SERBIA/KOSOVO WATCH #75
March 26, 1998
Serbia Watch is issued by the Open Society Institute
(Washington Office).
Please communicate any questions or comments
on Serbia Watch to
Jay Wise at (202) 496-2401 or <jwise@osi-dc.org>.
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Please note at the end of this e-mail the updated
chart on Belgrade's
compliance with the Contact Group's March 9 London
Meeting demands
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A) News Summary (Compiled from news and wire reports):
1. Renewed Serbian attacks on
Kosovo villages leave three dead, eleven more arrested
or missing;
human rights
council: special forces keep tens of villages under siege, block
international
access;
Belgrade
"still ignoring Contact Group's key demands," says Albright, but Europeans
disagree;
Milosevic
escapes new sanctions;
Russia withdraws
veto of FRY arms embargo as arms deal alleged;
Contact
Group endorses international mediation of talks;
Seselj named
Vice-Premier of Serbia;
US Representatives
urge NATO intervention
B) "Lowest common denominator" diplomacy: Contact Group goes easy on Belgrade
2. BONN -- Contact Group Statement
on Kosovo
3. BONN -- Yugoslavia escapes
new sanctions over Kosovo
4. BELGRADE -- Radicals: Contact
Group softened stance on Serbia
5. BELGRADE -- Sanctions on
hold
6. ROME -- Press Briefing with
Secretary Albright, Foreign Minister Dini
C) Attacks continue as security forces "digging in"
7. PRISTINA, DECAN - ARTA News
Summary (Military movements, police harassment)
8. PRISTINA -- Serb police
digging in to stay in Kosovo
9. GLODJANE -- Serb leader
stokes fires of war in Kosovo
10. PRISTINA -- Serbs defy West with Kosovo
raids
11. PRISTINA -- Committee on Defense of
Human Rights and Freedoms letter to Contact
Group
D) Seselj named Serbia's Vice-Premier: Draskovic sees "grim days ahead"
12. BELGRADE -- Skinheads' hero beats war
drums
13. BELGRADE -- BETA suggests reasons for
Socialists' coalition with Radicals
14. BELGRADE -- Opposition leader sees
"very grim days ahead" with new government
A) News Summary (Compiled from news and wire reports)
" It is the same pattern, all over again....another
Balkan war is on the way....these clashes
seem to be only a foretaste of what is yet to
come...there is a general expectation here --
much stronger than ever before -- that Kosovo
is on the edge of conflagration..."
Steve Crawshaw in Glodjana
The Independent (London), March 26, 1998
Using attack helicopters, tanks, APCs and
mortars, Serbian security forces
attacked several Kosovo Albanian villages in
an operation that began Tuesday and ended
just hours before the start of Wednesday's Contact
Group meeting. The renewed
crackdown left at least two Kosovo Albanians
and one member of the Serbian police dead,
and at least eleven Kosovo Albanians are missing
and presumed arrested, according to
Serbian Interior Ministry and regional media
accounts. Kosovo Albanians repeatedly
returned fire in some villages; the Associated
Press reported "an eleven hour gun battle"
between Serbian security forces and Kosovo Albanians
in the village of Glodjane. The
attacks, the first so far in Western Kosovo,
centered around several villages about 15
kilometers from the Kosovo-Albanian border. The
Serbian Interior Ministry claimed the
attacks were "provoked" by an ambush on Serbian
police carried out by a team of
"terrorists" that had come from Albania;
the Albanian government vehemently denied the
charges. ARTA, the independent Belgrade-Pristina
news service, reported Wednesday
that Serbian security forces had abducted schoolchildren
and shot indiscriminately into
village dwellings. The New York Times reported
that Serbian forces set fire to civilian
dwellings in Glodjane village.
The Pristina-based Council for the Defense
of Human Rights and Freedoms cited
"tens of villages under siege" in a Wednesday
letter addressed to the Contact Group. The
letter described the increasing number of "special
military and police forces" sent to the
Drenica region, the use of snipers "to prevent
people from moving around," and the
continued obstruction of "international humanitarian
organizations and various human
rights organizations" from the area. Local and
international media reported a belief on both
sides that the conflict was spreading and would
continue to do so, particularly in the
absence of forceful action by the international
community. The Washington Post reported
Wednesday that "Serbian officials agreed the
conflict was likely to spread," and quoted a
former Communist Party leader of Kosovo as warning
that "any delay or confusion will
produce a wider conflict or even a war."
Sharp and growing divisions between the
US and most of the Contact Group were
on public display during Secretary Albright's
joint press conference with Italian Foreign
Minister Dini Tuesday. "Belgrade is still ignoring
the Contact Group's key demands," said
Albright. "Serbian forces are digging in,
not pulling out; President Milosevic still has not
committed himself to unconditional dialogue;
aid workers continue to be harassed, and the
list goes on...We have seen too many diplomatic
efforts fail to believe that President
Milosevic will respond to positive measures alone.
And if we give him even a shadow of a
glimmer, of a hint, that he has done enough,
he will most assuredly do no more."
For his part, Dini declared himself "extremely
pleased with what has been done [by
Belgrade authorities]...we are equally pleased
that it has been indicated that special forces
will be withdrawn from Kosovo, that the crackdown
will end, and this it seems has been
achieved for the time being." Responding to a
question about the Serbian special police
units, Dini said: "Have the troops been withdrawn
from Kosovo...? I understand that they
have not been withdrawn from Kosovo. But I understand
that they have been confined in
their barracks and certainly we cannot say that
they have intervened again in Kosovo."
The Guardian reported Wednesday that the "paramilitaries
manning checkpoints in
Drenica clearly wear insignia saying æSpecial
Police Units' ".
Wednesday's Contact Group meeting in Bonn
-- originally set to judge Belgrade's
compliance with Contact Group demands and impose
"severe consequences" if the
demands were not met in a ten day period that
expired March 19th -- failed to produce the
further sanctions promised against Belgrade if
Milosevic did not comply with its demands.
US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said
Tuesday that Milosevic had not met the
"specific demands of the Contact Group. I don't
think any of us can credibly say that he
has." To date, at least 9 out of 11 Contact
Group demands have been rejected or violated
by Belgrade, and the remaining two only partially
met (see attached updated chart for
details). The March 9 Contact Group demands included
the withdrawal of Belgrade's
special police units, cessation of action against
civilians in Kosovo, and access to Kosovo
for representatives of any Contact Group member
state. Before the Bonn meeting, US
officials had expressed growing frustration with
the determination of Russia, France,
Germany and Italy to accept Belgrade's claims
that most of the demands had been
implemented and to forego further sanctions against
Belgrade. On Wednesday, the
Washington Post quoted one "senior administration
official" as saying that the US effort in
Bonn would be to "prevent backsliding" on existing
sanctions.
