Prepared by European Action Council for Peace in the Balkans and

Kosovo:
                         From Crisis to a Permanent Solution

                                          Prepared by
                 European Action Council for Peace in the Balkans
                                                and
                         Public International Law & Policy Group
                of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

                                    1 November 1997

About the authors

This report has been prepared under the auspices of the European Action Council for
Peace in the Balkans and the Public International Law & Policy Group of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace. The findings and recommendations presented in this
report are partially based on discussions that took place during the "Forum on Kosovo,"
which the Carnegie Endowment and the European Action Council organised in Vienna,
Austria on 18-20 April 1997. At the Forum, a group of specialists evaluated the various
aspects and potential solutions to the Kosovo crisis. Contact information for the Carnegie
Endowment and the European Action Council can be found at the end of this report.
 

Contents

Executive Summary

I. Introduction

II. Background
II-a. Determining factors
II-b. Recent developments
II-c.Recent initiatives

III. Crafting a permanent resolution of the Kosovo crisis
III-a. Status quo
III-b. Improvement of the human rights situation
III-c. Special status/autonomy
III-d. Equal status in the Yugoslav Federation
III-e. Partition
III-f. Independence

IV. The process towards a permanent solution
IV-a. Confidence-building measures
IV-b. Dialogue and negotiations

V. Recommendations

Executive Summary

The current state of relations between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians_based on a system of
apartheid grounded in ethnic hatred and growing fear_is untenable and the coexistence of
two completely separate and unequal systems in Kosovo_the official Serbian state and the
Albanian shadow-state structures_can not persist. While both Serbs and Kosovo
Albanians claim sovereignty over Kosovo's territory, they have diametrically opposed
political objectives. This political impasse and the growing impatience amongst the
Albanian population could easily escalate into violence.

Neglecting a resolution of the Kosovo crisis dangerously risks a conflagration that might
spread beyond Kosovo's borders. Escalation of the crisis could have severe
consequences for regional and European security and stability. Although the international
community understands the high stakes involved, it has so far shown little inclination to
earnestly address the problem, nor the determination to ensure a peaceful solution of the
Kosovo crisis. In view of the dynamic situation in Serbia, the challenges to the current
leadership of Kosovo, and the deteriorating state of the Serbian economy, strong and
united international action is both timely and necessary.

The Serbs and Kosovo Albanians sharply disagree over the various approaches to
resolving the problem and the nature of the permanent status of Kosovo. In theory, there
are several options for a permanent solution of the Kosovo crisis: status quo; improvement
of the human rights situation; special status/autonomy; equal status in the Yugoslav
Federation; partition; and independence.

In view of the rigid positions of the Serbian authorities and the Kosovo Albanians, the
international community should initiate and facilitate a process that will ultimately lead to a
peaceful settlement and a permanent constitutional solution to the crisis. This process
should include (1) confidence-building measures to create a climate of trust between the
Kosovo Albanians and Serbs; and (2) dialogue and negotiations.

To prevent an escalation of the Kosovo crisis, and to initiate and facilitate the path toward
peaceful coexistence, several specific steps are recommended:

· The international community should initiate and actively promote a process designated to
lead to a permanent solution of the Kosovo problem, including confidence-building
measures, a political dialogue, and negatiotions.

· The international community should avoid advocating any specific option for the
permanent status of Kosovo and leave it up to the parties to reach agreement.

· The international community should demand the immediate and full restoration of the civil
and human rights of the Kosovo Albanians.

· The international community should use existing leverages to encourage progress
towards a solution.

· The international community should define a common policy and appoint a high-level
special envoy.

· Additional assistance should be made available to support the democratisation process
in Serbia, to strengthen civil society, and to improve the social and economic situation in
Kosovo.

I. Introduction

In reaction to the unconstitutional abolition of Kosovo's autonomy by the Serbian
authorities in 1989, the majority Albanian population in Kosovo withdrew from all
participation in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), proclaimed the
independent "Republic of Kosova," and built parallel administrative structures, including a
government, parliament, limited health care, education, and social services, as well as
taxation. The Kosovo Albanians now suffer severe repression and maltreatment by
Serbian security forces, with systematic human rights violations, intimidation, and police
terror occurring on a daily basis.

The coexistence of two completely separate and unequal systems in Kosovo_the official
Serbian state and the Albanian shadow-state structures_can not persist. Relations
between Albanians and Serbs are not based on tolerance and mutual respect, but on a
system of apartheid grounded in ethnic hatred and growing fear. As such, a total lack of
communication between the two communities and their leaders characterises the political,
economic, and social landscape in Kosovo.

