ZëRI DIGEST
Nr. 1669, July 11, 1998
KOSOVA
BATTLE FOR PRISHTINA
By Mufail LIMANI
While fighting erupts, or last preparations for
it are made all around Kosova, Prishtina has become a political province
indeed; on the other hand, transforming Prishtina into Kosova's political
capitol, through a demand that Albanians should have a single competent
and fully legitimate center to communicate with, has become an actual international
matter. Naturally everyone knows what we have here is that KLA should get
into politics, meaning that force will be more close for KLA, and will
perhaps have a major weight for future developments.
At the third DLK convention
Dr. Rugova made the biggest mistake in his career: he overestimated the
role of the personality in history (which he himself spoke of at that convention...),
he changed and sacked the entire party leadership, with very important
representatives of all relevant political views in Kosova. Hence he, in
fact, remained alone.
In elections that followed
in March, amidst Serbian massacres that were beginning to take place, people
had gone in demonstrations against Serbia, with almost no one even looking
at what was written on the ballots... But Rugova's "friends" do not explain
these elections as such. Quite the opposite, the course of the third convention
and March elections were totally misread by those who have influence at
Rugova, averting him from the most essential thing - that for a long time
now Rugova has no simple status of a national personality or symbol in
Kosova, who people like more or less then others, and that he was a real
embodiment of Albanians' crucial need to be unified in face of the Serbian
threat. His critics never entirely understood this spontaneous popular
need as those who profited from Rugovism. The misreading of Rugovism, as
a massive, almost religious idolatry of a man, seems to be the very factor
that leaves Kosova lacking a serious political decision making center.
And that Kosova is still
not such unexperienced in political life, it suffices to recall a popular
support for Communist leaders by the end of '80-ies, when they started
openly quarrelling with Milosevic. Those who have forgotten this, perhaps
ashamed of those days, are the ones to blame why they once underestimated
and once overestimated the political maturity of the average Kosovar. Put
into a single word, by attaching the entire weight of "power" on a single
man, with a clear and not too disgraceful purpose of putting under control
all developments in Kosova, quite the opposite was achieved: Kosova, some
maintain, has been decapitated.
Rather then decapitated,
Kosova today has been left without political monopoly. In this situation,
DLK now tries to preserve as much influence through Rugova and Western
diplomacy, for which he remains a major player, with the most significant
aspect being the demand for the constitution of the parliament where DLK,
in fact, has no opposition whatsoever. This demand is nothing less that
an open attempt for Demai's and Qosja's new expulsion from politics.
This attempt for the
constitution of the parliament, which derives from the dubious elections
(which is proven by the immaterial influence of current representatives
in their electoral units) revives the fear as far as the prospects of a
new consensus among Albanian leaders, being that at the very start, by
reaffirming monopoly, it excludes the idea of consensus. Anyhow, a further
denial of the DLK monopoly by Americans is a sign that days of all calculations
with the one- party monopoly in this party are gone for good. The sooner
they see this they will be better off. Those who are left, ought to learn
form mistakes of the others...
COOPERATION AND RIVALRIES
By Fehmi AGANI
Should the parliament be accepted or not, convoked
or not, should it function or not? How come there are such dilemmas concerning
the parliament of the Republic of Kosova? It is indeed hard to understand!
There may be a lot of
truth in numerous objections as far as the elections. But, who can deny
the legitimacy of the elections with the turn out of over 80% of potential
voters! And, who may be interested in denying the Parliament which in our
case is the furthermost important institution of the statehood?! And how
come an institutional vacuum is created exactly when the Republic of Kosova
craves to be recognized and affirmed?!
There is no need to
mystify the role of the institutions, consequently neither of the parliament!
But, nor to belittle its function by artificial analogy. Less can we problematize
its composition. There are no illusions as far as prospects of functioning
of this parliament. But, even its mere symbolic functioning as a parliament
of the Republic of Kosova, even if as only its contest of Serbia and its
pretensions in Kosova, the fact that we can say that Serbian parliament
is not ours, and that its laws are invalid to us, and that they can only
be imposed as laws of the occupying power - even this fact only, does this
not suffice to constitute the parliament as soon as possible, to demand
accountability solely from it, to eventually push the constitution of the
parliament?
