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DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF ALBANIA
PRESS AND INFORMATION DEPARTMENT

                                                Tirana, July 17, 1998

                                Press Release

The Chairman of the Democratic Party of Albania, Prof. Dr. Sali Berisha
hailed the legal establishment of the Parliament of the Republic of
Kosova as an important institutional event in the Kosova history.

Mr. Berisha expressed his confidence that the cooperation of this
parliament with the other political and institutional factors as well as
with the Kosova Liberation Army is the best way to consolidate and forge
forward the process of the political solution of the Kosova problem.

Mr. Berisha stressed, "I avail myself of this opportunity to call upon
all the Kosova political forces and their leaders, to call upon the KLA
and its leaders to cooperate with each-other and with the Kosova
institutions in the spirit of realizing the great interests that join
them. I call on them to bear in mind that differences among them weaken
the representing and negotiating power of 2 million Albanians, whose
human and national rights have been confiscated by the regime of
Belgrade. Otherwise, the latter is provided with the chance to create in
Kosova another Bosnia".
--
Democratic Party of Albania
http://www.albania.co.uk/dp
e-mail. dpa@albania.co.uk

17 July 98
The Guardian

Rebels snub Kosovo politicians
By Jonathan Steele
Friday July 17, 1998

The Kosovo Liberation Army, the increasingly powerful armed champions of independence from Serbia, has thrown the province's politicians into disarray with a demand that their parties should "disband, create a united front and join the KLA".
The statement by Jakub Krasniqi, the KLA's official spokesman, snubs Kosovo's best-known political leaders, including the unofficial "President of Kosovo", Ibrahim Rugova, who has had strong backing from Western governments. "We don't acknowledge him as president," Mr Krasniqi said in an interview with the Albanian-language newspaper, Koha Ditore.
He accused Mr Rugova of "a series of mistakes", from his agreement to meet Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic in May without consulting other political forces to his failure to set up a coalition government in Kosovo representing all Kosovo Albanian opinion. "He is the main splitter," said Mr Krasniqi. Ironically, until he took up the gun this spring, Mr Krasniqi led the local branch of Mr Rugova's party, the Democratic League of Kosovo, in the region of Glogoc.
Mr Krasniqi's demand for primacy over the civilian politicians reflects the confidence of a movement that has grown within barely four months from a few isolated groups of men with rifles to a well-armed force estimated to be at least 10,000 strong.
Mr Rugova yesterday called the unofficial parliament of Kosovo into session for the first time. The move is likely to confirm his image as a splitter, since the main parties boycotted the elections in March.
Shortly after the legislators were sworn in at Mr Rugova's headquarters, Serb police entered the building and ordered them to leave. They dispersed peacefully.
The KLA spokesman had no comfort for the leaders of the two more radical parties that have been bidding to speak for the KLA. On the Albanian Democratic Movement, which split from Dr Rugova's party, Mr Krasniqi said "We have never had any contact or talks with this party."
The KLA spokesman was marginally less curt about Adem Demaci, a veteran campaigner for independence who spent 28 years in Yugoslav prisons, and heads the Parliamentary Party of Kosovo. Mr Demaci recently attempted to mediate with local KLA commanders laying siege to Kijevo.
Mr Demaci advocates a confederation, Balkania, which would link a sovereign Kosovo with Serbia and Montenegro. "We respect Demaci's personality and long political engagement with the Kosovo question," Mr Krasniqi said, "but we can't accept Balkania for many reasons".
The Americans have also been trying to get the Kosovo parties to unite. Richard Holbrooke, the US special envoy, spent three days in Pristina this month urging them to agree on a joint team to negotiate with the Serbs. He came away infuriated by the personality clashes between Mr Rugova, Mr Demaci and Rexhep Qosja, leader of the newly-formed Albanian Democratic Movement.
In frustration, the Western-led Contact Group - the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, plus Russia - which began by imposing sanctions on Yugoslavia for failing to offer serious concessions on Kosovo's status, has moved towards trying to impose a solution on both sides.
Klaus Kinkel, the German foreign minister, has compared it with the Dayton agreement, which ended the war in Bosnia in 1995. Diplomats say the plan, not yet complete, will enshrine the Contact Group's insistence that Kosovo cannot become independent.
Observers noted that the KLA spokesman did not attack the province's younger generation of politicians. One is Bujar Bukoshi, the unofficial "prime minister" of Kosovo, who lives in exile in Germany and is in charge of fund-raising for the independence movement. Another rising star is Veton Surroi, the founder of the paper Koha Ditore. Mr Surroi is highly regarded by the Americans.
Mr Krasniqi will have pleased Washington by describing the United States as "the most acceptable international mediator for us".
He rowed back from an earlier interview with the German magazine Der Spiegel in which he was translated as calling for Kosovo's unification with Albania. "In all our public statements we have declared that the KLA is struggling for the unification of all Albanian territories under occupation, which does not imply unification with Albania," he said.
--
Kosova Information Centre - London

17 July 1998

1 - 16 July 1998 TRANSCRIPT: PENTAGON BACKGROUND BRIEFING ON KOSOVO JULY 15
2 - TRANSCRIPT: STATE DEPT. NOON BRIEFING, THURSDAY, JULY 16, 1998
3 - NATO SECRETARY GENERAL MEETS WITH NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER BERGER
4 - TRANSCRIPT: WHITE HOUSE DAILY BRIEFING, THURSDAY, JULY 16, 1998
EXCERPTS
5 - PENTAGON SAYS AEGEAN PEACE, STABILITY A PRIORITY .16 July 1998
6 - TRANSCRIPT: PENTAGON SPOKESMAN'S REGULAR THURSDAY BRIEFING
___________________________________________
16 July 1998
TRANSCRIPT: PENTAGON BACKGROUND BRIEFING ON KOSOVO JULY 15

(Experts say FRY offensive has radicalized Kosovars) (7420)

Washington -- Slobodan Milosevic, president of the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" (FRY), by mounting a military offensive against Kosovar Albanians, has radicalized the province's majority ethnic Albanian population and helped transform the Kosovo Liberation Army from what had been a fringe insurgent group into a growing military force that is rapidly expanding its area of operations, according to top U.S. defense and intelligence officials July 15.
     As one of the senior briefers described the political/military situation in Kosovo, "Milosevic served very early on to radicalize the Kosovar Albanian ethnic population. With his decision to launch those operations, he has taken what at the time was a pretty fringe little group that had some popular acclaim, perhaps some scattered popular support, and through his actions he was able to drive them out of the Rugova camp who, by the way if you remember, Rugova during the shadow elections, drew 82 percent of the ethnic Albanian vote.
     "That's quite a significant statement on the part of the Albanians about who they vested their loyalty and vested their authority in.... But as time has gone by, I think it's fair to say that Milosevic's political decisions resulting in military action served to radicalize the ethnic Albanians and have a growth, consequently, in the KLA support."
     The officials told the press at a July 15 Pentagon background briefing that the insurgents now have a main force of about 2,000 fighters and the backing of as many as 20,000 armed supporters. They also said it appears the insurgents, who want an independent Kosovo, are also receiving considerable financial aid from expatriate Albanians elsewhere in Europe and in North America.
     One briefer said, the insurgents (UCK or KLA) are at this stage too poorly organized, trained and armed to be capable of launching major offensive operations against FRY forces and even too fragmented to negotiate. However, they said it appears that Belgrade has reduced the scale of its Kosovo military operations in recent weeks, in part because Milosevic does not want to provoke NATO retaliation.
     On the issue of the ground now being held by the KLA, one of the senior briefers said, "They hold the ground because the Serbs are allowing them to hold the ground. It hurts the Serbs too much right now to go in and take that ground. Milosevic is a master tactician. He knows exactly what he's about, and he understands fully those triggers, that level of pain, if you will, that will trigger an international response. He's a master at being able to manipulate those kinds of things."
     The officials indicated that the NATO is not "anywhere near" making a decision right now about any kind of armed intervention in Kosovo. However, one of them said that if "some levels of atrocities were to be reached that would be intolerable," this would "probably" trigger action.
     The briefers made clear that NATO members favor greater autonomy for Kosovo within the FRY, but that they also want to maintain the FRY's territorial integrity and oppose Kosovo independence.
     The U.S. military and intelligence briefers said, "Certainly the international community has made plain to both sides that we are not supporting either side. What we're supporting is an accommodation between the parties, and calling on both sides to reject violence as the solution.... They need to know and NATO has made this clear, the U.S. government has made this clear, that the cavalry is not coming. We are not supportive of Kosovo independence. So that needs to be very clear.... Our goal is to bring about serious negotiations."
     Asked if the situation in Kosovo has had any effect on the implementation of the Dayton Accords, an official briefer answered, "To date, no. There's been no influence on Bosnia on the situation right now."