Both the Serbs and the Kosovo Albanians claim sovereignty over Kosovo's territory. The
Serbs' claim is based on legal, historic and religious arguments. They consider Kosovo to
be the "cradle" of their nation. It is the birthplace of the Serbian Orthodox Church and
Kosovo Polje, just outside Pristina, was the site of the famous battle of 1389. Further, the
Serbs fear that the growing Albanian population will erode their control and jeopardise the
rights of the Serb minority in Kosovo.

With approximately 90 percent of the inhabitants of Kosovo being ethnic Albanians who
have lived in the region for centuries, the Albanian claim on Kosovo is based on the right
of self-determination. The Kosovo Albanians assert that Kosovo, like all former constituent
units of the SFRY, has the right to independence after the disintegration of the SFRY.

The Serbs and Kosovo Albanians have diametrically opposed political objectives.
According to the Serbian government, Kosovo is and will remain part of Serbia. It
considers the problems in and the status of Kosovo to be an internal matter. According to
Belgrade, the problem should be solved through a dialogue between official
representatives of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and
representatives of the Albanian "national minority," under the condition that the latter
accept the existing, uniform constitutional system, recognise the territorial integrity of the
state, and participate in the political institutions of Serbia and the FRY. If the Kosovo
Albanians accept this, they can enjoy the rights of a minority, including limited autonomy
under the Serbian constitution.

The Kosovo Albanians do not want to live under Serb rule and refuse to participate in the
political systems of Serbia and the FRY. Most Kosovo Albanians strive for independence
and international recognition of the "Republic of Kosova." They have adopted a dual policy
of passive resistance against the Serbian administration and of demanding international
involvement in the process of finding a solution to the Kosovo crisis.

In view of the rigid positions of the parties and the growing impatience amongst the
Albanian population, the present political impasse could easily escalate into open conflict.
Neglecting a resolution of the Kosovo crisis dangerously risks a conflagration that might
spread beyond Kosovo's borders. Involvement of Macedonia and Albania could
destabilise the whole region. Subsequent refugee flows would also tax the resources of
Western Europe. Escalation of the Kosovo crisis could therefore have severe
consequences for regional and European security and stability.

Although the international community understands the high stakes involved, it has so far
shown little inclination to earnestly address the problem, nor the necessary determination
to ensure a peaceful solution of the Kosovo crisis. In light of the dynamic situation in
Serbia, increasing challenges to the current leadership of Kosovo, and the deteriorating
state of the Serbian economy, strong and united international action is both timely and
necessary.
 

II. Background

In addressing the Kosovo crisis it is important to take into account several determining
factors, recent developments, and recent initiatives that affect the nature of the conflict and
opportunities for its resolution.

II-a. Determining Factors

Demographics

In Kosovo, an estimated 1.5 to 2 million Albanians vastly outnumber the 150,000 to
200,000 Serbs. As the Albanian birth rate is far greater than the Serbs', the Albanian
majority in Kosovo will only increase. The population of Kosovo currently constitutes
approximately 20-25 percent of the total population of the FRY. Given present birth rates,
ethnic Serbs could be a minority within Serbia by the year 2020.

It is estimated that since 1990 more than 400,000 Kosovo Albanians have migrated to
Macedonia and west European countries to escape high unemployment and economic
depression, and to avoid military service in the FRY army. Likewise, some Kosovo Serbs
have departed to other parts of Serbia in search of better employment opportunities.
Attempts by the Serbian authorities to "re-colonise" the province, including efforts to
resettle Krajina refugees in Kosovo, have failed to alter the demographic reality.

Religion

Although religion is not a cause of the Kosovo crisis, religious arguments are sometimes
used to define social antagonisms and to enhance national and political claims by both
sides. Christian Orthodoxy is the dominant religion among the Serb population in Kosovo,
while most Kosovo Albanians are Muslims.

Economics

Kosovo has many natural resources, including lead, zinc, silver, nickel, ferronickel and
coal. A rich mining area is situated in northern Kosovo.

