http://www.crisisweb.org/26 April 2001
Welcome to CrisisWeb.After Milosevic: A Practical Agenda for Lasting Balkans Peace
ICG Balkans Report No.108
Slobodan Milosevic is gone, but he has left in the Balkans a bitter legacy of death, destruction and distrust, and the potential for renewed conflict remains dangerously high. It is vital that there be forward-looking and comprehensive action by the international community to address the continuing sources of tension. ICG's new 350-page report is a comprehensive and up-to-date attempt to map a realistic agenda for achieving lasting peace in the Balkans. The focus is on accelerating political and institutional reform, and addressing - sooner rather than later - the difficult remaining issues of future and final status, and minority rights, that keep holding back stability and economic growth, especially in the troubled Yugoslav trio of Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo, and in Bosnia and Macedonia.
This report is built on five years of intensive field-based analysis throughout the western Balkans. The policy ideas contained in it grow out of the experience gleaned in the course of writing 140 earlier Balkans reports and briefing papers and discussing them with policy makers in the region and around the world.
The complete text of the report may be downloaded in pdf format by clicking the above link. The report is also available at cost in printed paperback book form: click ordering details for information.
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http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/book_showreport.cfmAfter Milosevic: A Practical Agenda for Lasting Balkans Peace
26 April 2001
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mailto:icgbrussels@crisisweb.orgSlobodan Milosevic has gone, but he has left behind him in the Balkans a bitter legacy of death, destruction and distrust. His democratic overthrow was a watershed, but the potential for renewed conflict in the region remains dangerously high, and it is vital that there be forward-looking and comprehensive action by the international community to address the continuing sources of underlying tension.
Across the Balkans, security and stability continue to be undercut by lingering nationalism, fragile and unresponsive government institutions, underperforming economies, undelivered justice and the issue of unreturned refugees. Breaking the cycle of violence in the region will require shattering the hold on power of narrow and often anti-democratic political elites, and accelerating difficult transitions to lasting political and economic reform.
As recent outbreaks of violence in southern Serbia and Macedonia underscore, events in the seven countries and entities covered by this report - Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia and Albania - will move dynamically and unpredictably in the immediate term. Anticipating to the extent possible, and responding to, these events will be a continuing test of the transatlantic community's broader political aspiration: to socially and economically integrate the region into a democratic and peaceful Europe.
The international community's response to events in the Balkans has too often been reactive and ad hoc. The overwhelming need now is to set clear goals and pursue them consistently. And the foremost goal now must be to peacefully and enduringly settle unresolved political status and minority rights issues in all the areas, beginning with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its component entities, where they remain most contentious.
Settling and moving past these difficult issues - not just hoping they will go away - will allow for much more rapid improvements in security, economic growth, regional integration and human rights across the entire western Balkans, as well as in a number of neighbouring states. Until the fundamental governing structures of these societies are clarified, all their institutions will remain built upon a foundation of sand.The Future of the FRY
The stakes involved in resolving the final and future political status of the FRY are high, crucial in determining whether the region emerges into a new era of stability and relative prosperity or continues to be plagued by divisions capable of escalating into war. Until clear directions are set, the FRY's current constituent parts (Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo) and much of the Balkans, will remain in an uneasy limbo. Foreign investors will be deterred by the continuing uncertainty, issues of ownership and other basic legal rights will remain clouded by muddy constitutional structures and politics will remain plagued by nationalism.
The constitutional and legal structures of the FRY were neither intended nor designed to meet the needs of any modern, democratic state. The time has come for the international community to assist in an orderly and democratic process to resolve future and final status issues. The task, particularly for Kosovo is huge: to confront the reality that the status quo is not sustainable; to identify processes that will move things forward constructively; and to find ultimate solutions that are principled and consistent, and don't make things worse, including within the wider region.
Hopes that the FRY can be reconstituted - on a transitional or permanent basis - as a loose federation or confederation with little or no power vested in central authorities - appear painfully detached from political reality. Both Montenegro and Serbia remain reluctant to enter into a revised federal arrangement as co-equals; Kosovo wants nothing to do with Serbia or the FRY at all.