Following is the Pentagon transcript:

(Begin transcript)

Background Briefing
Subject: Kosovo
Attributable to Defense and Intelligence Officials
Wednesday, July 15, 1998
11 a.m.(EDT)

CAPTAIN DOUBLEDAY: Good morning everyone. This is a background briefing today on the subject of Kosovo. We have a panel of six members. Right now the name cards are turned around with identifications that you can use for reporting purposes. I would ask the panel members to turn the name tags around at this point so that those of you in the audience will at least have some sense of the organizations and agencies that are represented today. But to make sure everybody is working off of the same sheet of paper, this is a background brief and you can attribute it to either defense officials or intelligence officials as indicated on the cards.
     We're going to start the briefing today with a brief rundown of the situation, where we stand at present in Kosovo, and then we'll take your questions.

BRIEFER: You've all been following what's going on in the news in Kosovo probably as well as I have. I'll just give you a quick rundown on where we stand based on the situation, as situations have unfolded since the beginning of the month, 1 July.
     Up to that point, as you'll recall, we know that the UCK [Kosovo Liberation Army, usually referred to as the KLA in the United States], the insurgent, basically had made some significant advancements because they were previously operating primarily out here in the western part of Kosovo after the air power demo on the 15th of April. Basically they started moving their operations to the east. The most significant gains being this control of a small town here south of Klina which is called Kijevo. And also, most notably, the coal mines located here in the vicinity of this town called Belecevac. What made it significant is the fact that it's located very close to the capital city of Pristina -- essentially less than ten kilometers from Pristina. That was significant enough it prompted the Serb forces to respond to this by basically sending forces into the area. The insurgents basically -- There was some resistance that was put up, but for the most part they basically withdrew from the area which allowed the Serbs to basically control the mines in this area again, and also within a couple of days basically muster up forces and actually move in from the west to retake this town of Kijevo. But retaking is probably a little bit strong. Basically the insurgents withdrew again, allowing the Serb forces to come back in, resupply the police station which was in the area, and then essentially they left the area again, which allowed the insurgents, like they typically do, which is basically fall back into those areas. That's generally what we're seeing.
     But since then, most of the operations, after basically what amounted to an operational pause probably by both sides, essentially were concentrated out here in the western area with sporadic outbreaks of low level fighting occurring out here in the Nariza Pec, and as we continue to see happen, down here in the Jocovic area where much of the smuggling activity tends to occur.
     Anyway, to bring you up to date to where we are now, not only is there some sporadic outbursts of fighting occurring here in the Pec area, also down here along the border with Albania, but also up here in the north in this town of Mitrovica where there appears to be some activity related to the Kosovo Liberation Army attempts to perhaps gain control or at least threaten this mine, a lead mine which is located in this area.
     So right now the Serb forces are probably moving to respond to this particular area, and that's where we stand. So for the most part, significantly lower levels of activity in terms of fighting or exchanges of fire by these sides than what we were seeing prior to the Belecevac and Kijevo actions by the Serb forces.

Q: Do you have any statistics on the numbers of individuals that are engaged in these?

A: Actually, no I don't, because for the most part we don't have very good information on that. We do know there is -- The number of Liberation Army folks that were involved [in] this Belecevac operation were fairly sizable numbers, probably in the several hundreds; and likewise by the Serbs. Otherwise in this operation, currently up here in the Mitrovica area, we don't have very good numbers.

Q: Have you seen any growth over time in terms of population of the insurgents? Growth over time of some of the individuals involved in some of these activities.

A: If you're talking about the size of the Kosovo Liberation Army, since this thing began, when it really kicked off back in the March time frame when we saw the activity out here just north of Lausa. The insurgent force has grown significantly. The current estimate that I've seen talked about in the press, which is probably as good as any other number, is around 2,000. That is, again, before this thing really started to heat up, the number was significantly lower, down in the lower hundreds.

Q: Do you know whether all those 2,000 are native Kosovars or Albanians or --

A: We don't really know. I would have to say they are predominantly, our estimate would be they are predominantly Kosovar Albanians -- native to this area, indigenous peoples.

Q: The Greek Defense Minister was in town last weekend. He said there were mercenaries from Tajikistan taking part on the side of the KLA. Do you have any knowledge as to whether that's true?

A: No, I don't. Because there have been a lot of reports like that, and for the most part they could very well just be spurious reports. There are a lot of people who want to make claims, I think, of supporting this particular operation, but we really don't have any way to verify the veracity of that information.

Q: So you have no knowledge if there are any foreign mercenaries involved in the Kosovo fighting, is that correct?

A:  Correct.

Q: How centralized are the insurgents? There are reports that a loose confederation of just folks that don't talk to one another.

A: For the most part, at least prior to this year, anyway, it was probably related to more of a loose confederation. As this particular insurgency has had some success, they probably have become more organized, just based on the way we sort of see this activity occurring. Really no hard and fast details or real intelligence information on that.

Q: Is there a centralized chain of command in the KLA? Is there a single military leader?

A: Our assessment would be that there is a central command structure, but in terms of how many people that represents, whether it's an individual or a coalition of both, we don't know.

A: These are particularly difficult questions to answer because the growth of this organization has been so explosive in the last six months. For us to say there's a specific chain of command might suggest something well beyond what we actually know and what exists. There obviously is communication and a sort of chain of command, but we are really uncertain as to the details of that and we don't have a lot of access or a lot of information on those kinds of issues. A lot of the good reports are actually coming from your colleagues who are in Kosovo at this point.

Q: Where is the funding for the KLA coming from? Is it indigenous? Is it local to Kosovo? Is it coming from outside?

A: The reports that we have suggest that the largest amount of the funding is coming from the outside, from Albanian expatriates in Europe and North America. But that's also very difficult to confirm.

Q: Can you describe a bit what you see as the objective of the insurgents and their capabilities in terms of achieving them?

A: That's a much more political question than a military question, as a matter of fact. There is currently a great deal of -- debate is probably not the right word. A sort of tug of war going on within the UCK and, frankly, among the Albanians over that issue. There are a variety of different goals. There are some political goals, some military, some factions among the Albanians led principally by Rugova looking for greater autonomy. Others are looking for independence, so it's very difficult to pin down an exact answer to your question and what their immediate goals are. They tend to be more localized for the moment. I'm not sure that it's possible to say that there is one single goal that all the Albanian Kosovars are actually speaking [seeking ?] at this point.

Q: I'm just wondering if there are any objectives that are intermediate to full independence that are suggested by the nature of their military campaign today.

A: I think it's probably fair to say there is not enough cohesion among the Albanian Kosovars politically, or militarily, at this point to say there's a single goal that has been articulated. We actually have a hard time in our community understanding exactly who is in charge, who is in charge of the military, who's in charge of the politics. Rugova has been the more or less elected and legitimate spokesman, but over the past few weeks it's been very clear that he doesn't necessarily speak for all Albanians. So it's very hard to identify...

Q: What I'm trying to get at is the guiding idea, if any, behind the selection of targets. Are they just hitting what they can hit? Are they just trying to stir up trouble? Does there seem to be some objective by hitting a coal mine here or another facility there?

A: I'd say it's probably a little bit of both. We know part of their plan has to be to keep this insurgency in the news, to keep it being discussed. That creates pressure not only on Milosevic, but supplies fuel for the international community to try to resolve this particular problem area. There's certainly a conscious effort on their part to keep this thing alive, so there will continue to be the sporadic outbursts of activity to put pressure on Milosevic and the international community.

Q: Can you talk a little bit about the chances of this conflict spilling over the borders? That seems to be a major concern for policymakers, but it's a little unclear to me how that can happen.

A: The general scenario, the most likely one, one of the things that was alluded to several weeks ago, and that is, it can come in the form of either an attempt to pursue smugglers that have come into Kosovo from Albania, and as they attempt to chase them back across the border, and the same with not just smugglers but also troops that are infiltrating in the area along the border areas. It's the cross border potential which is the thing which could cause this thing to spread. That's one of them. The other concern is that as this refugee situation increases, or the smuggling increases, that NATO might choose to intervene, or the Albanians perhaps put more forces there in the area. As you bring two forces into close proximity to each other, given their lack of concern about firing weapons at each other, that could spark something off.