As in Serbia proper, the economic situation in Kosovo is severe and continues to
deteriorate.
Over seventy percent of Kosovo Albanians are unemployed, and the figures are not much
better for Serbs living in Kosovo. Economic activity takes place mainly in grey areas of the
economy. The level of foreign investment is insignificant. Since most Kosovo Albanians
have been replaced by Serbs in public jobs, they are primarily supported by hard currency
sent home by the approximately 600,000 to 700,000 Kosovo Albanians abroad.

The "Albanian question"

The dream of unification_the creation of a "Greater Albania" which would unite all
Albanians in one state_cannot be neglected. The number of Albanians outside of Albania
almost equals the number of inhabitants in Albania itself. While approximately 3.4 million
Albanians live in Albania, almost 2 million live in Kosovo; between 500,000 and 600,000 in
western Macedonia; and approximately 60,000 in Montenegro. Significant numbers of
Albanians can be found in southern Serbia, northern Greece, and several countries in
Western Europe. The creation of a "Greater Albania" seems geographically feasible
because most Albanians are concentrated in ethnically homogeneous areas bordering
Albania.

At this point in time, however, support for a "Greater Albania" is negligible. International
pressure against the concept, the failure of attempts to create a "Greater Croatia" and
"Greater Serbia," and the recent political turmoil and economic insolvency in Albania have
diminished_at least for now_the attractiveness of a union of all Albanians in one state.

II-b. Recent Developments

Recent developments in Kosovo

Although the Kosovo Albanians have used largely non-violent resistance to pursue their
political aims, many have begun to question this strategy, as it has not led to any progress.
While the Dayton Accords have rewarded Serbian aggression with a legitimate sub-state
entity in Bosnia, the Kosovo Albanians' patience has brought no results.

More specifically, since early 1996, several influential intellectuals and politicians have
challenged the non-violent tactics promoted by Ibrahim Rugova, president of Kosovo's
shadow state and chairman of the Democratic League of Kosova (LDK). The
Parliamentary Party of Kosova (PP), led by Adem Demaci, for instance, criticises the
passive policy of the LDK by encouraging a program of "active non-violent resistance."
Further, Demaci has proposed the creation of "Balkania"_a confederation that would
include Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia, and potentially Albania, Bosnia, Macedonia,
Sandzak, and Vojvodina.

Other critics advocate an intifada-type protest movement. The most radical opposition
group, the Kosova Liberation Army (UCK), carries out an armed campaign for an
independent Kosovo, assassinating representatives of the Serb regime, as well as
Albanian collaborators. Some have argued the UCK might start a full-scale guerrilla war or
become a major political force in Kosovo depending on the perceived near-term success
of Rugova's non-violent approach.

In May 1997, Rugova postponed, for the second time, the elections for the Kosovo
Albanians' parallel parliament in order to avoid any provocation. He extended the mandate
of the current parliament by decree and announced that new elections would be held in
December 1997. If by then no dialogue has started with the Serbian authorities, it
might_for political reasons_be impossible for Rugova to postpone these elections for a
third time. The holding of elections could, however, lead to serious incidents.

The Kosovo Albanians have consistently refused to participate in any Serbian or FRY
elections, arguing that this would imply recognition of the Serbian and FRY authorities, as
well as the legitimacy of Serbian rule in Kosovo. They have, thus, resisted pressures of the
international community, which considered the Kosovo Albanians' votes crucial in securing
victory of the democratic opposition in Serbia.

Recent developments in Serbia

The realisation of the fact that_in view of demographic developments and the high costs of
maintaining a large security force in Kosovo_the present situation cannot go on forever
has prompted a debate among Serbian intellectuals over the question of whether Serbia
would not be better off without the Kosovo Albanians. In July 1996, the President of the
Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences publicly referred to the possibility of a partition of
Kosovo between Albanians and Serbs. Dobrica Cosic, who was later to become President
of the FRY, had expressed similar views many years before.

The democratic opposition in Serbia has so far failed to propose a clear policy on Kosovo.
This may be explained by considerations for nationalist elements and the fear of a
backlash at future elections. Due to the continuing Kosovo Albanian boycott of all Serbian
and FRY elections, Serbian opposition parties advocating a constructive policy concerning
Kosovo are unlikely to gain any additional electoral support for their position from the
Kosovo Albanians.

Recent developments in Albania

Although the Albanian authorities permit the Kosovo Albanians a quasi-diplomatic
presence in Tirana, they have never recognised the parallel state or officially supported the
Kosovo Albanian's quest for independence.