Montenegro should no longer be discouraged, as it has been by the international community, from seeking independence. Concerns about this triggering internal conflict, negative impacts on Serbia and in Kosovo, and domino effects in Bosnia and elsewhere, have all been overstated. The departure of Montenegro from the FRY would not mean its automatic dissolution as a legal entity, nor effect the operation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 in Kosovo.
There are a number of constitutional models available through which Montenegro and Serbia can retain some of their traditional ties and advance common interests. As Montenegro navigates its way through forthcoming elections and a possible independence referendum, discussions should be held with Serbia on a wide range of issues that must be resolved whatever structure formally binds them or not in the future, such as monetary policy, taxation, environmental regulation and cooperation over pensions, education and healthcare.
For its part, the international community - perhaps through mediating assistance from the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or Group of Eight (G-8) - should help Montenegro and Serbia to find a mutually satisfactory basis for this new relationship. The approach until now of seeking to pressure Montenegro into drawing back from independence has been both unconstructive and ineffective, and has discouraged Belgrade from engaging in meaningful dialogue.
In Kosovo, the profound gulf between Belgrade and Pristina has led many in the international community to assume that Kosovo's final status remains too explosive a subject to tackle in the near term. However substantial progress toward building a viable economy, deradicalising the province, and stabilising the neighbourhood (particularly in southern Serbia and western Macedonia) will be virtually impossible unless greater clarity is brought to the fundamental legal and constitutional framework in Kosovo.
The first step is to establish with no further delay a full system of democratic and autonomous self-government within Kosovo - the full set of "provisional institutions", legislative, executive and judicial, referred to in Resolution 1244 and described in more detail in the Rambouillet accords.
The second step should be to establish a focal point for Resolution 1244's "political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status". The most obvious candidate for that role is the "international meeting" (anticipated as occurring three years out by the Rambouillet negotiators in 1999) held under the aegis of the G-8 or the OSCE.
The third step would be for consultations to occur - preferably, but not necessarily, in the context of an anticipated international meeting of the kind just described - on the principles that might constitute the foundations for a final political settlement. In keeping with Helsinki Final Act principles, a peacefully agreed adjustment of Kosovo's border (possibly involving both northern Kosovo and the Presevo valley) should not be ruled out as part of such a settlement. This would not be rewarding ethnic cleansing, and there are no relevant parallels with demands for partition in Bosnia.
The most appropriate status for Kosovo to emerge from such consultations may be "conditional independence", which could involve preconditions (e.g. minority rights protection) having to be satisfied for a period before all the benefits of recognition (e.g. UN membership) are granted; the permanent renunciation of some forms of action (e.g. territorial expansion); and a form of a period of international trusteeship, in which certain veto powers would qualify Kosovo's capacity to exercise complete sovereignty.Serbia Internally
Even after Milosevic's departure, Serbia faces enormous challenges - resolving the constitutional relationship with Montenegro and Kosovo, restoring accountability and the rule of law, addressing an insurgency in the Presevo valley and bringing new life into an economy decimated by mismanagement and debt.
Reformers and hard-liners are struggling with each other to define Serbia's place in the world in a battle with high stakes, and the struggle between liberal European-style policies and holdover nationalist policies continues. The new leadership in Serbia will not necessarily embrace policies aimed at creating regional stability, and the embrace of the new government by the international community should be less uncritical: it should be held to the same high standards demanded of other Balkans countries, notably Croatia.
The international community must certainly continue to insist that Milosevic be tried not in a local court but under international law, in an international court, for the war crimes for which he has been indicted. A range of policies still supported by Belgrade are unacceptable, including its policies toward ethnic minorities, support for extremist elements in both Bosnia and northern Kosovo, and the continuing detainment of large numbers of ethnic Albanian "political prisoners".
The international community should closely condition financial assistance on Serbia's ability to meet clear benchmarks with regard to economic and democratic reforms and cooperation with the Hague tribunal. If the standards are met, both the European Union (EU) and U.S. should initiate a comprehensive economic assistance strategy for providing the FRY desperately needed technical assistance to rapidly reform the old socialist economic laws and carry out privatisation.
