Kosovo: Bosnia Deja Vu - By Ivo H. Daalder

Editorials & Opinion Columns

Kosovo: Bosnia Deja Vu
By Ivo H. Daalder
Friday, April 17, 1998; Page A23

With Secretary of State Madeleine Albright leading the way, the Clinton administration
firmly insists that it will not "repeat the mistakes of the past" in responding to the Serb
crackdown in Kosovo. Yet, rhetoric aside, U.S. actions have differed little from the way
Washington responded to the blowup of Bosnia six years ago. Instead of exerting the kind
of leadership that finally succeeded in ending the Bosnian war, the administration is
repeating four fundamental mistakes.
     The key fallacy - then as now - is insistence on acting only in concert with our partners
in Europe. Given profound differences in perspective within the six-nation Contact Group,
that leaves us with a least-common denominator policy. If Bosnia taught us anything, it is
that subordinating U.S. policy to the dictates of allied unity ensures paralysis rather than
forceful action.
     Second, the method of choice today, as in 1992, is economic sanctions. Although
sanctions may push the fragile Serb economy over the edge, as an instrument of pressure
sanctions have drawbacks. If implemented by the Contact Group, sanctions hurt the
struggling market economies of Serbia's neighbors - all of whom suffered serious
economic harm during earlier rounds.
     At the same time, the effectiveness of sanctions requires the Contact Group's
willingness to fully implement them. But that leaves U.S. policy hostage to the whims of
Russia and the European allies - most of whom do not share Washington's umbrage at
Milosevic's actions or are unwilling to take an economic hit. Indeed, the Contact Group's
failure to agree to new sanctions in Bonn is emblematic of the problems that sole reliance
on sanctions poses for U.S. policy.
     A third critical mistake is insistence on conditioning any political solution to the conflict
on maintaining the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia - even though
one party rejects this condition. Moreover, there's nothing magical about Yugoslavia's
territory. It has existed in its current configuration only since 1992. We have only limited
diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia. And it has no seat in the United Nations or the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
     U.S. interests are best served by a resolution that is both peaceful and that promotes
regional stability. It may well be that this involves some form of autonomy for Kosovo within
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia - perhaps as a third constitutive republic alongside
Serbia and Montenegro. And it may be that independence is not the best solution,
because this could create similar demands on the part of the Albanian minority in
Macedonia. But Kosovo's future autonomy, independence or partition is an issue for the
parties to work out - preferably with U.S. or Contact Group mediation - not for outsiders to
impose.
     Finally, the administration is repeating its earlier mistake in Bosnia of being deliberately
vague about the use of military force. Senior administration officials have said that "no
options" have been ruled out and expressed a willingness "to use every appropriate tool at
our command" to deal with this problem. But no official has repeated the so-called
Christmas warning issued by President Bush in late 1992, which reportedly made clear
that in "the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action, the United States will be
prepared to employ military force against the Serbians in Kosovo and in Serbia proper."
     After years of making military threats in Bosnia and failing to follow through, the
administration finally regained its credibility after the August 1995 bombing campaign
against the Bosnian Serbs. It would be tragic to squander this credibility on repeating past
mistakes by making military threats while having neither the plans nor the intention to
follow them up.  Instead, the administration must clarify the conditions in which military
force will be used. There must be a clear red line-for instance, a repeat of the kind of
massacres by Serb paramilitary police we saw at the beginning of March.
     Clarity concerning the use of force against Serbia also is necessary to ensure that
steps we and our allies might take to deploy NATO troops along the border in Albania and
extending a beefed-up military presence in Macedonia are not taken to mean by Belgrade
that we're concerned only about preventing the spread of conflict beyond current borders
and not about what happens inside Kosovo proper.
     Our initial response to Serb atrocities in Kosovo has been all too reminiscent of
previous failures in Bosnia. It is time to show we have learned the lessons of Bosnia that
an effective response to unacceptable behavior cannot be confined to economic sanctions
alone but must include a workable diplomatic framework and an evident willingness to use
force.
     Above all, it requires concerted American leadership by demonstrating a willingness to
go it alone rather than compromising for the sake of allied unity.

The writer, associate professor at the University of Maryland's School of Public Affairs,
worked on U.S. policy toward Bosnia on the National Security Council in 1995 -1996.

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