The National Council
which is being recommended, even though such institutions may be very fruitful,
in the concrete case means giving up from the statehood institutions; to
me it sounds something like 'National Council - Sulejman Ugljanin"! It
cannot replace the parliament, it can only be its degradation!
The president? There
is much to be said on this subject. Not enlisting into the camp of those
who are today inclined only to disapprovingly weigh his function, I have
to say that there was and still is much misunderstanding regarding this
function.
First, it is commonly
forgotten that president as an institution exists only in the system of
institutions and therefore, if there is no parliament (and government),
there can also be no president. Not to mention various aspects of realizing
its very function. But, the president is the one elected and dr. Rugova
is the one who has been elected, not longer ago then this year.
Relations between institutions
are always complex, and the act of elections does not sanctify every action
taken. Elections, on the contrary, create obligations and responsibilities,
with a obligation of establishing a cooperative spirit that can not be
realized through isolation and scorn, but through encountering permanently
discussing matters of this or that view with his associates, certainly
being among the most important. Anyhow, disagreements in these relations
through designated, institutional procedures, such as early elections and
other ways, cannot help but seriously damage the cooperation as well as
the Kosova question.
Political disagreements
are not seldom anywhere, and therefore should not come as a surprise. But,
Kosova finds itself in moments when its destiny is decided, at least at
this stage. Hence, one can understand the public pressure not to allow,
regardless of who is right and who is not on particular matters, inter-Albanian
disagreements with all the emotional weight they carry, to damage or prolong
the most favorable settlement possible.
AVOIDING A BIG POLITICAL MISTAKE
By Adem DEMAÇI
Mr Rugova's and his supporters' policy of wrong
"investments" was found, precisely during this hot summer, before full
bankruptcy. In order to escape full bankruptcy, mr Rugova, his supporters,
his followers and his advisors have thought of finding creditors who would
be prepared to cover up their political losses.
For this purpose, mr
Rugova and other political bankrupts called a "consultation" of all "parliamentarian"
and non parliamentarian parties. The idea was to urge the non parliamentarian
parties to become partners with bankrupts so these deceivers and swindlers
could, for some time, continue selling fog and illusions.
Let's see whether one
can trust mr Rugova, and whether one can work with mr Rugova? How can you
trust a man who has not only tried to stop mr Gelbard in making a mistake
by unjustly accusing KLA as a terrorist organization, but has made the
very same mistake himself, after which the Serbian regime was given a green
light to massacre the martyr people of Drenica under the veil of "fighting
terrorism"?
A question rises - who
are those who hold lectures on unification? The very same ones that all
along engaged in splinters so they could preserve the political monopoly;
the very same that due to extremely low political level helped and supported
our political splinters and defeats in the name of unification around never
created and non existent institutions even nowadays.
Joining these individuals
means that you are headed toward a bottomless well! Because only lunatics
may try to carry coal to Newcastle! We engage and we will engage for unification,
because even little children know that unification builds strength, but
not by carrying coal to Newcastle, not with sour apples and not with bearers
of bankrupt politics.
Let us round up this
"tale" for all those who urge us to join "those who carry coal to Newcastle".
It is an argument, seemingly small, but with great meaning. Why has mr
Milosevic stated that he is prepared to meet only and only mr Rugova? Well,
for the mere fact that mr Rugova for so many times now has shown as such
a soft, such generous and such "spendthrift" man so he could be prepared,
despite big words he speaks, to sell Albanians' interests. Many people
still talk more than think, still wish more than work, give more then buy
airs, consequently we find ourselves in this political destitution.
CONSENSUS OR DISSENSUS
By Mehmet HAJRIZI
Many a thing was responsibly or irresponsibly
written these days on the topic of consensus, on the unity and on the unification.