At the March 9 London meeting, Contact
Group members had agreed if Milosevic
"fails to take these steps, and repression continues
in Kosovo, the Contact Group
will...specifically pursue a freeze on the funds
held abroad by the FRY and Serbian
governments." The Group's statement from Bonn
backed away from this stance and
extended the deadline for Belgrade's compliance
to late April.
Cautioning that "further progress by Belgrade
on certain points [of the March 9
demands] requiring action by the FRY and Serbian
governments is necessary," the Group
said it would meet "in four weeks time...if Belgrade
fails to meet the London
benchmarks...we shall take steps to apply further
measures." The US only succeeded in
getting Russia to drop a threatened veto of a
UN Security Council arms embargo on
Yugoslavia. At the March 9 Contact Group meeting,
Russia had agreed that an embargo
would be imposed in response to previous attacks
on civilians; within days, Moscow
publicly threatened to veto the measure in the
Security Council. US State Department
spokesman James Rubin said today the resolution
would be for an "unconditional,
unlimited arms embargo" and that it would prohibit
any "transfers... of military equipment."
International media reported Wednesday
that Russia had entered into a deal to sell
Belgrade a large number of arms -- including
the kinds of tanks and helicopters used in the
recent attacks on Kosovo. The New York Times
reported that the deal, which was agreed
in Moscow in December, would put the FRY in violation
of the Dayton Accords, and that
US officials could not rule out that some weapons
in the arrangement may have already
been sent to Belgrade. The Russian foreign ministry
denied the reports. Asserting that the
embargo would cover any Russian sale of
arms to Belgrade, US State Department
spokesman James Rubin declared Thursday that
any military assistance would, "if it
involved military equipment, be prohibited by
an arms embargo resolution."
Russia continued to lead the opposition
to US efforts to hold Belgrade to the March
19 deadlines. Agence France Presse reported yesterday
that Moscow had demanded all
specific examples of the "further measures" --
such as a freeze on Belgrade's bank
accounts abroad cited in a draft of the Bonn
document -- be deleted from the final
statement. Reuters reported today that Russia
had also tried to "water down" the London
benchmarks during the Bonn conference.
Immediately after the Contact Group meeting,
Belgrade authorities refused to allow
US Special Representative Robert Gelbard to enter
Serbia. Gelbard, who was slated to
visit Pristina and Belgrade, was eventually allowed
into the country. Following a meeting
with Serbian President Milan Milutinovic, he
told reporters that Serbian special police are
"digging in and making their presence permanent
or at least semi-permanent, and that
Milutinovic had been unable to give a "credible
assurance" that special police would be
removed. On Wednesday, Belgrade announced that
all special police had been sent back
to bases outside Kosovo.
Reaction to the outcome of the Contact
Group meeting was harsh, with one US
Congressman saying the Group was "shaking like
jelly." US diplomats also registered
disappointment with the outcome of the Contact
Group meeting, calling it "the lowest
common denominator" approach. The
Los Angeles Times reported that Kosovo Albanian
leaders were disappointed by the Contact Group's
decisions and believe Milosevic will
interpret it as a green light for further attacks.
Reuters quoted Kosovo Albanian Prime
Minister-in-exile Bujar Bukoshi as voicing "regret
the Contact Group failed to agree to
concrete steps to speed a solution...the only
language Milosevic understands is that of
violence."
Following the Contact Group meeting, Secretary
Albright said that only "the
minimum amount of pressure needed" to push Belgrade
to a negotiated solution had been
attained. Reuters reported that "frustrated"
US officials were drafting options for further
unilateral and multilateral economic measures
against Serbia.
In what appeared to be a significant softening
of the March 9 demands, the
Contact Group Wednesday did not reiterate that
Milosevic must accept a long-term EU
and OSCE presence in Kosovo. The Bonn statement
urged Milosevic to "cooperate fully
with the mission of Mr. Felipe Gonzales," and
suggested that full cooperation with OSCE
and EU representative Felipe Gonzales will make
it possible to "address the potential for
FRY participation in the work of the OSCE."
The new Contact Group statement dropped
any reference to the OSCE's agreed position that
the FRY would not be readmitted to the
OSCE before long-term monitoring missions are
installed in Kosovo, the Sandzak, and
Vojvodina; the March 26 document also omits recognition
of Gonzales' mandate to
specifically address the "problems in Kosovo."
Urging President Milosevic to "take political
responsibility for ensuring that Belgrade
engages in serious negotiations on Kosovo's status,"
the Contact Group urgently
demanded the initiation of "unconditional
dialogue" between the Kosovo Albanian
community and "federal and republic levels of
the government." The Group urged that
"authoritative delegations from both sides convene
rapidly in order to agree a framework
for a substantive negotiating process and agree
to the participation of an outside
representative or representatives." This marked
the first time the Contact Group has
endorsed international mediation of Belgrade-Pristina
negotiations on Kosovo's status.
Belgrade has repeatedly rejected this proposal,
declaring Kosovo an "internal" matter for
Serbia to deal with. Despite this language, as
well as the formation of a Kosovo Albanian
council to draft a platform for negotiations,
and a recent letter addressed to the Contact
Group in which Kosovo Albanian "President" Ibrahim
Rugova said that the ethnic
Albanians were prepared for "unconditional dialogue"
with Yugoslav (not Serbian)
authorities in the presence of international
mediators, subsequently both France and
Russia publicly pressured the Kosovo Albanian
leadership to enter into talks with
Belgrade. Reuters reported Wednesday that French
President Jacques Chirac had called
Rugova to press him to "take the initiative"
on talks with Belgrade. Russian Foreign
Minister Yvgeny Primakov said that "dialogue
does not only depend on Belgrade, it
depends on the Albanian side." So far, only Serbian
-- and not Yugoslav -- officials have
offered to participate in talks. On Wednesday,
Secretary Albright noted that "President
Milosevic has still not committed himself to
unconditional dialogue."
Former paramilitary commander and ultra-nationalist
Vojislav Seselj was one of
two Serbian Radical Party (SRS) leaders given
a vice-premiership in the Serbian
government formed Tuesday. Seselj's Belgrade-backed
paramilitaries committed some of
the worst atrocities of the wars in Croatia and
Bosnia. During the most recent presidential
campaign, Seselj advocated the deportation of
Albanians disloyal to Serbia, criticized
Milosevic for being "soft" on Kosovo and declared
that the would "use all available means"
to fight terrorism in Kosovo. Seselj's party
was also given 15 out of 35 ministerial portfolios.
Independent Belgrade news agency BETA reported
that "with the Radicals in the
government, the Serbian authorities" will "more
decisively...reject calls for international
mediation in resolving the Kosovo issue and the
demands that [Kosovo] become a unit of
the Yugoslav Federation...the Yugoslav president
could not survive such developments
politically...the Radicals were the most suitable
partner for fighting internationalization of
the Kosovo issue." At a news conference today,
Seselj welcomed the outcome of the
Contact Group meetings, calling it "milder than
first signaled," and suggested that the
government appointments of the SRS had "stabilized
the position of Serbia and
Yugoslavia." He also rejected the idea that Kosovo
talks should be held at the federal
level, saying "we are convinced that Serbia is
absolutely capable of resolving this problem
on its own."
