as well in Bosnia, Montenegro and Kosovo.
    In Bosnia today, a new challenge comes from Bosnian Croats seeking to destroy the fragile Muslim-Croat Federation. Over the past 10 days, they have inspired large-scale Croat defections from the federation army and attacks on NATO peacekeepers and officials charged with implementing the Dayton accords. Their goal is to create a separate Croat ministate, perhaps to merge later with Croatia itself. (The goals of some Bosnian Serbs are similar.) If the Croats succeed, Dayton will be effectively dead and Bosnia substantially wounded. The United States must lead a vigorous international effort against these criminal elements, arresting them and using force if necessary.
    The second problem, in Montenegro — Serbia's much smaller partner in what remains of Yugoslavia — is more elusive. President Djukanovic of Montenegro bravely stood up to President Milosevic during the Kosovo war, helping NATO enormously. Now he is moving gradually toward full independence for Montenegro, meaning divorce from Serbia and the final dissolution of Yugoslavia.
    If Mr. Djukanovic's party makes significant gains in the Montenegrin assembly election on April 22, it will be difficult for the international community to oppose the will of the people. Because of a fear that it might bring instability, Montenegrin independence is opposed by the United States and the European Union. But if Montenegro declares itself independent, we will have little choice but to accept that decision. It is far better to prepare for this possibility rather than invest a lot of American prestige in opposing it. We could live with Montenegrin independence, provided it does not trigger copycat movements elsewhere.
    The most urgent challenge is in Macedonia. At most, only weeks remain for mediation to prevent a civil war between Macedonian Slavs and radical members of the Albanian minority. To prevent this, Washington should have a high-level emissary, clearly representing the Bush administration, alongside the European Union's Javier Solana. At present, by leaving diplomacy almost entirely in European hands, Washington risks repeating the mistake of 1991 — early neglect, followed by war.
    Finally, Kosovo itself. Unlike Bosnia, whose peace has been internationally guaranteed by the Dayton accord, Kosovo has nothing more than a shaky cease-fire and a United Nations Security Council resolution that leaves its final status vague. The Albanians demand independence; the Serbs want to keep Kosovo part of Yugoslavia. Until a solution can be negotiated that is acceptable to both Belgrade and the Kosovo Albanians, it will be impossible to withdraw NATO troops without triggering more fighting.
    Yet neither side is ready to negotiate. The Kosovars must first have an election to choose their leaders — and unfortunately this election has been delayed until the end of this year by foot-dragging international bureaucrats. Belgrade, meanwhile, is not prepared to negotiate until its quarrel with Montenegro is settled. As in Macedonia, America, whose influence in the region is greater than that of Europe or of the United Nations, needs to lead the search for a negotiated solution.
    I recognize, of course, that what I have outlined above constitutes advocacy of a continued, indeed increased, American leadership role in the Balkans, in partnership with our NATO allies. This is the same position I argued for as a government official.
    In the end, the key question is whether the Balkans matter enough to justify such risks and costs. My answer is simple: They do matter that much, because European stability remains a basic American national security interest which did not end with the end of the cold war. When confronted by the criminal elements still threatening the Balkan region, which is located well within NATO's area of responsibility, the only choice, in my view, is between early involvement at a low cost or heavier involvement later.

Richard Holbrooke, former United States ambassador to the United Nations, was chief architect of the Dayton Peace Agreement for Bosnia.

Copyright 2001 The New York Times Company
 

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