The FRY government's reaction to insurgency in southern Serbia by ethnic Albanian guerrillas has been reasonably restrained. While that restraint and better Western policing and imaginative diplomacy may hold down the fighting, the situation in southern Serbia will remain dangerously unstable as long as Kosovo's status is unresolved.Montenegro Internally
Over the past three years, Montenegro has increasingly come to operate as a separate state, and it continues to focus its energies on resolving its constitutional status within the FRY or outside it. Opinion polls persistently show that none of the various options for the republic's future status enjoys overwhelming support. Opposition to independence is strong, especially in parts of the north, but it does not appear severe enough to trigger violence or a counter separatist movement.
In order for the process by which Montenegro decides on its future status to have credibility, strict adherence to the Montenegrin constitution - which ultimately requires a two-thirds majority in parliament - is advisable, if the appearance is to be avoided of rules being manipulated at will in much the same way that Milosevic abused the federal constitution.
Beyond its status, Montenegro also needs to make progress in key areas of reform such as public administration and the judiciary. The United States and the EU will need to move from their earlier priority of direct budget support to supporting sustainable reform, including thorough overhaul of the party-state apparatus, and the networks of cronyism, nepotism and corruption that go with it.Kosovo Internally
Kosovo is adrift, and real stability will continue to elude it and the adjoining areas in Serbia and Macedonia until substantial self-government is put in place and a process for resolving the province's political status is resolved. Renewed rioting in Mitrovica, violence in Serbia's Presevo valley, clashes on the Macedonia border and attacks on bus convoys escorted by the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) all served to drive home this point that while Kosovo is not out of control, violence is lurking near the surface.
Issues surrounding Kosovo's final status remain central to virtually all the challenges facing the province, from security to economic growth to basic governance. The lack of any foreseeable resolution of the status of Kosovo and the resulting continued insecurity for the people of Kosovo complicates almost every one of Kosovo's other problems, especially efforts to encourage reconciliation between Albanians and Serbs. As long as Albanians fear and Serbs hope that Belgrade's rule might return, each side will be preparing both psychologically and practically for the next war, deflecting attention from other pressing political, economic, and social problems.
KFOR and UNMIK can both take important steps to help destroy the illegal armed groups that operate among both the Albanian and the Serb communities. This will require a more focused and aggressive posture against both ethnic and political violence. A critical element in dealing with the Serbs of Kosovo, and indeed in preserving Kosovo as a single entity, is regaining control of Mitrovica.
The municipal elections of October 2000 were an important symbolic step in demonstrating Kosovo's commitment to democracy. By and large, Albanian political parties, candidates, and media behaved in a responsible fashion. UNMIK should have then moved quickly to begin the complicated and potentially dangerous process of creating the provisional democratic institutions specified in Resolution 1244. Unfortunately the reasons for inactivity and caution are clear. Without strong international support, the UN administration is afraid any progress or decision may be seen as prejudicing the question of final status, and disturb the new government in Belgrade. Again new clarity of thought, and a new direction are required from the major international actors.Bosnia
Bosnia is still burdened by the legacy of war and trapped by the contradictions of the Dayton Peace Agreement. Bosnia's nationalist politicians have preserved considerable populist appeal, often paying little more than lip service to Dayton and have devoted their energies over the last five and a half years thwarting reform, with the most recent challenge coming from the Croat hardliners. Any move now toward international disengagement or outright partition of the country would be disastrous - risking undoing all the gains to date and potentially triggering renewed conflict.
Since 2000, the international administration has been more active in breaking down the influence of nationalist extremists, and building up Bosnia's state institutions. But if the international community walked away tomorrow those institutions would crumble. Even with more cooperative governments now at state and Federation levels, more vigorous enforcement measures remain necessary for Bosnia to achieve stability. The enforcement mechanisms granted by the Dayton Agreement must be used to further strengthen Bosnia's central institutions while eroding the power base of factions that oppose the development of a functioning, democratic state and the reintegration of Bosnia's ethnic communities.