The instability and lawlessness in Albania resulting from the collapse of the financial
pyramid schemes and subsequent developments have reduced the attractiveness of
Albania and its role of "motherland" of all Albanians in the Balkans. In fact, many Albanians
from Kosovo and Macedonia have stopped looking to Albania as a possible leading force
in the sub-region. The greatest danger to emerge from the Albanian chaos is the
increased availability of small arms that can easily be sold and smuggled to Kosovo.

Recent developments in Macedonia

The relationship between Albanians in Macedonia and Kosovo has traditionally been
closer than contacts between them and the Albanians in Albania. Most Albanians in
Macedonia support the idea of an independent Kosovo and are willing to actively help the
Kosovo Albanians in the pursuit of that objective.

Although some Albanian political parties are represented in the Macedonian government
and parliament, more extremist Albanian parties are gaining influence as a result of
alleged discriminatory policies by the Macedonian government. Furthermore, the
purported development of quasi-autonomous Albanian political and social institutions in
western Macedonia has increased tensions and fears of separatism. The Albanians in
Macedonia support their Kosovo kin with materials, such as goods for the parallel
education system. Eventually, a "shadow union" could develop between western
Macedonia and the Albanian parallel state in Kosovo.

Recent international developments

The recent deterioration of the situation in Kosovo has increased international attention to
this problem. The international community has repeatedly called on the authorities in
Belgrade and the leadership of the Kosovo Albanian community to join in a peaceful
dialogue. Regarding Kosovo's status, the international community supports neither
independence nor maintenance of the status quo. Instead, it favours an enhanced status
for Kosovo within the FRY, fully protecting the rights of the Albanian population in
accordance with standards of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) and the United Nations Charter.

So far, international involvement in the Kosovo crisis has lacked both determination and
coordination. Although United States (US) officials have stated that improvement of the
situation in Kosovo is one of the conditions for lifting of the "outer wall of sanctions"
imposed on the FRY, the only achievement of US policy has been the opening of a US
Information Centre in Pristina in June 1996. With the restoration of full diplomatic relations
between European Union (EU) member states and the FRY in April 1996, and the granting
of EU autonomous trade preferences to the FRY for the year 1997, critics fear that the
"outer wall" is crumbling. The EU, however, makes further development of friendly
relations with the FRY dependent on inter alia progress concerning the Kosovo issue.

Apart from the US Information Centre, no other government, intergovernmental agency, or
foreign media is permitted permanent representation in Kosovo. The OSCE long-term
mission was forced to close in 1993 and attempts by the EU to open an office in Pristina
have, so far, been unsuccessful. Few non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are
allowed to operate in the province.

II-c. Recent Initiatives

The education agreement (1 September 1996)

Following years of segregation during which Albanian children in Kosovo did not attend
state schools, the Vatican humanitarian community of Sant'Egidio mediated an education
agreement between Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Rugova on 1 September
1996. Both leaders committed to "commence normalisation" of the educational system.
The agreement envisages "the return of Albanian school children and teachers to the
schools," and designates a committee of three Serbs and three Kosovo Albanians to
implement the agreement.

To date, the education agreement has not been implemented. Kosovo Albanian children
and teachers have not returned to official school buildings and the committee has met only
three times, without results. The Kosovo Albanians accuse the Serbs of preventing
implementation of the agreement after having exploited its signing for political gain. The
Serbs, on the other hand, claim that the Kosovo Albanians are mainly interested in
returning to the school buildings, but not in discussing common curricula and other
technical issues.

On 1 October 1997, Serbian riot police used force to disperse Kosovo Albanian students
who participated in a peaceful demonstration to protest the failure to implement the
education agreement. In run-up marches to this demonstration, the Serbian police also
beat up and detained some participants. Following the violent reaction of the Serbian
police, the students heeded the calls by Rugova and Western diplomats to postpone their
planned daily demonstrations. On 29 October, a demonstration organised by the
Independent Student Union passed off without incidents.

Serb-Albanian Kosovo Roundtable (New York, 7-9 April 1997)

Various informal talks have been organised between Serbian and Kosovo Albanian
delegations, mainly by international NGOs.

On 7-9 April 1997, Serbian opposition leaders and Kosovo Albanian politicians met in New
York for discussions on Serb-Albanian relations and issues of mutual concern in Kosovo.
The participants agreed that the Kosovo problem can only be resolved by mutual accord
reached through dialogue that is entered into with no preconditions or prejudgement of
possible outcomes. They stated that the current lack of confidence between the sides
cannot be overcome, nor a lasting settlement reached without international
encouragement and assistance.