Q: Beyond that, there was a projection that the Kosovo issue may bring Turkey and Greece face-to-face in a war. What kind of scenario is that? What could happen to bring them face-to-face?

A: The particular reference that you've just made is a reference that has significant historical roots and has been a part of our sort of consideration analysis of this area since 1992, really. The problem is both historic, and currently it's one of interlocking arrangements.
     The principal spillover scenario that we have looked at heretofore has been one involving refugees. That's the most difficult one because it involves the largest number of people. The refugee scenario is one in which a large number of refugees from Kosovo move into adjacent countries, Albania, Macedonia, and within Macedonia, for example, or within the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, to be precise, creates additional tensions among the ethnic Albanian population there which destabilizes the government and so forth, and the potential for those refugees to move further into Greece, which as you well know, still has some significant political problems with the government and certain arrangements between itself and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The Greeks have mentioned that they have legitimate security concerns there, and they might be forced to create some sort of protected barrier for themselves.
     In the meantime the Greeks and other countries in the region have arranged military and defense agreements with the countries in the Balkans. The Turks have done something similar. So what happens is you begin to build a great deal of pressure creating tensions and the potential activation of bilateral defense arrangements which could create all sorts of problems that might not necessarily be able to be controlled in terms of escalation.

Q:  Isn't that far-fetched?

A: For the moment, I hope that it is, but these tensions are very real and history is very real. Once there is one element of the sort, one thing happens, the prepared response by another country is almost immediate so there's not necessarily that period of consideration there. It's a possibility. One of the things we have to look at in terms of numbers of refugees and the potential for involvement of two NATO allies.

Q: I'd like to ask some of the defense officials. NATO planners have been working on a list of military options which we've been told run from everything from putting troops along the borders to possibly enforcing a no-fly zone, even up to possibly airstrikes as options. Given the situation on the ground now as you've described it in which it appears that the Kosovo Liberation Army is as much the problem as Milosevic's heavy handed tactics, how could any of these military options be employed to resolve this?

A: Mr. ____ is our NATO expert and he can talk to the planning process, but as a preliminary remark, I would just like to say that that is exactly what both the political and the military side of the house are grappling with. When you look at the situation on the ground you have to weigh any action that you take. Is it in terms of helping the UCK versus Milosevic? Is it helping Milosevic versus the UCK? How is it that you differentiate to take those very specific actions to achieve the political ends that you want? That is a tough nut to crack and that's one that all of the military and political authorities are dealing with right now in trying to come to grips with that, because there's not an easy answer to that right now. Given the very nature of the insurgency of the UCK, and if you decide to try to take some action against them, what would the nature of that action be, or how would you even get to them?
     So as a broad introductory remark, I would point out that that's the very question that a lot of people are grappling with. On the specific NATO planning process, if you would expand on that.

A: I would just support everything that [my colleague] is saying. It is a tough nut to crack. It's a very good question.
     You will recall that at the NACD in Brussels, Defense Ministers tasked the NAC essentially to begin NMA planning with specific political objectives in mind -- to halt the systematic campaign of violent repression, to support international efforts, and to try to create the conditions by which a compromise settlement can be reached.
     I can only say the NATO planning process is going well. Your question is a good one because yes, the situation does change on the ground, but in addition to the planning that the NATO military authorities are doing, we're also looking at a political/military framework which is a living discussion in Brussels, and it continues to take place. All I can say is that as the situation changes on the ground, so, too, will this political/military strategy to make sure that we're doing as much as possible to make sure that the military options that we have address those issues.

Q: If the military options include up to possible potential airstrikes which is clearly what was broadly hinted at with the show of force of NATO air power, is there any consideration of use of that kind of force against targets for both sides in order to send both sides the message that they need to negotiate a settlement?

A: I can only say that certainly, consistent with what NATO has been saying, what the U.S. government has been saying, this is all about preserving the territorial integrity of the FRY, and it's also about not supporting Kosovo independence. We've made that very clear. The cavalry is not coming in such a way that we are engaged in conventional military options that are one-sided. So, clearly, we're going to strike that balance and when feasible, certainly there will be operations to ensure that -- Our goal is to bring about serious negotiations.

Q: Given those restraints, is there any room at all for intervention of any kind?

A: I believe that if the nature of the actions, if you will, the operations, were to reach such a level of abhorrence, that perhaps the grounds would be there for intervention. But I will tell you that we're not, from a policy perspective, we're not anywhere near making a decision for any kind of armed intervention in Kosovo right now. The situation is so fluid. The difficulties that are posed by trying to figure out who do you even talk to, who do you bring to the table to talk to. All of these considerations, trying to make sure that you get the message through that the international community supports enhanced autonomy for Kosovo within the FRY "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," but not independence, and yet in the face of that you have the constant repetition and the constant call for the Kosovar Albanians for independence.
     In the face of trying to work with Milosevic and convince him to come to the table and try to reach a negotiated settlement would be in his best interests, all of these dynamics, if you will, are shifting almost on a daily basis as the action in Kosovo changes, and frankly, as we get conflicting messages from the UCK [or KLA] side of the house.
     So in all respects, to try and identify what the intervention point might be or the trigger, we're far from doing that. But in response to your specific question, I think if some levels of atrocities were to be reached that would be intolerable, that would probably be a trigger.

Q: Are the Serbs kind of keeping below that threshold which would trigger a US or NATO intervention?

A: I would think the intelligence community would agree that over the past two to three weeks we've seen a definite leveling off and perhaps even drop in offensive type of operations on the part of the Serbs. So clearly following the Milosevic-Yeltsin meeting on 16 June, which actually kind of marked that drawdown in activity, clearly Milosevic is thinking about all of this.

Q: What are the prospects for continued growth of the KLA and how is that growth changing the military balance of power between the KLA and the Serb forces there?

A: The problem again is that Milosevic served very early on to radicalize the Kosovar Albanian ethnic population. With his decision to launch those operations, he has taken what at the time was a pretty fringe little group that had some popular acclaim, perhaps some scattered popular support, and through his actions he was able to drive them out of the Rugova camp who, by the way if you remember, Rugova during the shadow elections, drew 82 percent of the ethnic Albanian vote. That's quite a significant statement on the part of the Albanians about who they vested their loyalty and vested their authority in.
     So Milosevic served to radicalize that part of the population. So it's been a constant, if you have a time line and you have a support line in the vertical, there's a clear growth from zero pointing up to wherever you want to take that line. But as time has gone by, I think it's fair to say that Milosevic's political decisions resulting in military action served to radicalize the ethnic Albanians and have a growth, consequently, in the KLA support.

Q: Is it going along the same sort of growth line or is it kind of peaking or what?

A: I think the growth is going to keep expanding here at quite a rapid rate. They've grown from about several hundred folks in early March to almost 2,000 core fighters now, and they have several tens of thousands armed supporters throughout the province so they're remarkable. They're expanding their ops now from the central part of Kosovo to the western part and beyond so their growth will continue to expand as they go into new areas and get new recruits. Also, they're getting better training from a variety of sources and more equipment of a more lethal nature in the country. So their growth will be better here in the next campaign.

Q:  What does that all portend for the nature of this conflict?

A: The Serbs have done, overall, to date, rather poorly. They have not contained the growth of the UCK. So it appears there is no military solution to the conflict.

Q: Could you talk a bit about the types of equipment that they're getting, what types, country, nature --

A: Right now they only have small arms for the most part. They have heavy machine guns, they have some mortars, and a lot of small arms from a variety of sources, both from Albanian sources and Western European sources. They're trying to get other gear like anti-tank missiles and anti-aircraft missiles, but they haven't gotten those, it appears, yet. But they're still trying.

Q:  What about the training?  Where are they getting the training?

A: They train folks. It appears that some of the members of the UCK have come back from Western Europe and North America, perhaps, from the Albanian diaspora, have been or may have been former members of the JNA, the old Yugoslav National Army. So some of the UCK members were former military personnel in the old Yugoslav Army.

Q: You say from North America, are we talking Americans who are now over there?

A: I don't know about Americans being over there. I think we've already said most of the people that come back into Kosovo, there are a large number of Albanians living in Western Europe, primarily Germany that return to Kosovo.

A: Albanian expatriates. They're refugees or have left Albania at some point that are going back.

Q: We've had a couple of reports that they've been seeking anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons right along and that the KLA actually acquired a few. Your view is different. Your view is they may be seeking them, but they have not yet gotten them.

A:  That's true.  We can't confirm that they have them yet.