We all know, and we all understand the historical weight of the consensus
today as an internal need and external demand, but not the same goes for
criteria and ways it may be reached. This can best be illustrated by the
recent meetings of representatives of Kosova political subjects who dealt
exactly with this topic.
Conceptual differences
of these meetings consist in the continuation of already failed practices
of the past, or in their change. The previous legislature of the Republic
of Kosova, in spite of all ceaseless and various forms insistence of representatives
and political subjects, was never convoked. The Kosova public not even
today knows anything about fundamental reasons why parliament and bodies
which derive from it were not constituted, since we metanymycally spoke
about the effects rather than reasons. Therefore, we ought to clarify these
reasons and those who caused them in order to understand better current
phenomenons in the political arena.
Those that yesterday's
did not want because they lacked the courage, boldness and will to institutionalize
the independence of the Republic of Kosova, fail to do that today, too.
This March elections were carried not only without a considerable part
of our national movement, but further worse, against it, by settling accounts
with it in a lowest possible way: by the misuse of the electorate, misuse
of its sentiments and votes.
The parliament deriving
from the March elections not only does not represent the unification of
our entire political and national subject, but also does not represent
those who participate in it, because four months have e already passed
without convoking its constitutive meetings. Whoever else would have blocked
this meeting, but not non-parliamentarian, as they please to call them,
subjects.
Now the very same subjects
are urged not to jointly and sincerely deal with capital matters of our
broken down movement toward building, with democratic suggestions, our
common responsibilities, but are rather urged for consensus so they could
endlessly continue their game of deceit and illusion with strong but fictive
words.
How can you forge new
associations, build the unity of a national movement and the consensus
without repairing big damages caused by blows against the Prishtina University
students' movement, by disregarding and scornful stance against the organized
and already internationally recognized national resistance, or by treating
subjects of this movement as convinced scribes.
The political subject
of Kosova, united or splintered, should ultimately understand (if it still
remains on the arena) that the a chapter of our movement, that started
on October 1, 1997, has already been completed. Like it or not this chapter
cannot be brought back. New realities can not be treated by old archetypes.
Old ideas of their authors sink together with past times.
Organized masses have
already replaced sick political protagonists, courage has replaced fear,
and the real cult of freedom has replaced mystified idols. "When masses
get on the political arena", used to say Zwieg, "courage is the decisive
nominator in all calculations".
ON THE INAUGURAL EXPEDITION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
MONITORING MISSION IN KOSOVA
DIPLOMATIC PICNIC THROUGH RUINS OF HUMAN CONSCIENCE...
By Agron RAMAJ
Although in his speech mr Miles announced that
a mixed convoy of diplomats and journalists would pass through four Serbian
police checkpoints, not specifying whether this implies stopping, it was
very soon clear that Serbian authorities had tried to maximally relativize
the significance of police checkpoints during this expedition.
The convoy procreated
by the first police checkpoint at the entrance to Vushtërri without
stopping, passed through the outskirts of Mitrovica, Shipol, and headed
toward Skënderaj. Only few kilometers out of Shipol, passengers of
this convoy started encountering a new reality - a horrifying void along
the road replaced Shipol's streets full of people, a void which was disturbed
only by a convoy of Serbian police armored vehicles which was passing by
shortly before noon.
And police officers
are the first living creatures to emerge. At high noon convoy makes its
first stop at the police checkpoint in Klina e Epërme, on the road
junction that leads to Peja and Skënderaj.
Soon as the auto convoy
stops, diplomats go ahead, followed by rushing reporters who hope to grasp
bits of the discussion between diplomats and the police. But, a low stature
police officer, with an automatic rifle in his hands, assisted in conversation
by ambassador Kotov with his knowledge of English, only reports that situation
during the day is quiet, with shooting from surrounding hills during the
night.
After passing the checkpoint
on the entrance to Klina e Epërme, the convoy continues its way through
this quiet scattered village, and while approaching Skënderaj there
are people emerging reporting that this village is, still not completely,
abandoned.
