JANUSZ BUGAJSKI: The case for an independent Kosovo
Copyright © 1998 Nando.net
Copyright © 1998 The Christian Science Monitor
(August 19, 1998 10:01 a.m. EDT http://www.nandotimes.com)
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If Kosovo ever slips out of Serbia's grip, the
international community will need to weigh the regional impact of the region's
independence. Most policymakers still believe that a sovereign Kosovo will
destabilize the Balkans. But an alternative scenario must now be seriously
considered: that without independence the unresolved Albanian question
will traumatize Europe for many years to come.
Conventional wisdom
contends that statehood for Kosovo will ignite a series of ethnic and territorial
conflicts in the south Balkans. It will radicalize the large Albanian minority
in Macedonia and precipitate the disintegration of this linchpin state.
Indeed, some leaders of the guerrilla Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) have
asserted that their ultimate objective is the "unification" of all Albanian
lands.
The destabilization
of any state bordering Kosovo would have wider ramifications. Analysts
worry about the unraveling of the Dayton accords through the revival of
Serb separatism in Bosnia. Meanwhile, conflict in Macedonia could embroil
Bulgaria, Serbia, Albania, Greece, and Turkey in a replay of the Second
Balkan War. In order to avoid such scenarios, NATO leaders have adamantly
opposed Kosovo's independence. The main fear in any planned NATO bombing
campaign is not the Yugoslav military reaction but the political impact
on Kosovo's status if Belgrade withdraws its security forces from the province.
But an alternative view
on the Kosovo crisis must now be seriously weighed: the independence option.
Kosovo's detachment from Serbia could deal a fatal blow to President Slobodan
Milosevic and unleash potentially more constructive forces in Serbian politics.
It is the absence of Kosovo's statehood that can be seen as destabilizing
the region by providing opportunities for militant gunmen and criminal
organizations to prosper. Milosevic manipulates the Kosovo question to
keep himself in power and to stifle any chances for political or economic
reform throughout rump Yugoslavia.
Milosevic bears primary
responsibility for four wars in the past decade and if left unchecked he
could spark further conflicts in Montenegro and Macedonia by manipulating
the Albanian question. The loss of Kosovo and the collapse of the moribund
Yugoslav economy could provoke an internal conflict in Serbia. This would
weaken Belgrade's expansionist pretensions and may bring new democrats
or pro-Western figures to the forefront. Even if this fails, then a truncated
Serbia will remain a weak pariah state that no longer threatens its neighbors.
The legal arguments
for maintaining an integral Yugoslavia are reminiscent of our obsolete
policies in 1991 when four of the eight federal units declared independence.
Kosovo is simply the fifth unit that has opted for sovereignty, and Montenegro
may be the next in line, particularly as President Milo Djukanovic has
already threatened to hold a referendum on secession. Milosevic's Yugoslavia
is not the successor to the Titoist state and cannot be treated as a normal
legal entity given Milosevic's disregard for international human rights
conventions.
Kosovo's statehood,
if handled adroitly by the international community, could help resolve
the simmering Albanian question in the south Balkans. Instead of provoking
calls for a Greater Albania it could actually pacify Albanian demands and
allow Europe to increase its influence in the region. But in order for
Kosovo to become a source of regional stability, NATO must control the
process from the very beginning.
Once Belgrade is forced
to withdraw its forces from the province through some combination of NATO
intervention and Albanian resistance, then Kosovo should be declared an
international protectorate. Washington and London must take charge in overseeing
the creation of any new Kosovor administration and this must be accomplished
in a much more resolute manner than in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Under international
supervision, the Pristina government would need to commit itself to ensuring
a full range of minority rights for Serbs, Montenegrins, Muslims, and Romas.
It would have to renounce any potential territorial claims to Macedonia,
Serbia, or Montenegro, and indeed sign treaties with its three Slavic neighbors
to that effect. It would also need to commit itself to democratic pluralism,
the rule of law, a market economy, and European integration.
The KLA could then develop
into a Kosovo Security Force under a NATO arm and train program similar
to the one in Bosnia. NATO itself would disarm any rogue units and help
patrol the Macedonian and Serbian borders. Meanwhile, the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the European Union could dispatch
teams of monitors to the country. Their long-term presence under a NATO
umbrella would help ensure Pristina's compliance with democratic norms
in a range of arenas.
Beyond Kosovo, the international
community would need to make a much firmer commitment to both Macedonia
and Albania, in terms of ensuring their territorial integrity and domestic
development. In Macedonia a multi-ethnic polity must be promoted with expanded
rights for the Albanian population that would undercut the demands of militants
for unification with Kosovo. Albania itself must be rebuilt as a secure
and law-abiding state while eliminating gun-runners, smugglers, and other
criminal organizations.
The international Contact
Group has failed to come up with a credible plan for Kosovo. Instead, its
empty statements have simply encouraged both Belgrade and the KLA to continue
the war.
Now is the time to lay
the foundations for a lasting political and regional solution, one that
will guarantee self-determination for the Albanian majority while simultaneously
pushing Milosevic toward a long-overdue political suicide.
JANUSZ BUGAJSKI is director of East European studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington and a frequent visitor to the Balkans.