Effectively implementing a landmark Constitutional Court ruling against ethnic discrimination may be the key to achieving a smoother transition to a more viable post-Dayton governance structure. While building Bosnia's central institutions, the High Representative must use his authority to eliminate political party control over pension funds, publicly-owned enterprises, the judiciary, the civil service and police; trace the funding mechanisms and patronage networks of political parties; and enable the local judiciary to prosecute corrupt officials. The OSCE, OHR, UN and all other international agencies in Bosnia, under the direction of OHR, must develop a detailed plan for pushing the full implementation of the Constitutional Court decision on the constituent peoples of Bosnia. In particular, the OSCE should investigate voting rules and governing structures that violate the decision.
Sooner or later the representatives of these communities will have to replace the Dayton governing structures with something more viable, but this will only be productive after Bosnia's numerous constitutions and laws have been amended in line with the Constitutional Court's ruling. The logical end-point for reform of the Dayton structure would appear to be a strengthened central government, with reduced or no roles for the two present "entities" (Republika Srpska and the Federation), replacement structures for the cantons (resembling the pre-war "okruzi", with reduced fiscal and administrative powers), and enhanced powers for the municipalities.Croatia
Croatia continues to make impressive strides in distancing itself from its nationalist past. Its restraint in dealing with Bosnian Croat hard-liners and continued willingness to move toward international standards are welcome. However, it still has to tackle difficult issues of economic reform, and to make further progress with regard to the return of refugees and its treatment of the Serb minority: the Tudjman legacy dies hard.
Since parliamentary and presidential elections in Croatia in early 2000, Croatia has taken major strides in strengthening democracy and the rule of law. It has also played an increasingly constructive role in the region, particularly by its refusal to support or encourage Croat nationalist extremists in Bosnia. This progress has been warmly received by the international community, as reflected in the country's admission to NATO's Partnership for Peace program, the ending of the Council of Europe's monitoring regime and the November 2000 initiation of negotiations for a Stability and Association Agreement with the European Union.Macedonia
Recent violence has made clear the need not only to contain conflict in the short-term but to bring greater energy to the underlying political task of improving civil rights and relations between the country's Macedonian-speaking and Albanian-speaking communities. It has also reinforced the need to speed progress in Kosovo toward self-government and resolution of its final status. Much remains to be done in Macedonia to reduce corruption, remove other impediments to economic growth and improve the quality of governance.
In late February 2001, violence flared in villages in northern Macedonia close to the border with Kosovo and in mid-March, the fighting spread to Macedonia's second largest city, Tetovo. Whatever the rebels' intentions, they clearly tapped into the frustrated local demands for basic minority rights: citizenship, ownership, education, language and representative government. The Macedonian government should accept, and the international community continue to insist, that the primary focus in resolving Macedonia's internal security problems must be political rather than military. A serious effort must be made by Macedonian-speakers to address the reasonable political, cultural and economic concerns of the Albanian-speaking community. The international community should help to broker talks on minority rights and hold the government to higher democratic standards over elections and human rights.
NATO's role in containing guerilla activity from the Kosovo side of the border is crucial. Within Macedonia it should continue its existing training and support programs, and be prepared to consider an active role in support of the Macedonian security forces against further rebel activity if the country's government so requests. But the NATO allies must recognize the need to maintain primacy for a political rather than military solution.Albania
Albania's preoccupations are internal, as it struggles to establish the rule of law, battle endemic corruption, restructure its economy and build the basic institutions of governance. Western efforts in support of strategies to stem the flow of illegal weapons and other forms of trafficking are essential.
While Albania has made important strides in restoring essential order, the central challenges facing Albania include restructuring an economy severely hampered by outdated and obsolete industry; filling the social vacuum left by the collapse of a rigid authoritarian state; combating crime and corruption and disarming the civilian population; and balancing the newly enhanced sense of Albanian national consciousness throughout the southern Balkans with respect for the multi-ethnic nature of the region and the integrity of surrounding states.