Belgrade announced Wednesday that it would
launch its own inquiry to determine
whether Serbian police had "used excess force"
during recent crackdowns in Kosovo;
Reuters reported a Belgrade official saying that
Yugoslav authorities had asked forensic
experts from Russia and the United States to
investigate killings of civilians blamed on
police. The announcement comes two weeks after
Belgrade rejected direct demands from
the Contact Group and US Special Representative
Robert Gelbard to allow international
forensics experts to examine the bodies of victims
of the brutal Serbian crackdown.
Following the requests, and an announcement by
the International Criminal Tribunal for
War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia that it would
investigate the Kosovo killings for
possible future prosecution, Serbian police
used a tractor to dig a mass grave and bury
the bodies. In its March 25 letter to the Contact
Group, the Pristina-based NGO Council for
the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms said
that "local and foreign forensic crews
are not given permission to do an autopsy on
the civilians massacred and not one family
has the proof of the cause of death of their
loved ones."
Three US Members of Congress denied visas
by Belgrade to visit Kosovo held a
press conference Wednesday, condemning Serbian
"ethnic cleansing" and calling for
NATO to: create a no- fly zone in Kosovo, establish
humanitarian corridors for the
transport of food and medicine, appoint a special
envoy to concentrate on the region,
station US and international observers in Kosovo,
and refer Milosevic's name for
prosecution before the UN War Crimes Tribunal.
The lawmakers, Representatives Elliot
Engel, James Moran and Susan Kelly, also announced
that they and 19 other
Representatives had sent a letter to President
Clinton requesting to meet with him on
Kosovo. Representative Moran urged NATO's involvement,
declaring "while our diplomats
are talking today in Bonn...Belgrade is attacking
another Albanian city with helicopters and
armored personnel carriers."
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary
Robinson Tuesday condemned
"police brutality in Kosovo" and urged Serbia
to mount an "independent inquiry into the
killings." The High Commissioner also urged Kosovo
Albanian leaders to reiterate their
"total rejection of terrorism." The Organization
of Islamic Countries criticized the statement,
slamming the equation of "unsubstantiated allegations
of terrorism" with Serbian police
brutality.
B) "Lowest common denominator" diplomacy: Contact Group goes easy on Belgrade
2. CONTACT GROUP STATEMENT ON KOSOVO
BONN -- 25 March 1998
We the Foreign Ministers of Contact Group countries,
together with the Deputy Chairman
in Office of the OSCE, the Chairman-in-Office's
personal representative for the FRY and
EU Special Representative, the High Representative
and the representatives of the
European Commission, met in Bonn on March 25
to review developments in Kosovo and
to follow-up decisions reached at our March 9
London meeting.
1.In London, we called on President
Milosevic to take rapid and effective steps to end
the violence in Kosovo and commit himself to
a political solution through unconditional
dialogue. We adopted an action plan to advance
these goals, decided on a series of
concrete measures, and agreed to reconsider these
measures if President Milosevic took
the steps required by the Contact Group.
2.We insist that an urgent start
be made to the process of unconditional dialogue with
the leadership of the Kosovar Albanian community,
involving federal and republic levels of
government. Neither party should attempt to predetermine
the outcome. We expect
President Milosevic to implement the process
of unconditional dialogue and take political
responsibility for ensuring that Belgrade engages
in serious negotiations on Kosovo's
status.
3. Today we have reviewed the situation in Kosovo,
including the degree of compliance by
President Milosevic, FRY and Serbian authorities
with the London statement's
requirements.
4. Since our meeting in London, there has
been progress in some areas of concern,
notably some movement in Belgrade's position
on dialogue on a range of issues including
the autonomy of Kosovo and the conclusion of
the long-overdue agreement on
implementation of the education accord.
5. Our overall assessment is that further
progress by Belgrade on certain points in
paragraphs 6 and 7 of the London statement requiring
action by the FRY and Serbian
governments is necessary. Therefore we have agreed
to maintain and implement the
measures announced on March 9, including seeking
adoption by March 31 of the arms
embargo resolution currently under consideration
in the United Nations Security Council.
We call upon President Milosevic again to implement
fully all the relevant steps in the
London Statement.
6. We demand that authoritative delegations
from both sides convene rapidly in order to
agree a framework for a substantive negotiation
process and agree to the participation in
the negotiating process of an outside representative
or representatives. We will accept no
pretext for delaying such a process. We reaffirm
the willingness of the Contact Group to
facilitate talks, recognizing that international
engagement in support of dialogue is essential
to the achievement of a political solution.
7. We agree that the Contact Group will
meet again in four weeks time to reassess the
situation. Our assessment and subsequent decision
will take account of a report on
compliance to be submitted to the Contact Group
by the Troika of the OSCE, if they agree
to our request to prepare such a report. If President
Milosevic takes the steps specified in
London, we will reconsider existing measures
including action in the Security Council to
terminate the arms embargo. If Belgrade fails
to meet the London benchmarks, and if the
dialogue foes not get underway within the next
four weeks because of the position of the
FRY or Serbian authorities, we shall take steps
to apply further measures as announced in
London.
8. Unless the FRY takes steps to resolve the serious
political and human rights issues in
Kosovo, there is no prospect of any improvement
in its international standing. On the other
hand, concrete progress to resolve the
serious political and human rights issues in
Kosovo will improve the international position
of the FRY and prospects for normalization
of its international relationships and full rehabilitation
in international institutions. We urge
President Milosevic to cooperate fully with the
mission of Mr. Felipe Gonzalez as personal
representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office
and EU Special Representative. Once the
Gonzalez mission is underway, it will certainly
be possible to address the potential for FRY
participation in the work of the OSCE.
9. We take this opportunity to reaffirm
our strong opposition to all terrorist actions.
Violence does not contribute to the search for
a solution in Kosovo. This applies equally to
Serbian police and Kosovar Albanian extremists.
We will use all appropriate elements of
pressure and influence with both sides to ensure
that violence does not escalate and that
the serious dispute over Kosovo's status between
Belgrade and the Kosovar Albanian
community is resolved strictly through peaceful
means. We urge those outside the FRY
who are supplying financial support, arms or
training for terrorist activity in Kosovo to
cease doing so immediately.
10. We welcome Dr. Rugova's clear commitment to
non-violence and urge others in the
leadership of the Kosovar Albanian community
to make their opposition to violence and
terrorism both clear and public.
Belgrade authorities cannot, however, justify
their repression and violence in
Kosovo in the name of anti-terrorist activities.