Once in Skënderaj,
the situation changes - roads are barren, you perhaps see a man in every
hundred meters. Barren roads of Skënderaj seem to make heaviest impression
on passengers of the convoy who speak the same language with this towns'
inhabitants that have fled. On the other hand, there are but few policemen
- it looks as preparations for the diplomatic convoy were completed on
time.
The auto convoy doesn't
make a stop in Skënderaj. The next stop is Polaci i Ri, situated on
a hill from which Skënderaj is controlled, and where, half an hour
past noon, there were less then dozen policemen. Albanian forces are positioned
only couple of kilometers further.
As the convoy stops,
diplomats go forward again, and they are followed by reporters, but the
"dialogue" this time around is shorter. The Serbian commander of the checkpoint,
with a clearly simulated self confidence, says that he cannot say anything.
Regardless of the fact that mr Miles had announced in Prishtina that they
could go little further beyond this point, which optimists interpreted
as a chance of meeting members of the Kosova Liberation Army, this did
not happen. As asserted, reasons were of a diplomatic nature, and disagreements
in this regard were expressed up front the convoy, in the car with wavering
American and Russian flags.
The return to the road
that leads to Prekaz i Poshtëm showed that this is quite a different
experience.
You could not see a
living thing along the road. Even dead dogs lying along the unpaved road
showed that practically no one was saved around here. The road passes through
a woody hill, where the Ammunition factory is located, which represents
a Serbian police stronghold.
In ruins of Prekazi
i Ulët many diplomats are not in first rows. They remain almost alone
once they get of their cars. Reporters rush towards destroyed houses, despite
the warning by the U.S. mission chief of security that there may be explosive
devices. Those devices are, for sure, not the only things to impede reporters:
on the steep rise reaching the houses, colleagues from Reuters are attacked
by "reporters" - civilian Serbian policemen. Nothing has changed in the
house of Jasharaj family since that day of March 5 when they suffered a
massive attack by the Serbian police. Traces of destruction are a proof
to the visitors that the battle on that day of March was fought until the
end.
Nevertheless, a heavy
atmosphere of stillness, which terrifies, prevails in this unseen destruction.
Nor reporters and some diplomat, such as Italian ambassador mr Ricardo
Sesa, when they get nearer for a closer look of what has remained inside,
break this stillness. On the ground floor of the two story house visitors
notice a pair of children shoes, among others. Whose shoes may be... Blerim's,
Besarta's, Kushtrim's or...? It is difficult to answer this question in
the house that had twelve children among victims...
WITNESSES OF FIGHTING IN BARDHI I MADH AND HADE
THEY WERE USING HEAVY ARTILLERY WHILE MY SON
WAS USING A WELDED GUN
By Besa ILAZI
The crack down of the Serbian police and army
ten days ago in Bardh i Madh, Lismir and Hade forced more then 30 thousand
inhabitants of these and other close villages flee their homes. Most of
them have sought shelter in safer places, and it is claimed that a number
of them, thousands of them, are still somewhere in Qyqavica mountain whereabouts
awaiting starved and hopelessly to return to their homes. Whereas in the
village of Hade prevails a graveyard silence, and one can only occasionally
hear sniper shots fired by the Serbian police, in Bardhi i Madh you may
notice the movement of the KLA members if not of the domestic population...
From some that succeeded
in getting out of these villages we tried to find out how KLA took Bardhi
i Madh, how were villagers organized in defence, and to learn about the
crack down of the Serbian police and army.
A youngster from Bardhi
i Madh, who found shelter in Prishtina together with his eleven member
family, says: "On Monday, June 22, the day KLA took over Bardhi i Madh,
I was not at home. The next day I came home and the very same day, at eleven
11 A.M., villagers gathered in order to decide how to act. Unfortunately,
as you may know, DLK in Bardhi i Madh was divided in two factions, and
the faction of Prekopuca, who is very influential in villages, had previously
gotten in contact with KLA soldiers, those of Zhilivoda. The other faction,
the faction of Ahmet Krasniqi was constantly engaged all along the way;
we had tried to help inhabitants of these regions with food and medicaments
since war erupted in Drenica. Bardhi i Madh, on the other hand, was the
only supply route for this region, but how did all this happen, no one
can explain. Some say that KLA was forced to take the open mine pit so
it could avoid the stationing of the police in those parts..."