Albania's neighbours - Greece, Bulgaria, Turkey, Macedonia and Italy - and the administrators of Kosovo, should take urgent steps to strengthen their cooperation, in particular in closer border monitoring, over the problem of illegal trafficking of people, drugs and weapons through Albania. The provision of logistical and communications equipment for use against illegal trafficking, and help in establishing a regional centre against illegal trafficking in Albania, would be particularly valuable.Regional Cooperation and the Stability Pact
For the foreseeable future, regional cooperation in the Balkans is more likely to develop incrementally, from the ground up rather than architecturally, from the top down. There is an ingrained suspicion of grander regional organisations - but plenty of scope for bilateral and small group multilateral cooperation in a variety of economic areas (especially infrastructure, border controls and trade agreements), while security arrangements and cross-border cultural ties are also fertile areas for such programs.
The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, welcomed in 1999 by some as a latter day Marshall Plan, was meant to improve coordination of international assistance while emphasising regional cooperation. But, without significant resources or much planning or implementation capacity of its own, the Pact has so far failed to live up to expectations. For the Stability Pact to play a more effective role in building regional growth and cooperation it will need to focus its efforts better and determine where it offers a comparative advantage.Europe
Europe is well positioned to take a coordinated and forward-looking approach to the Balkans, but it cannot simply hope that a "common European home" will cure all the region's ills. Both the EU and the Balkan countries face much steeper challenges than they have publicly acknowledged in working toward eventual accession, and the EU will need to closely focus its immediate assistance to generate tangible benefits and maintain the momentum for reform. Washington's increasingly distant approach to Balkans diplomacy gives the Europeans new opportunities to set the necessary conflict prevention agenda, but it is hard to break old habits of doing too little too late.
The major European countries and institutions, like other key international actors, should adopt a less negative approach toward the holding of final and future status discussions in the region, and be more open-minded about possible outcomes. By continuing to insist upon the retention of the FRY in some form and to oppose the creation of any new states, the major European actors are jeopardising their role as honest brokers in such discussions.
If the U.S. seeks to continue to limit its military engagement in the region, Europe will need to establish just how much it is prepared to do in the region, either by assuming a larger role in the NATO operation or considering an operation that is not strictly NATO-led - a dangerous path. NATO, the OSCE and the EU need to work collaboratively to help militaries in the region reduce troops strength, improve equipment, professionalise, move toward partnership with Western military structures and become partners with a stake in regional security.
In terms of membership of the EU, there needs to be a clearer and more realistic acknowledgment on both sides of the enormous difficulties involved for the Balkans countries in meeting EU accession criteria. The EU should focus on efforts that have the best prospects for generating job creation and short-term economic growth in the region to maintain the momentum for reform, including clarification of property rights, a decision to relax the rules on investment guarantees for new investments in the Balkans and organising standard rules on dispute settlement.The United States
The U.S. has been a periodically reluctant, but often indispensable, force in the Balkans. More vigorous U.S. diplomatic and military leadership proved essential in transforming the disastrous international community policies of the early- and mid-1990s into the far more effective approaches of the last several years.
The current U.S. approach to the Balkans - seemingly designed with limiting diplomatic and military engagement in the region as a central goal - risks both alienating allies and creating a more dangerous situation on the ground. Washington should not become so obsessed with avoiding "mission creep" that it compromises the ability of its forces in the region to effectively prevent renewed conflict. Given its immediate interests in the region, and the scope of American military capabilities, the continuing deployment of U.S. forces in the Balkans is a modest investment.
The next round of NATO expansion will carry great political import in the region, and U.S. views toward expanding the alliance will be viewed as a barometer of Washington's willingness to reach out to South Eastern Europe. The U.S. should maintain pressure on Belgrade to reject unacceptable policies such as its support for extremist elements in Bosnia and a continuing pattern of discrimination against minorities, while developing a comprehensive economic assistance strategy for providing the FRY technical assistance to carry out privatisation and other reform efforts. The U.S. should also reconsider its blanket rejection of potential joint KFOR-FRY patrols in southern Serbia.Russia
Russia's engagement in the Balkans during the last decade has proved a decidedly mixed blessing for all parties involved, often deeply complicated by Russia's own social and economic transformation. While Russia's resources are more limited at this juncture than that of the EU and the United States, it can still play an enduring and positive role in the region.