We repeat that the way to combat terrorism
is for Belgrade to offer the Kosovar Albanian
community a genuine political process.
11. We applaud the work of Sant'Egidio and of
the 3+3 commission in reaching agreement
on measures to implement the 1996 Education agreement.
We call on all sides to ensure
that implementation proceeds smoothly and without
delay, according to the agreed
timetable. We are considering what assistance
we can provide to facilitate implementation.
We will also consider measures if either party
blocks implementation. We urge all sides to
cooperate with Sant'Egidio on efforts to reduce
tensions in other social sectors as well.
12. The fundamental position of the Contact Group
remains the same. We support neither
independence nor the maintenance of the Status
Quo as the end-result of negotiations
between the Belgrade authorities and the Kosovo
Albanian leadership on the status of
Kosovo. Without prejudging what that result may
be we base the principles for a solution
to the Kosovo problem on the territorial
integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and
on OSCE standards, Helsinki principles,
and the UN Charter. Such a solution must also
take into account the rights of the Kosovar Albanians
and all those who live in Kosovo.
We support a substantially greater degree of
autonomy for Kosovo which must include
meaningful self-administration.
3. YUGOSLAVIA ESCAPES NEW SANCTIONS OVER KOSOVO
Los Angeles Times -- March 26, 1998 (excerpts)
BONN--The United States
lost its bid Wednesday to punish Yugoslav President
Slobodan Milosevic for not fully meeting Western
demands that he make peace in
Kosovo, as European allies rejected an American
push for an immediate freeze on his
nation's overseas financial assets.
...while the Yugoslav
leader failed to meet the allied deadline, he took enough modest
steps to convince Russia and other reluctant
European powers that sufficient progress
had been made to obviate the need for further
sanctions, which the group had threatened
should Milosevic flout its demands.
As a result, the ministers
settled for a compromise giving Milosevic another four weeks
to begin serious talks with the ethnic Albanians,
who make up 90% of Kosovo's 2.1 million
people, and to meet other allied demands. The
ministers warned that they will freeze
Yugoslavia's overseas assets--and consider other
sanctions--if Milosevic does not comply.
Although U.S. officials
tried to put a good face on the decision, the outcome was a
setback for the Clinton administration. U.S.
officials had argued that the only way to
prevent Milosevic from repeating brutalities
such as the recent crackdown on Kosovo
separatists that left more than 80 people dead
is to punish him until he is convinced that
he must stop.
Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright, chairwoman of the ministerial-level meeting,
called the Contact Group's moves "the minimum
degree of pressure needed" to compel
action by Milosevic and forestall a bid by some
European allies to ease existing sanctions.
In Kosovo, ethnic Albanian
political leaders were disappointed by the Contact Group's
decision. They expressed fear that Milosevic
will interpret it as a green light for another
crackdown on separatists.
Even as the Contact
Group met, Kosovo's Albanians were surveying the damage to
several villages that police had raided the day
before in an apparent search for members
of the clandestine rebel movement the Kosovo
Liberation Army.
The raids, along with
an ambush of a police patrol, allegedly by ethnic Albanians, that
killed one officer, had sparked fears that fighting
between state security forces and rebels
would again escalate. But on Wednesday, it appeared
that reports about the extent of
fighting had been overstated.
In the village of Glodjane,
in western Kosovo, residents who witnessed Tuesday's raid
said they watched government helicopters strafing
homes while police in armored
personnel carriers moved through the streets.
The police ransacked homes in a search for
weapons and interrogated villagers about the
whereabouts of rebels, the residents said.
Initial reports that
four Albanians were killed in the attack could not be confirmed.
Damage in the village was relatively light.
The Serbian government said that about 30
armed rebels ambushed a police patrol near Glodjane,
killing one officer and wounding
three others. One suspect was captured and told
authorities that the group had infiltrated
from Albania, the government said.
The Contact Group's
decision Wednesday to seek a U.N. embargo on arms transfers
to Yugoslavia was made once before, on March
9 at the group's last meeting, but Russia
later blocked the effort. However, the Russians
agreed Wednesday that the embargo will
be pushed through the U.N. Security Council by
Tuesday.
At the March 9 meeting,
the ministers gave Milosevic 10 days to withdraw Serbian
security forces from Kosovo and begin a serious
dialogue with ethnic Albanian leaders
aimed at giving the Albanian population more
autonomy in the province.
While the Yugoslav government
has said that Serbian special police units have been
confined to their barracks in recent weeks, they
still are deployed in the province in force,
and Milosevic has made only token efforts so
far to give the ethnic Albanians any
increased political clout.
At a news conference
Wednesday, a clearly disappointed Albright warned that going
easy on Milosevic was exactly what had caused
the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina to
escalate in the early 1990s, eventually involving
the allies.
"Clearly, President
Milosevic is hoping he can get away with this familiar pattern of
behavior by keeping the international community
off balance and divided," she said.
Diplomats said that
only Britain was fully in agreement with the U.S. on the question of
whether to freeze Yugoslavia's overseas financial
assets now. France, Italy, Germany and
Russia all opposed immediate imposition of such
a measure. Italy, for one, has developed
lucrative trade and business ties with Yugoslavia
in recent months...
4. RADICALS: CONTACT GROUP SOFTENED STANCE ON SERBIA
Reuters -- March 26, 1998
BELGRADE - The Serbian
Radical Party (SRS), a member of a new Serbian coalition
government, said on Thursday the six-nation Contact
Group's decision to delay extra
sanctions on Serbia was more lenient than initially
signalled. Foreign ministers of Britain,
France, Germany, Italy, Russia and the United
States decided to give Yugoslav President
Slobodan Milosevic four weeks to end bloodshed
in Kosovo and start a dialogue before
discussing additional sanctions.
"The decisions by the
Contact group are somewhat milder than first signalled and the
Serbian Radical Party thinks that the formation
of the government of national unity has
substantially stabilised the position of Serbia
and Yugoslavia," SRS leader Vojislav Seselj
told a news conference.
Seselj was an ultranationalist
firebrand and a paramilitary leader in wars in Croatia and
Bosnia but has recently softened his stance and
accepted the government of moderate
prime minister Milorad Dodik in the Bosnian Serb
republic.
He is now one of the
five vice-premiers in a new Serbian cabinet composed of leftists
and rightists.
Seselj said the fact
that Serbia has now got a stable and competent government would
prompt a more moderate course of the Western
powers to the Balkan events.
The leader of the radicals
said Kosovo was Serbia's internal issue to be addressed by
the Serbian government.
"The federal state should
not directly participate in any negotiations...We are convinced
that Serbia is absolutely capable of resolving
this problem on its own," he added.
Seselj declined to comment
on how the new government would avert threats of new
sanctions.
But he welcomed the
agreement on education signed earlier this week between
representatives of the Serbian government and
the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.