"But, something quite
different emerged; at the meeting names of leaders and commanders, all
fellow villagers of Prekopuca's faction, as well as of dubious individuals,
which were known for frauds much earlier, were read and we found ourselves
before a completed act, and we had our destiny in hands of individuals
one could not trust. We were disillusioned: how can a mass of 3-4 thousand
people follow individuals one can not trust. Later we were told by a soldier
that they were simply astounded with this people, how can they be so indifferent,
but then he too had suspected if they had knocked at the wrong door, which
was proven to be true. So, in that, call it, disarray that lasted for a
week people, although not opposing assignments given to them, such as opening
trenches and small shelters, carried out everything unwillingly. We in
the village had a man who had graduated the military academy, but he was
ignored and never asked about anything, never engaged for anything. They
wanted to verify his past, his record... He, nevertheless, tried and all
day long warned them that the attack would be carried not from Slatina
pines, as it was thought, but from the opposite end, from Dobro Sella,
thing later to be proven right.
The population began
fearing, and most of the inhabitants of these villages started pulling
out their families since the very first days. But, various individuals,
not soldiers, from surrounding villages, in the name of the army, were
thwarting them. They used to stop families on the road and send them back.
They maltreated our
children, and on the other hand they had pulled out their families themselves
days before. One of them even gave a totally irrational answer bearing
in mind the massacre in Prekazi i Ulët, saying that children should
not be pulled out because where there were children there would be no massacres.
It is not true that
villagers of Bardhi i Madh were offered weapons and that they had refused
them. There were no weapons, this was KLA's major concern".
"The attack of the police
and army began Sunday, somewhere around noon, at 2 P.M. Initially there
were sporadic shots from light weapons, and then two grenades were fired,
exploding on the entrance to Bardhi i Madh. That was the front line. They
shelled Bardhi i Madh, there are many houses destroyed, but none has totally
been burnt down. Fortunately, the population had pulled out earlier, with
only men staying behind. There were large movements of the population,
because soldiers all the time needed help..."
"Now I have found shelter
in Prishtina together with my six member family; I have my brother and
his four members family, and my mother, with me now too. There were massive
movements of the population from all villages of that part, not only from
Bellacevac. The population of Fushë Kosova, of the village Halilaq,
that is close to the army, Sllatina e Madhe, Sllatina e Vogël, Bardhi
i Madh, Bardhi i Vogël, Pomozetin, Grabovc, they all moved. Then villagers
of Obiliq municipality, Leshkoshiq, Shipitullë, Grabovc i Epërm,
Hamidi, Plemetin, Hade also moved... Some headed toward the town, and some
others toward Drenica and Qyqavica mountains. But, the situation is particularly
difficult for those who pulled out toward mountains and Drenica, because
it is known that Drenica, as it is, is an impoverished region, particularly
now when the only supply route for assistance has been blocked, and when
there is no food... We came through mountains around Sllatina and up to
Prishtina. The population of Bardhi i Madh moves from time to time, we
go for water for cattle and food, for a simple thing we need. The electric
power was cut off four or five days before making the already difficult
life more difficult for those who stayed behind. Dishonorable individuals
have come to the village to rob us... We think of returning to our homes
as soon as possible, but based on the positions of the Serbian police and
army, we think this will not happen soon", says by the end a disillusioned
youngster from Bardhi i Madh.
INTERVIEW
JANUSZ BUGAJSKI
THE INDEPENDENCE OF KOSOVA WAS UNNEEDEDLY
REFUSED
By Isuf HAJRIZI, NEW YORK
Z RI: Do you find the NATO threat real, or are we heading toward a strenuous path of awaiting and lagging as in Bosnia despite the statements given by Clinton and some others?
