WHY THE KOSOVO CRISIS NOW?

WHY THE KOSOVO CRISIS NOW?

by Patrick Moore

     The Kosovo imbroglio appears to have entered a new stage following a weekend of
violence that left at least 20 dead. There are at least three reasons for the change in the
Kosovo political scene, the most important of which is the emergence of the Kosovo
Liberation Army (UCK) as a key player over the past year.
     Over the weekend of 28 February-1 March, Serbian police sealed off at least 10 ethnic
Albanian villages in the Srbica-Glogovac-Drenica region west of Pristina. Serbian police
spokesmen said that the action was aimed at capturing "terrorists" (i.e. the UCK) who had
ambushed and killed four Serbian policemen on 28 February.
     Kosovar spokesmen, however, charged that the Serbs were themselves carrying out
indiscriminate terror with automatic weapons, armored vehicles, and helicopters against
civilians, including women and children. Veton Surroi, Kosovo's most prominent journalist,
said on 2 March that the special Serbian police involved in the crackdown are veterans of
the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and hence are "almost paramilitaries."
     But how is it that matters have come to such a point? After all, for many years Kosovo
was known as "the time bomb that does not explode."
     There were two main reasons why Kosovo remained relatively quiet for most of the
time since then-Serbian (now Yugoslav) President Slobodan Milosevic destroyed the
mainly ethnic Albanian province's autonomy in 1989. First, the Kosovar leadership under
Ibrahim Rugova and his Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) held the unquestioned
loyalty of the province's ethnic Albanians. Rugova and his party are committed to policies
of non-violence and of "internationalization," or of achieving a solution by bringing foreign
pressure to bear on Milosevic.
     Second, the Serbian authorities had no need to "crack down" on Kosovo or stage
military actions as they did in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia for the simple reason that the
Serbs already held all the levers of power in Kosovo. The only "threat" to Serbian authority
was Rugova's shadow state, which, in any event, busied itself with matters such as
education, health care, and political feuds among its leaders.
     All that has changed since at least the end of 1996. At approximately that point, the
shadowy UCK changed its tactics from carrying out occasional, random and hit-and-run
raids to conducting more frequent, well-planned, and well-executed moves against
individual Serbs, Serbian institutions, or Albanians whom the UCK regards as
collaborators. The UCK has meanwhile successfully established a geographical power
base in much of the area between Pristina and the Albanian frontier, and some
communities there have become no-go areas for Serbs, at least at night. Armed incidents
have increased in this region, moreover, in recent weeks.
     There are three basic reasons for the UCK's emergence as a force to be reckoned
with. First, the consensus has grown, particularly among young Kosovars, that Rugova's
policies have reached a dead end. A spokesman for the LDK admitted in London on 1
March that the peaceful policy "has brought no results."
     Second is what might be called the lesson of the Dayton agreement, which ended the
Bosnian war at the end of 1995. Some Kosovars argue that the international community
intervened to impose a peace in Bosnia only because the foreigners had come to regard
the continuing violence there as unacceptable. According to this argument, the major
powers will intervene in Kosovo only in response to an armed conflict there. Ergo, this train
of thought concludes, the Kosovars must provoke a war with the Serbs if the Kosovo
question is ever to attract the attention of the international community.
     The third development involves the changes in Albania over the past year. Before the
collapse of law and order there exactly one year ago, President Sali Berisha conducted a
policy that was supportive of the Kosovars, who knew that they had friends in official
Tirana. Berisha openly backed Rugova's goals and peaceful policies, and Rugova was a
frequent visitor to Albania. In the past year, however, a Socialist government has come to
power that has not always been clear regarding its policy towards Kosovo. Many Kosovars
fear that Prime Minister Fatos Nano wants to cut a deal with Belgrade at Pristina's
expense. Furthermore --and perhaps most importantly -- the collapse of law and order in
Albania provided a ready source of abundant and cheap weapons for Kosovar guerrilla
fighters.
     There are, moreover, at least two additional reasons for the timing of the Serbian
crackdown besides the increased violence by the UCK. First, the shadow state's
presidential and parliamentary elections are slated for 22 March, and Milosevic may want
to provoke confusion in order to ensure that the vote is postponed indefinitely. A
successful election, by contrast, would mean a Kosovar leadership with unquestioned
legitimacy to challenge Serbia in international forums.
     A second reason has been pinpointed by Surroi and by independent Serbian journalists
alike, namely that the major powers may have led Milosevic to think that he has a green
light in Kosovo. Those who support this view note that U.S. special envoy Robert Gelbard
on his recent trip to the region stressed that Kosovo is Serbia's internal affair and criticized
the UCK as well as the Serbian police. U.S. Secretary of State James Baker delivered a
similarly ambiguous message to Belgrade in June 1991. The Yugoslav army attacked
Slovenia shortly thereafter.

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