Q: I also have gotten reports that they have acquired radios, a significant number of them, and that some of the voices heard on those radios were speaking Swiss/German. Can you confirm any of that?

A:  No, we can't.

Q: Can we go back to the matter of possible peace talks. Is there currently any progress, any leaning toward some representatives, Rugova or other people going back to the table with Milosevic? Are the peace talks dead until the KLA sees how it does with its new strength? What's the situation?

A: Again, as a preliminary report, I would just say that the peace talks, when you talk about peace talks, we've not gotten to peace talks. That is one of the things the Contact Group is trying to put in place.

Q: As you're aware, the first overt mission into Yugoslavia did achieve a minor breakthrough in having the first face-to-face meeting between Rugova and Milosevic. As part of that meeting there was an agreement where the two negotiating parties, teams, meet on a weekly basis. Unfortunately, that coincided with the upsurge in military action in Kosovo and only one meeting took place, so those talks there were suspended, largely on the Kosovo Albanian side. How can we negotiate while this is going on?

A: The talks have not restarted, you're correct. But coming up the last Contact Group meeting, the 8 July Contact [Group] meeting in Bonn, there's been a fresh call now. They're again reiterating the Contact Group principles. They're to get a cease-fire and to get the dialogue restarted on the Contact Group principles. There are no preconditions. But again within the parameters of supporting a solution within the FRY.
     Work is under way behind the scenes there to get the parties back to the negotiating table. Part of the problem has been on the Kosovo Albanian side; admittedly, one advantage on the Belgrade side is there is an organized government we're working with there. We can talk to Milosevic, and he can speak on behalf of the Serbian side. The Kosovo side is a little more disparate where Rugova is the leader of the shadow government, but there are other parties, and now of course we have the UCK emerging as a major player, and the realization has come to people that we have to have the UCK involved in this process because they have shown at least the potential to be rejectionists of any deal that could be worked out there with the existing Kosovo parties. So somehow they have to be brought in and that's why we've made some initial contacts there with the group, hopefully the right people in the group, to try and bring them into this negotiating process.

Q: Doesn't this independence movement or basic -- they'll take nothing less than independence, the UCK, is it at the basic impasse to any kind of negotiation that the United States could be a party to?

A: That's obviously the point of impasse right now and this is something we're working at in the diplomatic strategy, which is -- you know, the major tack right now is to convince both parties on the ground that violence is not going to solve the problem. Certainly not from the Kosovo side, but from Belgrade's side.

Q: It would seem natural that anyone doing as well as the UCK is right now would think that violence is going to solve their problem. Do you see any reason to think they're tempering that view?

A: I wish we knew more about what the UCK was thinking. But sure, you can posit that [they are thinking] "why should we sit down and negotiate if we have the upper hand?" That would be a calculated judgment on their part. But certainly the international community has made plain to both sides that we are not supporting either side. What we're supporting is an accommodation between the parties, and calling on both sides to reject violence as the solution.

A: From the NATO perspective, that's why it's a very critical issue. They need to know and NATO has made this clear, the U.S. government has made this clear, that the cavalry is not coming. We are not supportive of Kosovo independence. So that needs to be very clear.

NATO planning is not ostensible movement toward some kind of a military action there. And as was pointed out, we're talking about serious instability in the region when you're talking about significant outpouring of refugees and what have you before NATO would get involved. By the same token, I think that the Serbs have showed restraint, as the intel guys were pointing out, because in 1995 in Bosnia, certainly NATO proved the fact that NATO is capable of getting involved, albeit some people would say in the case of Bosnia we waited to late. But probably in Milosevic's mind is that this is a possibility should the VJ get significantly involved and their heavy handed tactics become increasingly violent and repressive. So it is a balance.

Q: Do you get the sense that the insurgents can continue to do as well as they're doing now for the indefinite future? Are there any reasons to think that their success is only in the very short term?

A: For the most part they're going to be successful as long as the Serb forces don't decide to be more serious about cracking down on them, or more effective at effecting their ability to gain access to weapons.

Q: Serb forces can't crack down -- they're constrained somewhat right now by the threat of NATO intervention?

A: Yes. But also they don't have really enough people down there in country to contain this large-scale insurgency.

A: Also we've seen traditionally this sort of insurgency is that the harder they crack down the more they create fervor within the population there to join the Kosovo Liberation Army or these other insurgent forces and fight the oppressors.

A: I'd like to add one thing to that. One thing we'd like to point out is that you're not talking about standard military forces standing off here. When you talk in terms of the KLA being successful, running a campaign, things like that, this is a classic insurgency. There's a lot of cells out there; they depend on local support in villages. This is not a matter of set piece military organizations facing each other across some kind of a FLOT (Forward Line of Own Troops). This is that in the face of determined Serb operations the KLA has not shown yet that they're capable of holding ground, they can harass, they can temporarily occupy and hold ground, but in the face of a determined Serb resistance or counteroperation, the KLA has not shown the ability to do that. That drives at a lot of things -- organization, tactics, training, equipment. Don't confuse the KLA with any kind of an organized military force.

Q: Could you actually elaborate on the issue of holding ground? There's been a lot of figures thrown about of they now control up to a third of the territory. That sort of thing. What does control mean in this context? How much do you suppose they do control?

A: They hold the ground because the Serbs are allowing them to hold the ground. It hurts the Serbs too much right now to go in and take that ground. Milosevic is a master tactician. He knows exactly what he's about, and he understands fully those triggers, that level of pain, if you will, that will trigger an international response. He's a master at being able to manipulate those kinds of things.

So with that being said --

A: That's exactly it. They are able to occupy those territories which you have a copy of that map because the Serbs the system, are basically not trying to push them off of it.

Q: Can you summarize the Serb order of battle and the current military posture?

A: We can give you a rough idea in terms of what's done as far as the Serbs are concerned. They have a permanent garrison of their army down there. It's a corps-sized element in their parlance. It's about 10,000 people overall. It includes a number of different kinds of units, armor, mech infantry and artillery, so it's a conventionally armed and organized army. Also they have a large police force down there. In fact, the police are the primary agent of Serb control in Kosovo. They're called the Ministry of Interior Police, and that includes everybody from the traffic cops to cops on the beat to paramilitary forces who are now trying to contain the UCK. We don't really know exactly know how many MUP personnel are down there. It's probably less than the Army's total down in Kosovo.
     So it's no more than 20,000 people overall, and you can see that's not enough to contain the large scale UCK movement down there.

Q: Can you clarify those numbers just a little bit? We've been getting reports of up to 50,000 Serbs. That's not correct?

A: These are their peacetime declared units down in Kosovo. It's about 10,000 people overall. That has not changed as far as we can see that much since the fighting began in earnest in March. So the Army has stayed about the same 10,000 and the paramilitary police are not even that much.

Q: Could we just reiterate something earlier you said. There are 2,000 hard core KLA full-time folks, and tens of thousands of armed supporters?

A: Armed supporters. Those guys may be UCK and they may not. They're probably just self-defense village fighters.

Q: Everything from hardcore, dedicated, well-trained folks to good old boys with squirrel rifles. The UCK could field 20,000 perhaps, 30,000? What are we talking about?

A: Those numbers probably aren't far from -- if you lump in everything, every arms supporter, every ethnic Albanian arms supporter in Kosovo, you're probably talking tens of thousand, 20,000 to 30,000. Yes.

A: But that is, frankly, so far removed from reality. Again, the KLA is not an organized, trained, equipped type organization. To even suppose that the KLA would be capable of mounting an operation with that number of people is so far removed from reality at this particular junction, because they have no doctrine, they have no common training, they have no common leadership.

A: Difficult terrain, they don't have the ability to move people around. I don't personally see that as the threat of a 20,000 KLA type of operation. It's pretty far --

A: It's very hard to break out local supporters in the UCK proper. UCK is a very small force still. And the operations are very small in number usually.

Q: To make sure I'm taking away the right message here, I just want to summarize and perhaps oversimplify for a minute, and tell me if I'm getting this right. Since NATO's show of force, and the meeting in Moscow, what we've seen is Milosevic exercising more restraint, the KLA or the UCK exercising less restraint, and that situation has made the prospect of military intervention more problematic. Is that --

A: I would not say that it's made it more problematic. I think it's becoming complicated. Obviously, the answer is you have a conventional situation, you have a conventional military versus the military that [my colleague] is describing -- very undisciplined, sporadic, disparate, whatever. So it makes it more complicated. But as I said, the political/military framework that's being worked on, we're working on those details on basically the overarching diplomatic strategy, intensifying the diplomatic engagement, gaining more intel on the heartbeat of the UCK -- who they are, how they operate, how we can get to them. So we're making progress in these areas.