"This is only a step
towards resolving the Kosovo-Metohija problem, that is the problem
of the Albanian ethnic minority, whose members
mostly avoid to take part in our social
system, in education and all other fields," he
said.
The agreement was signed
one day before the new government was constituted.
5. SANCTIONS ON HOLD
B92 News (independent Belgrade news agency)
-- March 26, 1998 (excerpt)
BONN -- ...Yugoslav
Foreign Minister Zivadin Jovanovic has said that Belgrade will not
allow Gonzalez to get involved in Kosovo. Belgrade's
Studio B Television reported on
Wednesday that Gonzalez's potential role in Kosovo
is unacceptable because the
government continues to see Kosovo as an internal
affair.
6. PRESS BRIEFING BY SECRETARY OF
STATE MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT AND
FOREIGN MINISTER LAMBERTO
DINI
ROME -- March 24, 1998 (excerpts)
FOREIGN MINISTER DINI:
...To start with, we have examined developments in
Kosovo since the London Contact Group meeting....It
is consequently essential that, on
the part of the Contact Group countries and on
the part of neighboring countries that will
be present tomorrow in Bonn, that there be a
firm attitude towards Belgrade, since not all
that was requested has been done yet. It
is also necessary to be firm towards the Kosovo
authorities, so that they may accept the approach
we indicated, i.e., opening a political
dialogue and negotiations tables with a view
to negotiating a comprehensive and ample
autonomy for Kosovo, obviously within the territorial
boundaries and limits of the Yugoslav
Federation.
...We are also extremely
pleased with what has been done, particularly that it has been
decided to grant access to the observers of humanitarian
organizations in Kosovo. We
are equally pleased that it has been indicated
that special police forces will be withdrawn
from Kosovo, that the crackdown will end, and
this it seems has been achieved for the
time being.
...It is vital for the
Contact Group and the international community at large to remain firm
vis-a-vis Belgrade, so that it may live up to
all the conditions that were spelled out by the
Contact Group. This means maintaining sanctions,
considering more sanctions if
necessary, and, of course, this is going to be
the subject of tomorrow's meeting.
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT:
...Belgrade is still ignoring the Contact Group's key
demands. Serbian security police are digging
in, not pulling out; President Milosevic has
still not committed himself to unconditional
dialogue; aid workers continue to be harassed,
and the list goes on. We have too much
experience in the former Yugoslavia to settle for
half sincere, half measures. We have seen
too many diplomatic efforts fail to believe that
President Milosevic will respond to positive
pressure alone. And if we give him even a
shadow of a glimmer, of a hint, that he has done
enough, he will most assuredly do no
more.
We are exploring every
diplomatic option open for moving the process of dialogue on
Kosovo forward and that is what we did in our
meeting today and what we will do
tomorrow. My message is that these efforts
can succeed but only if we stick together, and
we will need to maintain credible pressure on
Belgrade to end repression and restore
autonomy.
QUESTION: Minister
Dini, wasn't a ten day deadline (inaudible). Your basis for being
somewhat satisfied with Mr. Milosevic's compliance
and your compliance, the education
agreement basically. When did the special
forces get out of there?
FOREIGN MINISTER DINI:
We don't have visions to be especially satisfied nor to be
dissatisfied or entirely dissatisfied.
I didn't use these words in my introduction. I think that I
said that some steps in the direction that the
Contact Group wanted and have decided
upon in London have been taken. Now we
will have to make an evaluation of this.
Have the troops been
withdrawn from Kosovo, the special police troops? I understand
they have not been withdrawn from Kosovo.
But I understand that they have been
confined in their barracks and certainly we cannot
say that they have intervened again in
Kosovo. There have been numerous
demonstrations organized by the students as well
as by the citizens of Kosovo themselves that
have taken place peacefully without the
intervention of the authorities. So,
it is something that has to be looked at also in this light
but we ought to continue to apply the pressure
that is necessary to bring about what the
Contact Group has indicated as being necessary.
And we will do that, evaluating together
with the other member countries of the Contact
Group tomorrow on what will be the best
course of action.
I have indicated in
my introductory statement that we ought to continue to apply strong
pressure on the parties, especially on Belgrade,
but also on the Kosovo area in order to
start soon, as soon as possible, I would say
immediately, the political dialogue.
C) Attacks continue as security forces
"digging in"
7. ARTA EXCERPTS (the following items
are drawn from the daily bulletin of ARTA News
Service, independent Pristina-Belgrade news agency,
a joint service between the BETA
and Koha news organizations):
Military movements
PRISTINA -- March 26 1530 CET
Albanian daily "Koha Ditore" sources inform on
the deployment of the Yugoslav Army
troops. According to these sources, a large number
of tanks have left the military barracks,
close to the airport of Prishtina, and are going
in the direction of the villages Sllatinë,
Pomozotin, Bellaqevc i Vogël. It seems that
they will take new positions around the village
of Kuzmin, a village near Fushë Kosovë,
inhabited by ethnic Serbs.
Serb military forces
have changed positions in the past as well, but their movements
have become much more frequent nowadays, claim
the sources. Ever since the police
attack on the villages in the municipality of
Deçan (15 km northwest of the Albanian
border), there have been constant flighs by Serb
war planes, that are flying very close to
the ground, the Albanian sources say.
Police harassment -- police mistreat civilians
in Junik
DEÇAN -- March 26, 1900 CET
--
The political situation in the municipality of
Deçan is very tense, especially in the village of
Junik. Many civilians were reported harassed
and mistreated at the police check-point,
close to the community of the Serb settlers that
came from Albania, informs the Council for
the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms (CDHFR).
After filming certain sites in Deçan
and talking with the chairman of CDHRF, TV crew
of ABC-NEWS and SKY-NEWS were
relieved of their cameras by local police. The
Council also informs of frequent police
movements through Deçan.
8. SERB POLICE DIGGING IN TO STAY IN KOSOVO
Reuters -- March 26, 1998 (excerpts)
PRISTINA -- Special
Serbian police sent to the troubled province of Kosovo to crush
rebellion among ethnic Albanians are digging
in for the long haul rather than withdrawing,
American envoy Robert Gelbard charged on Thursday.
"It is the view of the
United States, based on first-hand evidence from embassy
personnel, that the special police and other
units are digging in and making their presence
permanent or at least semi-permanent," Gelbard
told reporters in Pristina.
"They are clearly in
positions they were not in before. The United States feels very, very
strongly that this is an abnormal situation which
is absolutely terrorising the population
throughout Kosovo."
Serbian police launched
a crackdown on ethnic Albanian separatists in the Drenica
area west of Kosovo's provincial capital, Pristina,
on March 5. More than 80 people,
including 25 women and children, were killed
in the operation.
Major powers known as
the Contact Group -- the United States, Britain, France,
Germany, Italy and Russia -- demanded on March
9th that Serbian special police be
removed from Kosovo within 10 days and threatened
economic sanctions if they were not.