While their joint statement indicates good will on both sides and represents a positive step
in the complicated process toward a solution, it falls short of necessary action. Moreover,
no representative of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) attended the meeting, and
although participants recognised the value of further discussion, no timetable was set.

III. Crafting a Permanent Resolution of the Kosovo Crisis

There are_at least theoretically_a number of options for a permanent solution of the
Kosovo crisis:

· Status quo

· Improvement of the human rights situation

· Special status/autonomy

· Equal status in the Yugoslav Federation

· Partition

· Independence.

III-a. Status quo

The status quo is inherently unstable and cannot last beyond the near term. In the
absence of real progress towards reaching a settlement of the Kosovo crisis, support for
Kosovo Albanian leaders who are agitating for more active non-violent resistance or even
violence against the Serbian security forces will increase. Augmenting the unstable nature
of the status quo is the fact that the one tangible success of Rugova's policy_the
education agreement_has not been implemented.

In the long term, the status quo might also become too costly for the Serbian
government_for economic and political reasons. The financial burden of maintaining
thousands of active duty forces and reserves in Kosovo is enormous; the "outer wall of
sanctions" is destructive for the Serbian economy; and the Serb minority in Kosovo might
hold the current Serbian leadership accountable for the increasingly hostile and insecure
environment in which they are living.

III-b. Improvement of the human rights situation

The least costly solution for the Serbian authorities may be to retain the current political
arrangement between Serbia and Kosovo, but with improvements in human rights
conditions. Such a solution would include ending police repression, releasing political
prisoners, re-employing Kosovo Albanians in public positions, reintegrating Kosovo's
education and health care systems, and allowing international monitoring agencies, NGOs,
and media to operate in Kosovo.

While at present rejected by the Serbian government, this approach could be acceptable
to some Serbian opposition parties. The Civic Alliance of Serbia (GSS), led by Vesna
Pesic, has indicated that it "is in favour of the existing federal structure of Yugoslavia,
which implies the equality of its federal units, Serbia and Montenegro, and of their
inhabitants, whether they feel that they are Serbs, Montenegrins or that they belong to
other national ethnic groups." Within those bounds the GSS advocates regional autonomy
and equal rights for all citizens of Serbia.

Although this option reduces the risk of violence, it would in effect amount to no more than
a series of confidence-building measures on the part of Serbia and not an end to the
longer-term question of Kosovo's constitutional status. Recognising this dilemma, some
Kosovo Albanians have indicated that improvement of the human rights situation as part
of an interim framework_which would not define the constitutional status of Kosovo, but
rather provide a modus vivendi until agreement on Kosovo's permanent status has been
reached_may serve as the initial platform for a broader dialogue.

III-c. Special status/autonomy

A variety of possible solutions revolve around the provisions of the 1974 Yugoslav
constitution, which granted the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina a status
similar to the SFRY's six republics. Most Kosovo Albanians believe that the previous level
of autonomy, although no longer sufficient as a permanent solution, should be restored
and form the starting point of negotiations on a new arrangement.

Under the 1974 Yugoslav constitution, Kosovo and Vojvodina were given the right to
establish their own constitutions, legislative power, and financial autonomy. The bodies of
executive, legislative, and judicial power (including constitutional courts) were afforded the
same status as those in the republics. Moreover, as the political and legislative process at
the level of the federation was concerned, the autonomous provinces were equal to the six
republics. They were directly represented in the federal parliament, constitutional court,
and presidency. Any alteration of the autonomous provinces' territory or borders required
the consent of the representatives of the provinces themselves.

Some other models of autonomy in Europe that are being discussed include the special
status of South Tyrol/Alto Adige in Italy and the Aland Islands just off the coast of Finland.
The territorial autonomy granted to the Province of South Tyrol_where sixty percent of the
population is German speaking_, as well as guarantees for language rights and equal
access to education and public administration is working to the satisfaction of all sides and
has diffused a political dispute between Italy and Austria.

The Aland Islands, which are mainly populated by peoples of Swedish descent, were first
taken over by Russia and then given to Finland by the League of Nations with the
guarantee of certain rights. These rights include preservation of Swedish as the official
language, internationally guaranteed demilitarisation, and the authority to pass laws apart
from Finland on most matters except foreign affairs.