So this political/military framework is being worked on, but you're right, you have a conventional military versus another type of situation. That makes it more complicated.

Q:  Substitute the word complicated for problematic?

A: The situation has clearly evolved from last March when what we were looking at there was the disproportionate use of military force by the Belgrade government there against this insurgency. This was the key focus, the Contact Group effort there. This kind of initiated the prudent NATO planning that there may be need for involvement there in the situation.

It has obviously evolved since then where we have a more robust insurgency and they've had to factor in realizations that it can't be a one-sided view of only targeting the Yugoslav military. Then you have to look at what are the possible unintended consequences of that.

Q: Would you sort of agree that there's sort of a feedback loop, if you will, on the military planning that the more we hear about NATO military planning, then that does embolden the UCK to some extent, and then --?

A: This is obviously a concern. You don't want to send the wrong message, and I think the community has tried to make that plain to both sides. Like I say, in their diplomatic language it falls on both sides to renounce violence as a solution and make it clear that we won't tolerate one side taking advantage of a stand-down by the other.

Q: On the military options that NATO has been looking at can you talk about the potential pros and cons of that first element of the option, of the bringing in a border patrol of some time? Given the difficulties of terrain or national agreements among the NATO members or whatever, could you just run through that option a little bit?

A: In a general sense, as a start, let's make a couple of things clear about the NATO planning. There is in fact, as you all know, a full range of possibilities being looked at from non-lethal to lethal. Down towards the non-lethal end is a border monitoring mission that was first proposed back immediately following the outbreak of violence. NATO went down, did an assessment of the area. They found that depending on the level, the kind of border monitoring mission you want to do, there are significant challenges posed because of weather and terrain. Force protection is also a key consideration in determining the level of risk of any of these missions, and that is not a sole U.S. concern. Concern of all of our NATO allies is the force protection piece.
     When we talk about the border mission, though, it's kind of like what we were alluding to in an earlier question. If you put your soldiers on that border, are you helping Milosevic by stopping refugee outflows that could be a trigger for an international response? Or are you helping the UCK by perhaps diminishing the Yugoslav's ability to also monitor their own border and interdict things?
     Depending on how you come at this situation, will drive obviously your interpretation. So a border monitoring mission sounds so simple on its surface, and yet underneath it there's a significant level of complexity and political ambiguity in terms of the outcomes to drive, to try to deal with it as you try to drive through.

Q: I would think just off the top of my head, the border being robust would help Milosevic.

A: Well, there's clearly one school of thought that says that, but there is also then another school of thought that looked at it from the UCK side of it.

Q:  What were the types of numbers of individuals?

A: In terms of the NATO planning process, I can honestly tell you that planning continues. There has not been any hard identification requirements. We are far from making any kind of a decision on any option. And in fact we are still in preliminary planning in a number of events.

Q: Can you at all identify the difficulties of putting NATO forces along a border in terms of the numbers, given the operation going on in Bosnia?

A: There are those political considerations without trying to raise another force for such a peacekeeping-type mission. That is something that has to be considered in terms of that. Are we able to put a force together like that? And interestingly enough, the significant majority of the soldiers that would be involved in such a mission would appear right now, at a preliminary stage, to probably be logistic- and support-type soldiers because Albania has no infrastructure or anything in which to work.

Q: (inaudible), but suppose in terms of the timing and the possibility of NATO intervention, I think there should be some kind of criteria for the NATO (inaudible). You just mentioned that if the number of refugees or if the number of (inaudible), NATO might intervene. How would you measure the instability of the region, and if there is any specific numbers... If there is any criteria? That's my question.

A: Obviously a big priority is some people have mentioned the cross border situation spillover. We can't say what the trigger mechanism is obviously that affords your opponent or the parties some kind of a measurable area with which they can work. All we can simply say is we're happy; the NATO process we're pleased with, we think it's moving forward very well. There's no specific date as to when we will move from preliminary to contingency to completing action orders or anything like that. It's on as soon as possible basis. So just to answer your question, we're moving along with the NATO planning, whether we're talking about border operations or we're talking about more intrusive measures in different variations, and both dealing with the UCK and the FRY, VJ and MUP forces, is just proceeding on a priority basis.

Q: Has Kosovo had any effect on the implementation of the Dayton Accords in Bosnia at all among any of the parties there or their willingness to abide by any of the...

A: To date, no. There's been no influence on Bosnia on the situation right now.

Q:  Is there any perceived risk of that happening?

A: Milosevic still has some ties to the Serbs in the RS, but to date he has not shown any inclination to... I think he kind of understands maybe there's a real line there also that he dare not cross.

Q:  (inaudible)

A:  Not from within Bosnia or anything.

A: Should we ever be engaged in activity? Obviously, that has implications for Bosnia in terms of force protection, etc., in the Republic of Srpska, so this kind of stuff is being incorporated into the planning process.

Q: (inaudible) the NATO force that might be required to monitor a cease-fire within Kosovo?

A: I can't give that information, and it's still at a preliminary stage anyway.

Press:  Thank you.

(End transcript)
___________________________________________
16 July 1998

TRANSCRIPT: STATE DEPT. NOON BRIEFING, THURSDAY, JULY 16, 1998

(Syria/Iraq, Kosovo, NKorea, India/Pakistan, Colombia)  (6770)

State Department Spokesman Jamie Rubin briefed.

EXCERPTS.
.....
KOSOVO -- A "parallel parliament" of Kosovo Albanians met today for the first time, Rubin reported. While the US does not support independent political institutions for the Kosovars, it does support the right of free assembly and thus objects to the "heavy-handed" actions the Serb police took in disturbing the meeting.
     Contrary to some news reports, "nothing has changed" with respect to NATO's efforts to plan for contingencies in Kosovo, Rubin said. "No option has been ruled out."
......

Following is the State Department transcript
(begin transcript)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING INDEX
Thursday, July 16, l998

Briefer:  James P. Rubin
.....
KOSOVO
5-6 Kosovar Albanian parallel parliament met today for first time
5-6     Serbian police were present, searched party files
6       Parallel parliament meeting a freedom of assembly issue
6,8 Grave risk of destabilization as a result of refugees pouring out of Kosovo
7       No change on NATO preparations
7-8 No evidence Kosovar Albanians are permitting mercenaries to join them
8       Discussion of Kosovo monitoring group
......

Q: Kosovo - actually a couple of developments. The Serb riot police stormed the headquarters of the Albanian political party - the Kosovar political party. The Albanian Prime Minister today said that the flow of refugees, which he puts at several thousand higher than I think you said in the past, is destabilizing Albania - seeming to endorse a position you've taken before. Has the refugee flow increased, do you know?

RUBIN: It is not our understanding that the refugee flow has increased. Often there are different databases that apply in this case. Our understanding of the situation there is that there is scattered fighting throughout the Decani and Pec region. Our embassy personnel continue to travel throughout Kosovo through the monitoring mission, and we are enhancing our ability to gather real-time information.
     With respect to the parliament, the parallel of Kosovo-Albanian parliament convened a meeting this morning in Pristina. They elected an assembly speaker and three vice presidents. This is the first time that the parallel parliament has met.
     With respect to what the Serbs have done, it is our understanding that Serbian police were present in force. There was no violence, and we saw no reports of arrests made as they entered LDK party headquarters where the assembly session was held and searched through party files.
     We do not recognize Kosovo's parliament as an official political institution. But we do recognize the right of free assembly and that this was engaging in the right of free assembly, and that right is vitally important. The kind of heavy-handed intimidation by the Serb police is emblematic of the repressive nature of Slobodan Milosevic's regime in Kosovo, which sparked the current crisis in Kosovo. If Belgrade is ever going to be able to benefit the Serbs in Kosovo or its country in general, they have to learn to change their tactics. Stripping away the legitimate rights of the Kosovar Albanian people using heavy-handed tactics like this in a legitimate expression of freedom of association and freedom of assembly, like the decision to use military force to crack down, are the kind of mistakes that have radicalized the Kosovar Albanian population and make it harder to get the kind of agreement that will serve the interest of both Yugoslavia and the people in Kosovo.

Q:  Was Ambassador Hill present when the incident occurred?

RUBIN: I believe there was someone present; I don't believe it was Ambassador Hill. He was here yesterday, and I can't imagine he made it all the way back to Pristina by this morning or the middle of the night.