The deadline for action
came and went with no penalty. The Contact Group, deeply
divided over Balkan policy as has been the case
ever since it first convened in 1994 to
deal with Bosnia, on Wednesday gave Belgrade
another month to shape up.
Belgrade said on Wednesday
that all special police anti-terrorist units (SAJ) used in the
Drenica operation had been sent back to bases
outside Kosovo.
Anxious to press Anglo-American
concerns over Kosovo home, Gelbard travelled to
Belgrade and Pristina on Monday, accompanied
by Jeremy Greenstock, the Political
Director of Britain's Foreign Office.
The two met Serbian
President Milan Milutinovic in Belgrade but got little satisfaction on
the police issue.
"We were not able this
morning, when we asked Mr Milutinovic, to get a credible
assurance from him that the special police would
be removed," Greenstock said.
...Both sides have appointed
negotiating teams since March 9 but the basis for
substantive talks still seems elusive.
"It is not for us, the
international community, to decide on the status of Kosovo,"
Britain's Greenstock said.
"That is to be done
by negotiations between the parties involved. But we haven't
reached the point of even beginning to talk about
substance."
Kosovo's Albanian leadership
insists that an international mediator be involved in the
talks, a position rejected by Milosevic, who
is now President of Yugoslavia, comprising
Serbia and Montenegro.
Gelbard and Greenstock
said that even Russia, Serbia's most sympathetic Contact
Group member, agreed that some international
role in the talks was necessary to
overcome the lack of trust and confidence poisoning
relations between Kosovo's
antagonists.
9. SERB LEADER STOKES FIRES OF WAR IN KOSOVO
The Independent (London) -- March 26, 1998
GLODJANE --
IT IS the same pattern, all over again. One destroyed house, and more
badly damaged. Four Albanian dead, and one Serb
policeman. Both sides blame the other
and expect things to get worse. Another Balkan
war is on the way.
In Bonn, the six-member contact
group on Yugoslavia - Britain, France, Germany, Italy,
Russia, and the United States - met to decide
what to do about the exploding violence in
the Albanian majority Serbian province of Kosovo.
They decided, in effect, that
the answer was: not very much. Theoretically, sanctions will
be imposed in four weeks time if President Slobodan
Milosevic fails to initiate peace talks
with Kosovo's Albanians. That hesitant proposal
suggests the West remains as confused
as it always has been about how to deal with
the Yugoslav leader.
In the village of Glodjane,
where the latest killings in Kosovo took place, the fire has
been well stoked.
Brutality begets bitterness,
and determination. As you turn off onto the road that leads to
Glodjane, 50 miles west of the Kosovo capital,
Pristina, Albanian men greet you with
victory signs, as though their battle with the
Serbs was already won.
For others, there is no reason
to feel victorious. Tractors and carts were leaving
Glodjane yesterday; villagers fear a renewal
of Tuesday's violence. Idajet and her
husband Janos sat with their four children on
a tractor. All they had was a change of
children's clothes. They do not know when they
will return. "What future have we?" asked
Idajet. "None."
The course of events on Tuesday
remains unclear. According to the Serbs, they ran
into an Albanian ambush. The Albanians insist
there was an unprovoked assault by the
Serbs. The Albanians deny a form of guerrilla
resistance movement is growing. The Serbs
deny they use unlimited brutality in an attempt
to eradicate this Albanian intifada.
Glodjane and several neighbouring
villages were deserted yesterday, except for
roaming groups of visiting locals, who had come
to inspect the damage for themselves.
There was a curiously unsettled atmosphere as
dozens of youths wandered through the
empty villages and gazed at the damage done by
the Serbs.
Some Albanians are keen to
ensure the official Albanian version is all anybody hears.
One remaining villager began describing Tuesday's
events - including the hours of
shooting and the Serb helicopters that landed
outside his house. But a self-important man
in a suit was eager to prevent him giving his
eye-witness account. The man in the suit held
a furtive conversation, accompanied by emphatic
hand gestures. Speaking freely to a
foreign journalist was clearly not a good idea.
Serb headlines talked yesterday
of how the police had "liquidated terrorists": the front
page headline in the Albanian-language Koha Ditore
listed the villages that had been
attacked, like a role call of death.
These clashes seem certain
to be only a foretaste of what is yet to come. Mr Milosevic
unleashed Serb nationalism in Kosovo as a way
of strengthening his power. The Balkan
wars that began in 1991 have helped to keep him
in power. Now, it may be Kosovo's turn.
There is a general expectation
here - much stronger than ever before - that Kosovo is
on the edge of conflagration. "We want freedom
- or we want war," said one man in the old
town of Pecs just a few miles away from the latest
violence, yesterday.
The Serbs fear what might
happen to them. But the Albanians are still more
traumatised. "We live like dead people. We have
nothing," said one Albanian in the village
of Dubrava, where Tuesday's ambush was said to
have taken place. "How can this go
on?"
10. SERBS DEFY WEST WITH KOSOVO RAIDS
The Guardian -- March 25, 1998 (excerpts)
PRISTINA -- Serbian
forces launched new attacks on ethnic Albanian villages in
Kosovo yesterday in a direct challenge to the
United States-led Contact Group, which
meets in Bonn today to decide whether to tighten
sanctions on Yugoslavia.
Four Albanians and a policeman
died in the fighting, a Serbian official said.
The attacks occurred
in the Decan area of the Serbian province, at least 20 miles from
the Drenica region where raids by paramilitary
police killed at least 80 people earlier this
month.
In another snub, Serbia's
Socialist prime minister, Mirko Marjanovic, ended months of
party haggling by forming a government in which
an extreme nationalist, Vojislav Seselj,
will be a deputy prime minister.
Mr Seselj's Radical Party
takes an even fiercer line on Kosovo than Yugoslavia's
president, Slobodan Milosevic. It took part in
some of the worst ethnic cleansing in Bosnia,
and he has been branded a fascist by US officials
who refuse to work with him. The
Radicals will have 15 ministers in the new government,
while 35 cabinet seats will go to the
Socialists and their electoral partner, the United
Left (JUL), led by Mr Milosevic's wife.
The Albanian-run Kosovo Information
Centre in the province's capital, Pristina, accused
Serbian police of using heavy weapons in the
assaults yesterday and forcing people to
flee. The information centre, run by the League
for Democracy in Kosovo, the biggest
ethnic Albanian party, said police from the town
of Pec, north of the villages of Glamocel,
Dubrave, Glocane and Babaloc took part in the
mid-morning attacks.
"The villages were sealed
off and later the sound of heavy Serb weapons and artillery
was heard," it added. "Several houses in Glocane
were set on fire and people abandoned
their homes."
Albanian sources said
the fighting spread in the direction of the nearest big town of
Djakovica in the evening, although the town itself
was calm. Reporters heard gunfire and
explosions in neighbouring woods.