BUGAJSKI: I fear that developments from last week show that we Americans have pulled back. We have pulled back from a strong threat against Milosevic urging him to revoke all forces from Kosova. He refused this, and at the same time recruited Russia to assist it so it could, once more, escape the NATO attack, similar to Bosnia before the Dayton Accords. Milosevic acts only up to the scale of not forcing NATO to embark its attack against it. I fear that we have made too many compromises by balancing the blame between Milosevic's forces and the Kosova Liberation Army. As we all know, most of the KLA guerrillas defend their homes. However, I think that NATO threat is on the table, and if Milosevic were to decide to get involved in a major crack down in order to massacre the population and force massive expulsion, then the NATO threat would become more real. But, even if NATO threat did not exist, I think that war in Kosova will continue whether NATO gets in or not. This war will drag. NATO intervention would shorten this dragging, the nonintervention would stretch it.
Z RI: In what measure has the splinter in the Kosovar leadership complicated efforts of the United States to resolve this problem?
BUGAJSKI: Unfortunately Kosova leadership does not speak with a single voice. There have always been political cracks among Rugova's people, on one side, and Demai's people and some other parties and individuals, on the other. Now a new factor has emerged, the KLA which has appointed its official spokesman. KLA hesitates to be connected to any of these groupations, and may head toward creating a sort of its own Sein Feinn which would speak on its behalf. I think that KLA's participation is necessary in any kind of talks, since it has already turned into a serious war force. But, the splinter in the Kosovar leadership does not help America, which can simply not talk only to Rugova or any of his advisors or some other leaders, and take this as an unified stance. On the other hand, Rugova is not able to take control over the movement, and the same goes for a part of the KLA which is not able of controlling the entire movement on the ground. Not being a concentrated force, KLA remains a decentralized guerilla force, which may be required for current circumstances. However, this form of action within KLA makes negotiations more difficult.
Z RI: Is there any particular strategy that the United States and is allies continue their support of Rugova, despite their awareness that Kosova president is losing control?
BUGAJSKI: I would say that they have no one else
they would support, so the United States continue to support Rugova, being
that they supported him from the very beginning. He is a man devoted to
the resolution of the problem in a peaceful way despite the fact that the
U.S. administration has not agreed to his objective, namely to the independence
of Kosova. But they have agreed to his strategy, to his tactics, to his
peaceful manner, to his nonviolent approach. Ignore Rugova at this time,
I think this would have produced confusion in America, lacking another
personality to talk to. Could that person be a KLA or opposition member?
If we abandoned Rugova, then we would have to insist on new elections or
on a new referendum in order to see who the people would chose.
Of course, KLA should participate in that process.
But it would be very difficult to hold elections at the time when everyone
is aware how difficult is to hold simple elections anywhere in Yugoslavia,
let alone in war time. I think that the U.S. administration will continue
to support Rugova despite his weakening. But, the administration will,
nevertheless, increase its contacts with KLA.
Z RI: Few days ago U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke stated that the status of Kosova should change within Yugoslavia. Does this imply the status of republic for Kosova, and is this the end to which Americans are aspiring?
BUGAJSKI: Yes, I think that the United States, although they have not stated this publicly, see the status of the republic as something that both sides would consent to. In other words, Kosova as the third Republic in the remnant Yugoslavia. Even though we are not certain what reaction could this cause in Montenegro, whose leadership is against such a status for Kosova, and could consequently seek a loose confederation, which would sent us back to 1991, when Yugoslavia disintegrated. I think that many governments have unneededly refused the option of the Kosova's independence. In fact, we should carefully see what kind of independence we are dealing with, what sovereignty, what kind of state would Kosova become toward fulfilling the will of the Kosova people by not causing instability in Balkans. My argument would be, if independence contributed the movement toward democracy and would have helped in overthrowing Milosevic in Serbia, then I think that independence is a right option. It is impossible to deny the option of the independence when 100 per cent of the Kosova people want it.
--- SUBMITTED BY PRESS NOW, AMSTERDAM 1998 ---
senden