Q: Have you seen the remarks of the Albanian Prime Minister about destabilizing the refugees -

RUBIN: I haven't seen those remarks, but I had two points to make. One is that we do believe there is a grave risk of destabilization as a result of refugees pouring out of Kosovo. That is the reason why we have made clear that this poses a security threat to Europe and a security threat to the world. It is the reason why the Contact Group and the international community, through the Security Council, has stated that it effects international peace and security.
     With respect to the numbers, again, I'm not aware of a ramping up of the numbers, but we may start from different numbers.

Q:  He put it 16,000 - 20,000.

RUBIN:  We still have our numbers.

Q: Jamie, there were some reports, stories today in papers and there was a briefing over at the Pentagon yesterday in which some people interpreted what was being said was that the fighting had subsided to such a degree that NATO was no longer really considering any sort of military intervention.

RUBIN: Well, interpretations are always a risky business. I've checked with the Secretary on this, and nothing has changed. NATO continues to pursue an accelerated military planning, continues to narrow and flesh out options for the possible use of force; and no option has been ruled out. That is the situation today; it was the situation before any briefing that was interpreted in a certain way; and it's still the situation.

Q: Just a follow-up, the NATO Secretary General said this morning that among the contingencies they were considering was a deploying a force in Kosovo after a theoretical peace treaty to enforce that peace. Is the United States prepared to participate in such a mission?

RUBIN: I am certainly not prepared to make a decision for the Commander-in-Chief here at the State Department on Thursday, as you could imagine. I can tell you that if the Secretary General is saying that they are doing such planning, then they are doing such planning.

Q: I just wanted to follow up on the subject of Kosovo. Yesterday the panel of DOD experts said they had no evidence that there were foreign mercenaries coming into Kosovo --

RUBIN:  That sounded familiar.

Q: -- with arms. Does the State Department have any evidence one way or the other about foreign mercenaries?

RUBIN: I think I've said for many weeks now pretty much the same thing; and obviously, my colleagues at the Department of Defense have said pretty much the same thing. That same thing is that we are aware of efforts on the part of the rogue's gallery of mercenaries in these kind of conflicts to seek access to participate in fighting of this kind. We have made clear to the Kosovar Albanians what a dumb idea it would be to accept such assistance. And we're not aware of evidence that such assistance has been accepted and delivered and operating now.

Q: Would it be a fair interpolation of what's just said to say - because several of us are hearing other accounts that Iranians and Albanians and people from Tajikistan are coming in and assisting the liberation army and trying to overthrow Belgrade in Kosovo. Would it be fair to say - is it a fair interpolation of what you just said that Kosovo Albanians - and by that I assume you mean - or maybe I shouldn't make any assumption - the guy you're backing and the people whose views ought to be heard but you're not backing have stopped --

RUBIN:  Well said, Barry.

Q: Well, you've got to speak in shorthand here. Have stopped, have rejected efforts by mercenaries to come help them liberate, in their terms, Kosovo?

RUBIN: You choose the verb. What I am under the impression is that entreaties have been made, supplies and assistance have been proffered, but it has not yielded any result.

Q: Jamie, you said - I'm quoting this accurately, I think - "We have enhanced our ability to gain real-time information." What does that mean?

RUBIN: Well, we are working through the Kosovar monitoring group to try to improve our ability to know what is going on there. We are trying to enhance the capability of that group so that it is in a position to accurately report what's going on.

Q:  And physically, how are you enhancing its abilities?

RUBIN: Well, I can get you the fact sheet on the Kosovar observer monitoring group that I've provided some general information on in the past. What I'm saying to you is that these monitors are operating and they are trying to improve their ability to know what's going on in Kosovo. That is a very important issue, because it's very important to have independent confirmation of what is going on there; and that is going on through the Kosovar monitoring group that I've described to you in the past.

Q:  Are you using satellites?

RUBIN: I don't believe that is a word that we normally use from the podium here. Is today the day to try to trick the spokesman?

Q:  No, it's just a straight-out question.

Q: Jamie, do you see an increase in displaced people within Kosovo, as opposed to refugees flowing out to Albania? Do you see them going into other neighboring countries, entities, whatever you want to call them?

RUBIN:  Sorry?

Q: The number of people within Kosovo that are displaced - do you see an increase in displaced people, as opposed to refugees going into Albania?

RUBIN: I'm not aware that there has been a fundamental change in the refugee or internal displaced person situation. Most of that happened several weeks ago. At low levels it continues.
     There were a lot of displaced persons within Kosovo. There were refugees that flooded into Albania; there were refugees that flooded into Macedonia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The fact that I indicated we don't see a ramping up of the refugees into Albania, as I understand it, reflects the fact there isn't a lot of movement of people in the thousands, the way there were several weeks and months ago. That would apply, as well, to internally displaced people.
........
___________________________________________
16 July 1998
WHITE HOUSE REPORT, THURSDAY, JULY 16, 1998

(Helms-Burton waiver, Solana/Berger meeting, ICBMs) (360)

White House Press Secretary Mike McCurry briefed reporters at an informal gathering in his office early July 16.

EXCERPTS.
.....
NATO SECRETARY GENERAL MEETS WITH NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER BERGER

NATO Secretary General Javier Solana was in town July 16 to see National Security Adviser Sandy Berger at the White House, the Press Secretary said. The NATO Summit in Washington in April 1999 will celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Atlantic Alliance. The White House has begun rigorous preparations for it, the Press Secretary said. Alliance leaders at the summit will focus on NATO's strategic vision for the 21st century. Solana and Berger, in additiion to discussing plans for the summit, will review the Kosovo situation, McCurry said.
.......
________________________________________
16 July 1998

TRANSCRIPT: WHITE HOUSE DAILY BRIEFING, THURSDAY, JULY 16, 1998

EXCERPTS

(Clinton/Solana/Berger, Helms-Burton waiver, Dr. King Memorial, Appeals Court/Independent Counsel, Secret Service, World Bank audit, IMF/Asia/Russia, US economy and Asian economic crisis, crop failures, HMOs, tobacco, Russian companies, Lott/China, India-Pakistan sanctions) (6440)

White House Press Secretary Mike McCurry briefed.

Following is the White House transcript:
(begin transcript)

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
July 16, 1998

PRESS BRIEFING BY MIKE MCCURRY

The Briefing Room

MCCURRY: A couple things to catch up from earlier when I talked to you. The President did drop by the meeting that Sandy Berger had with Secretary General Solana. They had a very good session, sort of anticipating the Washington summit that will occur next year, next spring, the 50th anniversary summit of the North Atlantic Alliance, and talked a little bit about how we can maximize the use of that occasion to do some long-range thinking about the future of the Alliance and how this, what arguably is the world's most successful military treaty alliance, can be adopted and structured to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War world and the next century. So a good discussion on that, and they also reviewed the status of military contingency planning on Kosovo, which continues -- events on the ground, of course, shape the thinking of NATO military planners, but the President emphasized it was important to have available options that could be considered, depending on what kind of outcome or lack of outcome there is in the effort to get the Kosovar Albanians and the Serbians in more direct dialogue on a peaceful reconciliation of their differences over the status of Kosovo.
     So the President appreciated that opportunity to see the Secretary General. He has not signed the waiver that I mentioned earlier on Helms-Burton, but I expect him to do so when he's done with some meetings he's got, and he's got some bills that he'll be signing this afternoon that we'll have more paper on later.
...
___________________________________________

16 July 1998
PENTAGON SAYS AEGEAN PEACE, STABILITY A PRIORITY

(Cohen-Solana talks to include region) (400)
By Susan Ellis
USIA Staff Writer

Washington -- Pentagon spokesman Ken Bacon said Defense Secretary Cohen and NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana would discuss a wide range of issues July 16, probably including progress on confidence-building measures in the Aegean.
     On their agenda, he said, would be NATO expansion, "the accession of new members (to NATO) in 1999 (during the) Washington summit, where the expansion of NATO will take place; Bosnia, Kosovo...and probably he (Cohen) will talk about the confidence-building measures in the Aegean, particularly because the Turkish general (General Ismail Karadayi, chairman of the Turkish Joint Chiefs of Staff) was here earlier today and that will be on Secretary Cohen's mind.
     "Those confidence-building measures are being shepherded through by Javier Solana," he added. Solana also met with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in the morning before meeting with Cohen in the afternoon.
     In response to a reporter's question, Bacon said U.S. views on the Cyprus situation are well-known, adding, "We had been talking with Greece and Turkey about a number of possible ways to reduce tensions on Cyprus and one of the proposals that the U.S. has made is a voluntary moratorium on military air flights on that island. What we're trying to do is get the parties to look at options for reducing tensions. We're trying to encourage both the Greek side and the Turkish side to step back from potential conflict, to step back certainly from the current confrontation, and to look for more peaceful, more stable solutions to their problems, and we have proposed some options which are under discussion. One of them is this idea of a voluntary moratorium."
     Bacon noted that both Greece and Turkey have been participants in the peacekeeping effort in the Balkans and that the two nations "are NATO allies. We expect that they will operate and act as NATO allies who step back from confrontation and look at the broader need for stability in the alliance. I think both Greece and Turkey understand, as do the other allies, that we need an alliance that's stable (in) both the North and the South and the East and the West corners. And that requires cooperation by all members."
___________________________________________
17 July 1998

