[C] END NOTE

[29] TENSIONS RISE IN MONTENEGRO AND KOSOVO
by Patrick Moore

Policies of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic have recently led to a dramatic rise in
tensions in Montenegro and Kosovo. The question is whether the outcome will be violent.

Milosevic enters 1998 with a major political difficulty in Serbia out of the way. The victory of
his ally Milan Milutinovic in last month's Serbian presidential vote ensures that the Serbian
government will do Milosevic's bidding for the next several years. Although Milutinovic's
ultra-nationalist opponent, Serbian Radical Party leader Vojislav Seselj, will continue to be
a major figure in Serbian politics, the levers of power will be well out of his reach.

Three other potential sources of trouble for Milosevic nonetheless remain, beginning with
the power struggle among the Bosnian Serbs. The hard-liners loyal to Radovan Karadzic
are blocking attempts by Prime Minister - designate Mladen Ivanic -- the nominee of
Republika Srpska President Biljana Plavsic -- to form a government of technocrats with
all-party support.

It seems clear, however, that neither Bosnian Serb faction is strong enough to decisively
defeat the other. The stalemate is likely to continue for some time, which will enable
Milosevic to use the divide-and-rule tactics he has often applied with quarrelsome Serbian
politicians in Croatia and Bosnia. Ivanic told RFE/RL recently that the current political in-
fighting among the Bosnian Serbs reminds him very much of the debilitating political
struggle among the Croatian Serbs shortly before the fall of the Republika Srpska Krajina
in 1995.

The Yugoslav president faces a situation in his second trouble spot, Montenegro, that
could pose a more direct threat to his power than does the imbroglio among the Bosnian
Serbs. Montenegro and Serbia form the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and an
independent-minded Montenegrin government could undermine his plans to strengthen
his presidential powers at the expense of the individual republics.

His ally in Podgorica, President Momir Bulatovic, lost the 19 October presidential vote to
Milo Djukanovic. The new head of state wants autonomy from Belgrade and an end to
international sanctions, which have crippled the tiny mountain republic's tourist and
shipping industries. Djukanovic argues that Milosevic wants to run Montenegro like a
colony and that his policies are responsible for the hated sanctions.

Milosevic seems unwilling to accept the result of the Montenegrin vote and has turned up
the pressure on Djukanovic in the runup to the 15 January Montenegrin presidential
inauguration. The pro-Milosevic media have sought to intimidate Djukanovic, whom they
wrongly accuse of seeking outright independence for Montenegro. The Belgrade courts,
for their part, have questioned the validity of the October vote.

More seriously, there have been strong suggestions from the Bulatovic camp that the
former president's supporters may resort to violence rather than yield power to their rivals.
Djukanovic and the pro-reform Montenegrin government expect Milosevic to use his time-
honored tactic of bussing in well-paid, armed demonstrators from outside Montenegro to
intimidate the new government or even to prevent it from taking office.

It is unclear, however, whether Milosevic is prepared to use violence to keep Bulatovic in
office or whether he is simply trying to bully Djukanovic. The Belgrade daily "Nasa Borba"
wrote on 7 January that Milosevic has accepted defeat and plans to name Bulatovic as
Yugoslav foreign minister. But Djukanovic's allies in the Montenegrin government
arwhether he is simply trying to bully Djukanovic.  [ The Belgrade daily "Nasa Borba" wrote on 7 January
that Milosevic has accepted defeat and plans to name Bulatovic as Yugoslav foreign minister. But Djukanovic's allies in th ]

The third problem confronting Milosevic is Kosovo. He has kept the restive mainly ethnic
Albanian province under tight police control since he abolished its autonomy in 1989. The
moderate Albanian leadership under shadow-state President Ibrahim Rugova, for its part,
continues to advocate non-violence and seeks foreign support. Rugova, however, has
achieved nothing in his quest to restore Kosovo's autonomy.

Over the past year, the clandestine Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK), has become bolder in
its attacks on government and police buildings, Serbian officials, and ethnic Albanians
whom the UCK considers collaborators. Many observers report that the UCK has captured
the imagination of many young Kosovars, who regard Rugova's policies as having
reached a dead end.

The UCK, moreover, may have won political and military as well as psychological victories.
On 28 November, some of its uniformed, armed members felt confident enough to deliver
a political speech in public. On 4 January, the UCK issued a declaration saying that the
armed struggle for the liberation of Kosovo and its unification with Albania has begun. And
Belgrade's BETA news agency reported this week that the town of Srbica and some other
areas are now firmly in UCK hands, at least under the cover of darkness.

There may be signs, however, that Milosevic is planning to intervene in Kosovo with
massive force, as he did in Croatia in 1991 and in Bosnia the following year. Some media
reports suggest that the departure of Serbian police from Srbica and several other
communities in Kosovo could be a prelude to an intervention by the Yugoslav army or by
paramilitaries like Zeljko Raznatovic, better known as "Arkan." The military or Arkan might
claim real or imagined UCK violence as a pretext for waging war on the local Albanian
population and for conducting a policy of "ethnic cleansing."

09-01-98