Each of these examples provide some important precedents, such as the provision of
equal language rights in public education, equal access to public jobs, administrative
autonomy, independent domestic legislation, and demilitarisation. They are, however,
based on totally different circumstances, have been developed in countries with a long
democratic tradition, and can therefore not be directly applied to the Kosovo situation.

III-d. Equal status in the Yugoslav Federation

A more far-reaching step would be to provide Kosovo_and maybe Vojvodina_with a status
in the FRY equal to that of Montenegro and Serbia. This option, which keeps the external
borders of the FRY intact, would seem to be the most equitable and least unrealistic
solution to the problem. Important issues that would have to be addressed include whether
Kosovo should be granted the right to secede and how the rights of the Serb minority living
in Kosovo would be protected.

Despite the objective appeal of a new Yugoslav Federation, Serbia would be extremely
reluctant to give up its federal superiority without significant carrots or sticks being brought
into play by the international community. Resistance could also be expected from
Montenegro, which might be reluctant to share power with a new Albanian dominated
federal unit. Kosovo Albanians, for their part, are concerned that even as a Yugoslav
republic they may be dominated by the more numerous Serbs. Furthermore, they appear
to prefer to abolish any vestiges of the old Yugoslav federal system and base new
arrangements on the changed political realities.

III-e. Partition

This option would grant Kosovo independence in exchange for a redrawing of its borders.
Serbia would retain control over the Serb-inhabited areas in northern Kosovo and some of
the most important historical and religious sites.

Most of Kosovo's material wealth, however, lies in the northern part of the province. The
Kosovo Albanians are unlikely to agree to giving up the most resource-rich portion of their
territory and would almost certainly fight partition. Furthermore, they might demand a
similar partition of those Serbian regions bordering Kosovo that are majority-Albanian
populated.

An additional difficulty would be defining the terms under which a new international
boundary is drawn. Choosing an ethnic, religious, geographic, or historic standard is
certain to cause bitter disagreements. Further, the international community would be
reluctant to continue establishing a precedent for ethnically defined borders, as they have
in Bosnia.

III-f. Independence

The most far-reaching proposal_and the one most Kosovo Albanians prefer_is
internationally recognised independence for the "Republic of Kosova". Some Kosovo
Albanians have further proposed that once Kosovo has attained independent status, it
should unite with Albania.

The Serbian leadership has declared it would act with military means to stop a secession
of Kosovo. Given its economic structure, Kosovo might have difficulties surviving as an
independent state, especially if Serbia were to retain control over part of its northern
territory. Even if their rights would be guaranteed, independence might also lead to the
migration of the Serb minority from Kosovo.

The international community would be unlikely to recognise an independent Kosovo, as it
has no desire to further `balkanise' the Balkans, fearing that independence would inspire
Albanians in Macedonia to attempt a similar act of secession.

Independence would not necessarily lead to merger with Albania. Albania has expressed
little interest in having Kosovo as a constituent province, nor has it given much overt
support to the Albanians' cause in Kosovo. Even if the dream of a "Greater Albania" is still
alive, the recent unrest in Albania has tempered most Kosovo Albanians' interest in joining
up with Albania.

IV. The Process Towards a Permanent Solution

In view of the rigid positions of the Serbian authorities and the Kosovo Albanians, a third
party should initiate and facilitate a process that will ultimately lead to a peaceful settlement
and a permanent political solution to the crisis. This function can best be exercised by the
international community represented by a special envoy. It should use all leverages
available to bring the parties to the negotiating table, promote a peaceful solution, and
extend international guarantees for any permanent constitutional settlement.

The process towards a permanent solution for the Kosovo should include two steps, which
are not mutually exclusive but should be pursued simultaneously:

· Confidence-building between the Kosovo Albanians and Serbs

· Promotion of a dialogue and negotiations between the parties.

IV-a. Confidence-building measures

In order to create a climate of trust and improve the relations between the Kosovo
Albanians and Serbs, several concrete measures should be taken:

· Both parties should express their commitment to a dialogue without preconditions.

· Both parties should re-affirm their commitment to a peaceful, non-violent solution.

· The Kosovo Albanians should commit to a solution that will guarantee the rights of the
Serb minority in Kosovo.

· The Serbian authorities should end police repression and human rights violations in
Kosovo.

· The Serbian authorities should lift the martial law.

· The Serbian authorities should grant amnesty to political prisoners.

· The Serbian army should withdraw from Kosovo towns to the borders.

· The Serbian administration should reopen the schools for Kosovo Albanian pupils and
teachers, in accordance with the education agreement.