TRANSCRIPT: PENTAGON SPOKESMAN'S REGULAR THURSDAY BRIEFING

(Threat Reduction Advisory Committee, NATO Secretary General, Kosovo, Bosnia, the Aegean, Turkey's Defense Minister, Greece's Defense Minister/Cyprus, Lockheed/Northrup, Rumsfeld report/missile defense, military housing, Daryl Jones nomination, Blassie/Medal of Honor, Tripp, future military exchanges with China, NKorea the major ballistic missile proliferator to Iran, Pakistan and others) (5360)

DoD News Briefing Thursday, July 16, 1998 -- 1:40 p.m. (EDT)
Mr. Kenneth H.  Bacon, ASD (PA)
.....
BACON:  Good afternoon.  I see we are all here.
     First I'd like to welcome to the briefing room the California writer Brandon Barker, who is probably finding that he can find more strange facts in the real life of the Pentagon than he can find in the fiction of California. So we welcome him.
     Second, I'd like to bring you up to date on the meeting of the group that I announced on Tuesday, that is the Threat Reduction Advisory Committee that was set up to monitor the creation of a new Defense Threat Reduction Agency. It met for the first time yesterday. Its purpose is to review our progress in dealing with ways to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and they looked at the policy and they set up three sub-groups. One is reducing the threat from biological weapons; the second is developing integrated weapons of mass destruction threat assessment techniques -- (inaudible) sustaining our nuclear deterrent. (Audio is lost momentarily)
     Maybe this is the right time to ask me a lot of tough questions on North Korea. Mr. Lambros?

Q: Anything on today's elaborative ceremonies and meetings here at the Pentagon with the Turkish General Ismail Karadayi? And could you please be more specific on the discussions on the Aegean/Cyprus issues?

A: The answer to the second question is no, I can't be much more specific on that. On the Aegean part of it, as you know those confidence building measures are being shepherded through by Javier Solana, the Secretary General of NATO. He's in town today. He met with Secretary Albright this morning and he'll meet with Secretary Cohen this afternoon. He's here to talk about a number of topics. One is Kosovo, one is NATO, the accession of new members in 1999 in the Washington Summit, where the expansion of NATO will take place. He'll talk about Bosnia, and I would expect that he will also talk about his plan to encourage more confidence building measures in the Aegean.
     Today the Secretary and Gen. Shelton did meet with Gen. Shelton's Turkish counterpart and they discussed a wide range of issues including peacekeeping in the Balkans, in which both Greece and Turkey had been participants. They talked about the importance of progress on the confidence building measures in the Aegean. They also talked about the very dramatic need for further progress in reducing tensions on Cyprus, and our views on that are well known. We've stated them many times. I don't think there were any breakthroughs on that, but it was certainly one of the main areas of discussion.

Q: Who is the employee you mentioned the other day who makes a kind of moratorium or mechanism over the airspace of the Republic of Cyprus?

A: I think you're combining two things. We have now, in Turkey or coming back from Turkey, Jan Lodal, who went over for a previously scheduled meeting. He had hoped to stop in Athens on the way, but was unable to. But he does visit Athens frequently.
     Separately, we have been talking with Greece and Turkey about a number of possible ways to reduce tensions on Cyprus. One of the proposals that the U.S. has made is a voluntary moratorium on military air flights on that island.

Q:  Did they talk about S-300s today?

A: I don't know specifically if they did. I'm sure they did because it comes up in nearly every meeting we hold on Cyprus. It clearly is a problem, the potential deployment of S-300s, and we've been very clear about that. We think this will increase tensions at a time we believe the parties should be working to reduce tensions.

Q: Why did DoD try to impose such a mechanism over Cyprus instead of a no-fly zone against finally the civil defense sovereign right?

A: First of all, I don't think we're trying to impose anything. What we're trying to do is get the parties to look at options for reducing tensions. This is on a list of possible options. Last week, Secretary Cohen spoke here with the Greek Defense Minister Tsokhatzopoulos and he said that we are discussing a range of options for reducing tensions on Cyprus. This is among those options.
     We're trying to encourage both the Greek side and the Turkish side to step back from potential conflict, to step back certainly from the current confrontation, and to look for more peaceful, more stable solutions to the problems. We have proposed some options that are under discussion. One of them is this idea of a voluntary moratorium.

Q: Yesterday -- official here at the Pentagon presented a kind of scenario on a Greek/Turkish war in the Balkans. Any DoD scenario to prevent such a war between your two allies Greece and Turkey in that area?

A: What was discussed yesterday dealt with Kosovo and the spillover problems of refugee flows from Kosovo. That was much more limited than a broader issue.
     Greece and Turkey are NATO allies. We expect that they will operate and act as NATO allies who will step back from confrontation and look at the broader need for stability in the alliance. I think both Greece and Turkey understand, as do the other allies, that we need an alliance that's stable in both the north and the south and the east and the west corners, and that requires cooperation by all members.

Q: The Lockheed/Northrop issue. Can you brief us on how far along you got in the talks, what kind of a proposal you were reviewing which has come to naught?

A:  No, I can't.

Q:  Can you give us any more details than you had in yesterday's...

A: I cannot. There have been discussions that have stretched over a series of weeks. Both sides have proposed conceptual solutions. The Department decided that there was not a conceptual solution, it did not see a conceptual solution that would work from the corporate side and therefore right now those discussions are over and we're preparing and planning to litigate this case in court starting in September.
.........

NEWS: KOSOVA UPDATE, JULY 17, 1998
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Taken without permission, for fair use only.

NY TIMES: Serb Forces Said to Abduct and Kill Civilians in Kosovo
Serb police break up Kosovo 'parliament'
Serb Cops Raid Ethnic Albanian HQ
Serbs break up Kosovo 'parliament'
Diplomats Plan Yugoslavia Mission
U.S. defends rights of Kosovo Albanians
NATO Ready To Use Force in Kosovo
LA TIMES: Albanian Politicians' Split Foils Kosovo Peace Moves
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July 17, 1998

