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Date: Thu, 07 Oct 1999 14:59:58
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From: Balkan Action Council <bac@balkanaction.org>
Subject: Brzezinski article - "Why
Milosevic Capitulated in Kosovo"
THE BALKAN ACTION COUNCIL
October 7, 1999We commend the following article to your attention, written by Executive
Committee member Zbigniew Brzezinski and published in The New Leader on
October 7, 1999.
------------------------------------------------------------------------Why Milosevic Capitulated in Kosovo
The unresolved mystery of the Kosovo crisis is why Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic capitulated. To be sure, a number of explanations have been advanced for his running up the white flag in Belgrade after enduring a 79-day air campaign. Yet even the principal ones, as we shall see, fail to answer the question.
1. NATO the Military Victor (initially favored by NATO spokesmen):
Milosevic gave in because NATO's bombing became more effective, especially after the Kosovo Liberation Army drew the Serbian troops out of their camouflaged and reinforced positions. But we know that the Serbian Army withdrew from Kosovo in relatively good condition, having suffered very few of the NATO-claimed personnel and material loses. From a battlefield perspective, the bombing campaign was a bust.2. NATO the Strategic Victor (the fallback position of NATO spokesmen):
Milosevic gave in because the bombing of Serbia's economic infrastructure became too painful. While painful, it did not crack Serbian civilian morale. Indeed, the Serbian Army seemed quite willing to wait until NATO gathered enough courage to engage in ground combat, at which point it hoped to inflict politically damaging casualties. Since Milosevic is not a sentimentalist, it is doubtful that the limited economic discomfort of his people was decisive.3. NATO the Relentless Warrior (favored by White House boosters):
Milosevic gave in because he realized NATO was quietly gearing up for a decisive ground campaign with the U.S. President gradually accepting its strategic necessity. The problem here is that any such preparations were at most minimal when Milosevic capitulated. Moreover, in the light of President Bill Clinton's continuing assurances to the contrary, it was far from clear that the U.S. leadership would muster the courage to undertake a potentially bloody ground operation.4. NATO the Political Success (favored by the State Department):
Milosevic gave in because he finally realized that NATO - thanks to constant diplomatic consultations - would stick together and persist in the bombing, no matter what. There is an element of truth in this view, but it does not tell us why the Serbian ruler caved in so one-sidedly and suddenly, especially considering the military ineffectiveness of the strategic air assault, its relatively limited economic scope, and the U.S. reluctance to fight on the ground. Public passivity and the good condition of his army were still his assets.5. Russia as NATO's Savior (favored by those who always see Russia as helpful, even when it clearly is not):
Milosevic gave in because Russia on June 3rd- after having strongly supported him - abruptly opted for the West, leaving Belgrade isolated and without any choice. This explanation, explicitly endorsed by Lieutenant General Sir Michael Jackson (the NATO commander in Kosovo) among others, seems to have some plausibility. But it does not explain satisfactorily what Russia was trying to achieve by appearing to embrace the Western demand for Milosevic's full withdrawal, or why he unexpectedly became so accommodating.The answer to the conundrums is to be found, I believe, in a careful chronological analysis of Moscow's reactions to the crisis, particularly the Kremlin's seemingly bizarre conduct during the crucial 10 days from June 2 to June 12. Actually Russia's policy toward the Kosovo crisis can best be understood as having three phases. The first was largely visceral and vitriolic. It involved an emotional and almost instinctive solidarity with Milosevic, violent denunciations of the bombing, and promises of support for the Serbs. Even prior to the bombing, on February 3, the Duma called for aid to Yugoslavia if NATO strikes. When a the air attack began, Russia sought a UN condemnation, and then Prime Minister Yevgeny M Primakov attempted to split off the Germans with a peace proposal that was more favorable to Milosevic than NATO's.
During this initial phase there were persistent rumors that a "volunteer" Russian contingent had gone to fight on the Serb side. Western intelligence sources also reported that some Russian military equipment was delivered to the Serbs, and that Russian military advice was provided. The overall Russian approach was well summarized on March 25 by a leading Moscow newspaper Nezavisimaya gazeta. The paper hopefully declared that the Kosovo action was initiating "the collapse of the U.S. global empire," and that it was in Russia's interest to let "the United States and NATO with its demented West and East European members bog down as deep in as possible in a Balkan War."