A Serbian official who refused
to be identified claimed the dead Albanians were
guerrillas of the separatist Kosovo Liberation
Army, and that a large amount of captured
weaponry came from Albania, 12 miles away.
The Contact Group, comprising
the US, Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Russia, told
Mr Milosevic two weeks ago to withdraw his special
police from Kosovo or face a freeze on
Yugoslav assets held abroad.
The Serbian government claims
its anti-terrorist forces have returned to barracks, but
the paramilitaries manning checkpoints in Drenica
clearly wear insignia saying "Special
Police Units"...
11. COMMITTEE ON DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
AND FREEDOMS LETTER TO
CONTACT GROUP
PRISHTINA -- 25 March, 1998
Despite the Contact
Group's requests that are in favor of creating conditions for finding
a solution to the issue of Kosova and Kosova
Albanians, the Serb regime continues to:
- Send more special
military and police forces to the region of Drenica, equipped with
light and heavy ammunition;
- To use snipers as
means to keep tens of villages in this region under siege and to
prevent people from moving around this area;
- To prevent food and
medicine from being sent to the sick and hungry people left in
this region;
- To prevent international
humanitarian organizations and various human rights
organizations from penetrating to the area;
- To prevent physicians
from giving medical help to the sick and wounded.
The situation in the
field confirms the fact that special military and police forces are not
being withdrawn. Local and foreign forensic
crews are not given permission to do an
autopsy on the civilians massacred and not one
family has the proof of the cause of death
of their loved ones; There were even cases of
people being buried without prior
identification. Humanitarian organizations are
allowed to enter only those villages which
have not been subject of attacks by armed Serb
police forces, and not those that are
struck by hunger and epidemics. The police
refuses to give any information on the
number of people they arrested or the well being
of those that they claim to have
"surrendered". There are claims that the
Ammunition Factory has been turned into a
concentration camp where Albanian civilians are
tortured. The police does not allow an
inspection of Sadik Jashari's demolished house,
where eight members of his family are
presumed to be. Many villages have been
abandoned in fright of new massacres and
those that escaped to safer areas, are prevented
from returning to their houses and living
under the already miserable conditions.
D) Seselj named Serbia's Vice-Premier:
Draskovic sees "grim days ahead"
12. SKINHEADS' HERO BEATS WAR DRUMS
The Times -- March 26, 1998
BELGRADE -- IN THE dark regions of the
Serbian extreme Right, Vojislav Seselj, a
former boxer, comes from the most Stygian depths.
To liberal Serbs, the leader of the
Serbian Radical Party is an open fascist. His
appointment as a Deputy Prime Minister in
the new Government of Serbia this week makes
the West's worst nightmares come true.
The heart of his appeal
is the mass rally, patrolled by heavily armed skinheads. The
nobodies of Zemun, his working-class Belgrade
power base, feel somebodies as they
bawl "Seselj, Seselj".
He abuses the corrupt
rich in the circle of President Milosevic and bellows against the
Dayton accords. But under the thuggish exterior,
there is an acute brain knowing how to
play on the genuine grievances of the dirt-poor
refugees from US-backed Croat "ethnic
cleansing" in Krajina in 1995.
The key to his elevation
is the Kosovo crisis. Mr Seselj is utterly opposed to
compromise on Kosovo, where 90 per cent of the
people are Albanian. Vuk Draskovic,
leader of the opposition Serbian Renewal Movement,
said the Seselj appointment showed
that Mr Milosevic "has opted for a conflict with
Kosovo and with the whole world".
Seselj supporters dominate
swaths of the police and army and he has big support in
south Serbia. Mr Milosevic needs him in the Government
for the war that seems to be
looming over Kosovo.
13. BETA SUGGESTS REASONS FOR SOCIALISTS' COALITION WITH RADICALS
BETA News (independent Belgrade news agency) --
March 26, 1998 (excerpt)
BELGRADE -- The
decision of the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] and the
Yugoslav Left [JUL] to form a coalition government
with Vojislav Seselj's ultranationalist
Serbian Radical Party [SRS], was received among
political observers in Belgrade as a
great surprise. The government was formed in
the morning of 24th March and only 18
hours earlier, a senior official, close to Serbian
President Milan Milutinovic, told Beta that
the Socialists were "still hoping" for an agreement
with Vuk Draskovic's Serbian Renewal
Movement [SPO]. He also said that the coalition
with Seselj "was out of the question" .
Such an opinion was also shared by all the Belgrade
newspapers, as well as Draskovic
himself.
The Serbian legislature
has 250 seats. The Socialist Party of Serbia and the Yugoslav
Left control 105 seats, the Radicals have 82
and the Serbian Renewal Movement 45
seats. The Serbian Renewal Movement negotiated
several months with the Socialists on
the distribution of ministerial posts. The belief
that he was the only potential partner for the
distribution of authority, Draskovic based on
an obviously wrong presumption - that
Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, because
of the international community, would
not dare make a pact with the xenophobic, ultra-nationalist
Seselj.
Serbian Premier Mirko
Marjanovic (who held the post of premier for four years in the
former government as well) will once again be
at the helm of the cabinet of 36 members,
which, apart from himself, also has five vice-premiers,
23 department ministers and seven
ministers without portfolio. In Marjanovic's
government there will be 15 Socialists, just as
many Radicals, four representatives of the Yugoslav
Left and an independent personality
(Milan Beko). Thus, during the same night that
the movie "Titanic" was awarded 18
Oscars, Seselj came by 15 ministerial posts.
This symbolism was also pointed to in the
halls of the Serbian government on the very day
of the election of the new government by
some displeased persons, who nicknamed the new
cabinet - "Titanic" .
To all intents and purposes,
the Radicals and Socialists have come to terms on the
Kosovo issue.
At a moment when Kosovo
is experiencing threatening turmoil, and the international
community is seriously announcing a reimposing
of sanctions, Milosevic needs a strong
and nationally reliable ally who will protect
his "flanks" . He needs a government even
"more Serb in nature" than the one he had so
far.
Seselj is, of course,
for that task incomparably more dependable than Draskovic who
very often shows understanding for the international
community's demands. With the
Radicals the left coalition has more than a stable
assembly majority.
Milosevic is certainly
aware of the danger which has been threatening him from the
Radicals for a long time, who by entering the
government have become stronger and
potentially pose a greater threat to him. Therefore,
he will now be forced to hasten the
intended transfer of the true authority from
the Serbian to the federal level, for which the
only serious obstacle comes from the new Montenegrin
authorities, led by [President] Milo
Djukanovic, who opposes such intentions. For
that reason Milosevic invests great hopes
in the former Montenegrin president, Momir Bulatovic,
whose victory at the parliamentary
elections in May could significantly speed up
the desired transfer of authority to the federal
level. Even in that task, Seselj, who announced
that his party would run in the Montenegrin
elections independently, could be a valuable
ally to Bulatovic (Milosevic) in the showdown
with Djukanovic...