Russia should take an active role in encouraging Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo to resolve their final and future status issues peacefully, with protection for minority rights and a shared understanding by parties to a settlement that the territorial integrity of new states must be respected. Russia should also maintain its peacekeeping presence in the region, and take great care to ensure that its assistance to Macedonia, whatever form it takes, does not inadvertently exacerbate tensions between Macedonia's Slav and Albanian communities.The United Nations
The Balkans have been a difficult crucible for the United Nations. In many ways, the events over the last decade have cut to the very core of the role the international community wants the UN to play in the modern world. The UN's relative effectiveness in carrying out its civil administrative duties in Kosovo, and its more limited role in Bosnia, will have a positive impact on the future of these societies. While these tasks rarely draw the same international attention as the use of military force, they are every bit as important in establishing the underlying conditions for regional stability. The UN still has a considerable way to go in developing effective and streamlined methods for getting such important operations quickly up to speed, and developing more important systems along these lines will be vital to the success of future operations.
NATO
While NATO only entered the Balkans militarily with reluctance, since the war in Bosnia it has become a cornerstone for maintaining stability in the region. NATO's military muscle made peace possible on the ground in Bosnia and Kosovo, and has been essential in keeping Macedonia from descending into wider conflict. One can also make the argument that the successful NATO military intervention in Kosovo during 1999, for all the controversy it generated, helped speed the demise of former Yugoslav President Milosevic, and put Serbia on a much faster track to normalisation.
There is increasing European concern that the Bush Administration is eager to distance U.S. forces from the Balkans, while expressing reluctance to see NATO robustly exercise its respective mandates in the region. Any NATO force reductions in its peacekeeping commitments should occur only within the context of regular NATO reviews as has been the case with all previous force reductions.
The U.S. should clearly understand that even relatively small deployments of its peacekeepers send out a larger and more powerful message to actors in the Balkans (and to NATO allies as well), regarding the U.S. commitment to regional stability and the ability to dominate any escalation in the conflict. It would be unfortunate if the Bush Administration desire to minimise foreign "entanglements" ultimately helps create the conditions that lead to a need for greater U.S. military involvement on the ground to stem renewed conflict.
NATO's long-term effort to partner with militaries in the region is also a vital part of regional stability. Efforts to help shape smaller, more professional and civilian controlled militaries throughout South Eastern Europe has been of great utility, and the efforts should continue and intensify efforts to rid the region of the paramilitary forces that have been a source of so much destruction and violence over the last decade.The International Financial Institutions
The international financial institutions, especially the World Bank, have both the authority and capability to exercise critical leverage over the Balkan states' economies. Their actions could determine not only direct access to concessional finance, but also the Balkans' success in mobilising supplementary financial resources, their ability to manage economic reform and their credibility in seeking to attract private investment. While EU association remains a relatively long-term project, building a constructive relationship with the international financial institutions will need to be an important short and medium term dimension of the Balkans' international engagement and their attempts to stabilise their economies. Without stabilisation, there will be no economic growth.
Towards a Lasting Balkans Peace
The international community has a vital role to play in assisting the forces of peace, and must avoid the temptation to let its attention drift at a time when the foundation for a more lasting peace is possible but far from completed. There is a dangerous tendency in Western capitals to marginalize, postpone or just ignore those issues not currently dominating the headlines.
Slobodan Milosevic was not the only source of instability in the Balkans region. Efforts to deal with the underlying sources of tension are key to keeping conflict from erupting and spreading. And no task is more central or profound for the international community than peacefully guiding the process to resolve final status issues for the FRY, and putting Bosnia and Macedonia on sounder constitutional footing. While policymakers often wince at the intractability and complexity of these issues, such fundamental structural challenges are the great unfinished business that Yugoslavia's dissolution set in motion.
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http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/book.cfmAfter Milosevic: A Practical Agenda for Lasting Balkans Peace
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