· Similar to the education agreement, the Kosovo Albanian and Serbian leaderships
should reach agreements on issues such as health care, employment, housing and
property, media, associations and political parties, the judicial system, police, and military
service.

· The Serbian authorities should allow the opening of offices of the EU and international
humanitarian organisations; the re-admission of the OSCE long-term mission; and the
permanent presence of international human rights groups and journalists in Kosovo.

These confidence-building measures would defuse tension and normalise conditions in
Kosovo. They could be formalised as an "interim framework," which would not define the
constitutional status of Kosovo, but rather provide a modus vivendi until agreement on
Kosovo's permanent status has been reached.

IV-b. Dialogue and negotiations

A genuine dialogue between the Serbian government and the Kosovo Albanian leadership
should be started. The scope of issues covered in such talks should ultimately include all
aspects to be addressed in a permanent settlement of the crisis. Several basic issues
should be agreed upon to begin a dialogue and negotiations.

The problem - Both sides should acknowledge that a problem exists in Kosovo.

The principles - Dialogue and negotiations should be conducted without preconditions and
be in accordance with the Helsinki principles.

The parties - The participants in the dialogue and negotiations should be identified and
mutually agreed upon. Apart from the Serbian authorities and the Kosovo Albanians,
participants could include representatives of the FRY, Montenegro, the Kosovo Serbs, and
the Serbian opposition.

Mediation - A mutually acceptable foreign mediator should be identified to assist in the
development of a dialogue and in the negotiations.

V. Recommendations

The international community should initiate and actively promote a process designed to
lead to a permanent solution of the Kosovo problem. The international community can play
a vital role in initiating and facilitating confidence-building measures, a political dialogue,
and negotiations; as well as guaranteeing agreements between the parties.

The international community should avoid advocating any specific option for the
permanent status of Kosovo and leave it to the parties to reach agreement. The
international community should not burden the process by promoting the option it
prefers_enhanced autonomy_ since this option is rejected by both sides. The parties
themselves should define the permanent status of Kosovo. International promotion of any
specific option will also hamper the principle of "no preconditions" in negotiations. Thus,
the international community should aim to start the process, not to define the final
outcome.

The international community should demand the immediate and full restoration of the civil
and human rights of the Kosovo Albanians.

The international community should use existing leverages to encourage progress towards
a solution. An international strategy of sticks and carrots should ensure that the parties
reach agreement on a permanent solution through peaceful means. Existing leverages
include the "outer wall of sanctions" and conditionality concerning the development of
friendly relations between the EU and the FRY. The "outer wall" should remain in place
until all conditions for its removal_including significant progress in the resolution of the
Kosovo crisis_have been fulfilled. Implementation of the education agreement should be
rewarded with financial support for education in Kosovo.

The international community should define a common policy and appoint a high-level
special envoy. As divergence of strategies will only weaken international leverage over the
parties, the international community should adopt a comprehensive, united policy
regarding the problem. A high-level special envoy should be appointed to act on behalf of
the international community.

Additional assistance should be made available to support the democratisation process in
Serbia, to strengthen civil society, and to improve the social and economic situation in
Kosovo. Although democratisation and strengthening of civil society will in themselves not
solve the Kosovo crisis, they are the indispensable basis for any sustainable solution.
International support_both financial and political_should be provided to the independent
media, the local NGO sector, human rights projects, alternative political voices, and efforts
to enhance communications between different civic groups. To normalise the social and
economic situation in Kosovo, direct international assistance should be given for
education, health care, income-generating activities, and the return of refugees.

For more information please contact:

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Public International Law & Policy Group
Mr Paul R. Williams
1779 Massachusetts Avenue N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
United States
Tel. 1-202-939-2266
Tfx. 1-202-483-4462

European Action Council for Peace in the Balkans
P.O. Box 10018
1001 EA Amsterdam
The Netherlands
Tel. 31-20-4205023
Tfx. 31-20-4204716

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace normally does not take institutional
positions on public policy issues; the views and recommendations presented in this
publication do not necessarily represent the views of the Carnegie Endowment, its officers,
staff, or trustees.
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Centre for Peace and Security Studies
Free University Brussels
Pleinlaan 2, B-1050 Brussels (Belgium)
Tel.: +32.2.6292228 Fax: +32.2.6292278  email: wdehaar@vub.ac.be
URL: http://www.vub.ac.be/POLE