The second phase came into play once it dawned on the Kremlin that the NATO alliance would neither split nor quit. Russia now somewhat shifted its stand and sought to be part of the Western decision-making process. The chosen avenue was the G-8 foreign ministers consultations, where former Prime Minister Viktor S Chernomydrin, as his country's special envoy on the Balkans, assumed a highly visible role in seeking to convince NATO that it should soften its stand if it wished a "political" solution. By late May this process assumed the form of a two-headed effort: Chernomydrin and Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari took the lead on behalf of the G-8 in discussions with Milosevic: however, Chernomyrdin at times also met with Milosevic alone while Russia's public pronouncements became increasingly strident.
On May 27 Chernomydrin published an altogether hysterical op-ed piece in the Washington Post. He asserted that "the United States lost its moral right to be regarded as the leader of the free democratic world when its bombs shattered the ideals of liberty in Yugoslavia," called for the payment of reparations to Yugoslavia, and warned that he would urge President Boris N. Yeltsin to freeze all American-Russian relations unless the bombing stopped. The next day he met alone with Milosevic.
Two days after that extraordinary outburst the third and critical phase of Russia's policy was set in motion. Chernomyrdin let it be known that he was pleased with his discussions with Milosevic. On June 2 Russian TV reported that Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin "have brought not one but two different plans to Belgrade, " and added that "Moscow is talking about a virtual partition of Kosovo," "with a Russian contingent" under separate Russian command in control of northeast Kosovo. The very next day June 3, Milosevic accepted NATO's demand for the withdrawal of all Serb forces, while Chernomyrdin in an interview with Russian TV stated that "at Yugoslavia's special request Russia will also be represented" in the occupying peacekeeping force.
Events then unfolded quite rapidly. On June 4 the Russian Foreign and Defense Ministers held a closed meeting with the Duma to reassure it that Yugoslavia had not been betrayed. On June 5 Russian officers did not show at the first scheduled encounter between NATO and Serbian officers, held to coordinate the Serb withdrawal that was to take place promptly within a week. Between June 5 and 7, Serbian officers continued stalling in the negotiations, and on June 10 NATO agreed to a delay in the Serb withdrawal.
The same day, June 10, a Russian military contingent left its position in Bosnia, and - benefiting from full Serbian cooperation - moved swiftly through Serbia toward Kosovo. As this was happening, the Russian government reassured U.S. Vice President Al Gore that the Russian contingent would not enter Kosovo. The White House, always trustful, then disallowed the NATO commander's plan to execute a pre-emptive seizure of Pristina, Kosovo's capital. On June 11, at 1:30 A.M. the Russian forces entered Pristina and, with Serbian military assistance, took up defensive positions at the airport, barring the later arriving NATO forces. (According to some intelligence reports, the Russians secured some military equipment there that they had previously provided to the Serbs.)
A detailed account in the Moskovsky Komsomolets of June 14 tells the rest of the story - both what happened and what did not happen. Crowing over the Russia military coup and over Serbian crowds in Pristina burning U.S. and British flags, the paper said that as of June 12 a contingent of 2,500 Russian paratroopers was ready to be flown into Pristina, and that "it has already been decided that Russia will have its own sector" in Kosovo. The report noted that although Hungary had denied Russia air space, "this is not a problem - Bulgaria, for example, gave the go-ahead. Our planes could make a detour-from Russian coast over the Black Sea and Bulgaria straight to Kosovo." In other words, Kosovo would be partitioned by a unilateral fiat whether NATO liked it or not.
Alas for the Kremlin, things did not turn out so. Not only Hungary, but Bulgaria and Romania refused access to their air space, and the Kremlin prudently decided that it could not run the risk of having its air transports forced down. As a result, the Russian contingent in Pristina was left stranded. In the meantime the Serbian forces, in full retreat on exposed roads, could not reverse course without facing enormous vulnerability to resumed air attacks. For a week the Kremlin continued to insist on a separate sector, but on June 18 Russia reluctantly agreed to have its troops dispersed within the U.S., French and German zones.
It thus appears that Milosevic's sudden acquiescence was part of a desperate double-cross attempt engineered jointly by Belgrade and Moscow. Once Moscow realized that it could not sway the West. It used its role as the West's co-mediator to secretly fashion, with Milosevic, a pre-emptive maneuver marked as an accommodation. The collusion was contrived to outwit NATO by salvaging for Serbia - under Russia's protection - the northeastern part of partitioned Kosovo, and to gain for frustrated Russia a significant boost in international prestige. The attempt faltered because three small European countries had the gumption to defy Moscow, and NATO remained firm in not agreeing to a separate Russian sector. Under these circumstances, the double-cross did not work. At the end of the conflict, President Clinton effusively praised the Kremlin for its helpful role.
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THE BALKAN ACTION COUNCIL
P.O. Box 27392
Washington, DC 20038-7392
Tel: (202) 737-7720
Fax: (202) 737-7721
bac@balkanaction.org
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