In case the world forces
him to abandon the just started co-operation with Seselj in
exchange for opportunity to come closer to the
international community, Milosevic may
once again turn to Vuk Draskovic. If something
like that happens (which is not out of the
question) the Socialists would have to pay an
incomparably higher price than the one
Draskovic demanded earlier, and finally did not
get.
At a moment when Serbia
was once again faced with the possibility of having the
sanctions reimposed because of the crisis in
Kosovo, it seemed more logical that
Milosevic would form a government with reform
potentials offered by the Serbian Renewal
Movement, instead of opting for cooperation with
xenophobic Radicals. During his expose
in the Serbian Legislature, Premier Mirko Marjanovic
several times expressed regret, that
despite the lengthy talks with the Serbian Renewal
Movement, an agreement was not
reached...
Certainly a great obstacle
for the Serbian Renewal Movement's entering the
government was also that party's decision not
to send its representative to Pristina for
talks on resolving the Kosovo issue.
Contrary to the Serbian
Renewal Movement, which insisted that the intended dialogue
with the Kosovo Albanians was unprepared, the
Radicals immediately sent their vice-
president, Tomislav Nikolic, to Pristina. Reporters
in Pristina noticed that at the so-far
unsuccessful talks, Nikolic was mainly passing
his time in the company of a Yugoslav
Left's representative, Milovan Bojic, and had
a premonition that maybe a "love affair"
between the Radicals and the Yugoslav left was
in sight. And that is how it happened in
the end: Bojic and Nikolic will continue their
friendship forged in Pristina, as vice-premiers
in the new Serbian government...
14. OPPOSITION LEADER SEES "VERY GRIM DAYS
AHEAD" WITH NEW
GOVERNMENT
BETA News (independent Belgrade news agency) --
March 24, 1998
BELGRADE -- Vuk Draskovic,
the chairman of the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO),
said today that time will show very soon that
the new republic's government will push
Serbia into even greater isolation.
"I would love not to
be right but I am afraid that the Socialists' coalition with Vojislav
Seselj marks the beginning of very grim days
indeed for our country and our people,"
Draskovic told Beta in connection with today's
election of the new Serbian government.
The new government comprises
the representatives of the Socialist Party of Serbia
(SPS), the SRS [Serbian Radical Party headed
by Vojislav Seselj], and the Yugoslav Left
(JUL). The SPO does not have representatives
in the government.
"Seselj's party has
been urging a tougher course towards the United States and other
Western powers, a shift to China, and a hard-fist
approach towards Kosovo-Metohija,"
Draskovic said, adding that the part of the SPS
that "feels close to Seselj's line" ultimately
won the day...
Asked whether he was
disappointed with not being in the government, Draskovic said:
"No, not in the least," but he stressed that
he was " very concerned about the fate of this
country and people" .
"It is incredible how
everything repeats itself, and how the person that makes all the
decisions always chooses the worst solution,"
Draskovic told Beta.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----
COUNTDOWN ON CONTACT GROUP DEMANDS:
"...we feel compelled to take steps to demonstrate
to the authorities in Belgrade that they
cannot defy international standards without facing
severe consequences...because of the
gravity of the situation, we endorse the following
measures to be pursued immediately...we
call upon President Milosevic...within ten days
[March 19, 1998] to: Contact Group
Declaration, London March 9, 1998
CONTACT GROUP DEMAND:
-----------------------
1. Invite independent forensic experts
to investigate allegations of extrajudicial killings
Status: Rejected
Reference: Serbian police buried more than 50
victims from last week's killings...last night,
in defiance of international demands that the
bodies be examined by forensic experts.
(Daily Telegraph, March 11, 1998)
-----------------------
2. Withdraw the special police units
Status: Violated
Reference: The paramilitaries manning checkpoints
in Drenica clearly wear insignia saying
"Special Police Units".
(The Manchester Guardian), March 25, 1998)
Albright said..."Serbian security police are digging
in, not pulling out."
(Reuters, March 24, 1998)
-----------------------
3. Cease action by the security forces
affecting the civilian population
Status: Violated
Reference: The village of Lausa--with over 4,500
residents, six of whom have already
been killed by police snipers -- has come under
increasing pressure in recent days.
(International Helsinki Federation, March 24,
1998)
-------------------------
4. Allow access to Kosovo for the
International Commission of the Red Cross and other
humanitarian organizations
Status: Violated
Reference: [Belgrade is] into a pattern of harassment
of NGOs...who are present or are
seeking to go to Kosovo... (State Department
press briefing, March 23, 1998)
-------------------------
5. Allow access to Kosovo by representatives
of the Contact Group and other embassies
Status: Violated
Reference: [Ambassador Gelbard said ]"We have
seen intimidation and death threats
against American journalists and ...diplomats..."
(Daily Telegraph, March 19, 1998)
-------------------------
6. Commit...publicly... to enter
without preconditions into a process of meaningful
dialogue on political status issues
Status: Not Met
Reference: Gelbard described [Milosevic's most
recent offer] as an "unfortunate attempt"
to catch the eye of the Contact Group and stressed
that "it falls quite short... of what we
feel is necessary." (Reuters, March 19, 1998)
--------------------------
Cooperate in a constructive manner with the Contact
group in the implementa- tion of:
--------------------------
7. A mission to Kosovo by the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
Status: Rejected
Reference: Serbian foreign minister Zivadin Jovanovic
told Russian Foreign Minister
Yvgeny Primakov the crisis in the breakaway province
of Kosovo is an internal affair of
Serbia and rejected any interference by a foreign
power. Jovanovic said international
pressure on Belgrade is "not welcome... Serbia
intends to solve the crisis...without
interference from abroad," he said. (UPI, March
17, 1998)
---------------------------
8. The Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia should
begin gathering information related to the violence
in Kosovo...the FRY authorities have an
obligation to cooperate with the ICTY
Status: Rejected
Reference: See #7
--------------------------
9. The return of OSCE long-term missions
to Kosovo, the Sandzak and Vojvodina
Status: Rejected
Reference: See #7
-------------------------
10. Support [Vatican NGO] Sant' Egidio's
efforts to secure implementation of the
Education Agreement
Status: Partially Met
Reference: {British Foreign Secretary Cook said]"...
what matters now is translating
commitments made by the two parties into
action and concrete results..." (Deutsche
Presse Agentur , March 23, 1998)
------------------------
11. The proposal of a new mission
by Felipe Gonzales as a personal representative of
the OSCE Chairman-in-Office for the FRY that
would include a new and specific mandate
for addressing the problems in Kosovo
Status: Rejected
Reference: Belgrade's Studio B Television
reported...that Gonzalez's potential role in
Kosovo is unacceptable because the government
continues to see Kosovo as an internal
affair.
(B92 News Service, March 26, 1998)