Serb Forces Said to Abduct and Kill Civilians in Kosovo

By CHRIS HEDGES

DECANI, Serbia -- Serbian forces have been turning increasingly to the abduction and execution of small groups of civilians in their fight against ethnic Albanian separatists in Kosovo, according to human rights officials and witnesses.
     Many of the executions took place moments after Serbian special police units concluded attacks on villages held by the Kosovo Liberation Army rebels, witnesses said.
     "The number of disappearances are increasing each month," said Behxhet Shala, secretary of the ethnic Albanian Council for Human Rights. "There is a mathematical logic to all this. As the Kosovo Liberation Army kills more police, the police go out and hunt down civilians who live in the areas where the attacks take place. These are reprisal killings."
     Some 300 ethnic Albanians are listed by human rights officials as missing since March, when the conflict intensified between the rebels and the 50,000 or so Serbian soldiers and policemen deployed here. Some of them may have fled to Albania or Montenegro and others may be living with relatives elsewhere in Kosovo. But some were seen by witnesses being led away by special police units, never to reappear.
     As the war progresses, and as the rebels, who themselves have abducted at least 30 Serbs, increasingly make Serbian civilians their target, the fear is growing that the fighting could spiral into the kind of war against civilians that swept across Bosnia.
     Visits to six of the sites where kidnappings and executions by Serbian forces are said to have taken place yielded accounts by witnesses and a look at the bodies of some of the victims. But the precise number of those executed is difficult to determine.
     Based on the accounts of witnesses from each area, it appears that a total of about 100 ethnic Albanians, most of them men of fighting age, have been rounded up and shot, usually in groups of fewer than a dozen, in the last five months.
     One man, Ndue Biblekaj, said he witnessed abductions and executions by members of the notorious Serbian "black hat" unit, which was employed in Bosnia to kill Muslims and Croats and expel them from their homes.
     "There were massacres in the village of Drenoc and Vokshit near Decani," he said in an interview in rebel-held territory. "I saw a black hat unit line up 13 civilians and shoot them. They stripped the bodies of their clothes, slashed the arms and legs with their knives and dug out their eyes. They used an excavator to dig a pit and bury the bodies."
     "I will never forget this sight," he said. "There were other executions that included women, children and the elderly. You could see the bodies, including one group of 15 people, lined up by the side of road."
     The detained men were often marched in single file by the black-uniformed Interior Ministry commando unit to the local water treatment plant, which was used as a command center, he said.
     Biblekaj, an ethnic Albanian, served for eight years in the police force in the border village of Junik. He was part of the Serbian force that recaptured Decani from the rebels in June. The Serbs shelled the town, reducing whole sections to rubble. They sent in tanks and armored personnel carriers, blasting holes in the walls of houses and driving nearly the entire population over the mountains into Albania.
     Decani is now abandoned, and the Serbian police, who crouch behind sandbagged positions in the ruins, come under frequent fire from rebel units.
     Biblekaj has deserted the police to join the rebel movement. He changed sides after the attack on Decani, because, he said, he was appalled by the killing there.
     Repeated attempts to inspect two sites suspected of being mass graves in a wooded area near the deserted and badly damaged town, still the scene of frequent armed clashes, were thwarted by special commando police units.
     The governor of Kosovo, Veljko Odalovic, a Serb in a province that is 90 percent ethnic Albanian, denied that the police had executed anyone. Serbian officials, as a matter of policy, refuse to disclose the names or location of those taken into custody.
     Not every ethnic Albanian who is picked up by the police disappears permanently, but the fear of being seized has become common in these villages. Many are those picked up return after a few days, complaining of beatings and other ill treatment at the hands of the police.
     According to witnesses, the largest number of killings occurred in the villages of Likosane and Cirez at the end of February, in the village of Prekaz in the first week of March, in the village of Poklek at he start of May, in Ljubenic at the end of May and in Decani in June.
     On May 30, special police units entered Poklek and ordered most of the residents into a house owned by Shait Qorri.
     Fazli Berisha, who was outside the village hiding behind a wall, said he saw 60 or 70 women and children ordered out of the house as Serbian forces burned neighboring homes. The women were told to walk across a field to Vasiljevo, a neighboring village, he said.
     "Hajirz Hajdini and Mahmut Berisha were brought out moments later and told to walk in the opposite direction," he said, referring to two men. "As they walked away they were shot by the police. Sefer Qorri, 10 minutes later, was brought out of the house and told to walk in this direction. He was shot in about the same spot."
     The villagers said they later found the body of Ardian Deliu, a 17-year-old youth, near Vasileva, about two miles away, but they said nine men remain missing.
     On June 8, Fred Abrahams, a researcher at Human Rights Watch, spoke with Zahrije Podrimcaku, who witnessed the attack on Poklek. An hour after speaking with Abrahams, who is compiling a report on human rights violations, she was arrested by Serbian police officers in Pristina, the provincial capital. She was charged a week later with involvement in terrorist activity. She remains in jail.
     Poklek is part of the silent no man's land that lies between the Serbs and the rebels, who control about 40 percent of the province. Broken glass litters the main street. The deserted stucco homes and small shops have been looted, with household items strewn over yards and left in broken heaps. A pack of mangy dogs snarl from behind the blackened shell of a house, and the stench of a dead farm animal rises from an untended hayfield.
     Down the road in the town of Glogovac the residents seem to move in fear down the dirt streets, which are periodically the targets of Serbian snipers. A farmer, Ali Dibrani, 54, was shot dead recently as he walked home at dusk with his niece.
     The Serbian authorities, who have issued a written order to block food and commercial goods to all but state-run shops in Kosovo, have effectively cut supplies to Glogovac and nearby rebel-held areas. The shortages have left people bartering for liter-size plastic bottles filled with gas. The clinic has run out of medicine, and processed food, like cooking oil, is scarce.
     Here, too, abductions have left their mark. Dr. Hafir Shala, 49, an ethnic Albanian who worked in a clinic run by Mother Teresa's Sisters of Charity mission in Glogovac, was seized by the Serbian police on April 10.
     Shala, who was jailed for four years for separatist activity during Yugoslavia's period of Communist rule, was pulled from a car at a police checkpoint on the road to Pristina and put in a black jeep with three plainclothes police officers. One officer got into a gray Volkswagen Passat with two of Shala's companions. The two vehicles were driven to the central police station in Pristina.
     "The three of us were taken to separate rooms on the third floor," said Shaban Neziri, 49, who was traveling with the doctor, as he sat in the remains of an unfinished house in the village. "I was interrogated for six hours and then told I could leave. When I was escorted out of the room and down the hall I heard horrible screaming. It was Dr. Shala. I stopped. I asked the policeman what was happening to Dr. Shala. He pushed me forward, saying, 'Go, go, go."'
     The doctor never returned. His father, Isuf Shala, 63, went to the police headquarters the next day, but was turned away at the door.
     "I saw the police after a few days and they said Hafir was not on the list of prisoners," he said, seated cross-legged in his home. "They said he had never been in police custody. The police said maybe our soldiers had taken him, perhaps I should check with them."
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Thursday July 16 4:52 PM EDT

Serb police break up Kosovo 'parliament'

By Douglas Hamilton

PRISTINA, Serbia (Reuters) - Ethnic Albanian political parties inaugurated their first parliament in Kosovo Thursday, surprising Serbian police who arrived minutes too late to pre-empt the session.
     Around 90 deputies attended the meeting in Pristina chaired by Kosovo Albanian "President" Ibrahim Rugova. They had already elected a speaker and sworn an oath of allegiance when armed police marched in and broke up the gathering.
     About 20 uniformed police with AK-47 automatic rifles then took up guard in their open vehicles outside while a dozen plainclothes officers entered the building and removed armloads of documents.
     The atmosphere was tense but the action ended with no arrests. A U.S. diplomat alerted to the police action was in the building for part of the time.
     "The police were not brutal but they were very tough. We were given two minutes to pack up the papers," said Nekibe Kelmendi, secretary of Rugova's Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), dominant ethnic party in the Albanian-majority province.
     "We have done it," Rugova told Reuters. A burst of applause from supporters greeted him as he emerged later from his party's headquarters, where the meeting took place.
     The Serbian interior ministry issued a statement via the official news agency Tanjug claiming to have prevented "an illegal attempt to constitute a so-called Parliament of the Republic of Kosovo."
     "Materials prepared for the meeting and other documents were seized and submitted together with criminal charges to the district prosecutor in order for legal steps to be taken against responsible persons," the ministry statement said.
     In Washington, the United States defended the right of assembly of the ethnic Albanians who inaugurated the parliament, but State Department spokesman James Rubin said Washington did not accept the authority of the self-styled parliament.
     The United States opposes independence for Kosovo, where 90 percent of the inhabitants are ethnic Albanians.
     "We do not recognize Kosovo's parliament as an official political institution. But we do recognize the right of free assembly and that this was engaging in the right of free assembly, and that right is vitally important," he said.
     He urged the Serb government to try gentler tactics in its dealings with the Kosovo Albanians.
     But Momcilo Trajkovic, head of the Serb resistance movement in Kosovo, said: "I fully approve of the police action. Are we going to see the creation of a state within a state, especially now? The answer is of course not."
     Albanian deputies said the next step was a government.
     "This time it will be a government in Kosovo, not in exile," said Gjergji Dedaj, who was named as one of three deputy speakers of the assembly.
     "It is a very historic day marking the start of a new free, democratic and independent state of Kosovo," he said, moments before police arrived on the scene.
     However, the significance of the move remains to be seen.
     Neither Belgrade nor any other capital recognizes Rugova's "parliament" to date. While major powers continue to view Rugova as the moderate voice of ethnic Albanian aspirations, they acknowledge that his authority has been weakened by the emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).
     The insurgents, who claim to be in control of 50 percent of the Serbian province where ethnic Albanians outnumber Serbs by nine to one, do not recognize Rugova as president and have said no political party can speak for them.
     The editor of the independent Koha Ditore, the most influential paper among ethnic Albanians, said the inauguration was a notable but limited step.
     "It's a step which shows for the first time that the LDK wants to do something. It shows them in a more serious light and it is a significant step but it is not enough to build a consensus," Vetton Surroi told Reuters.
     "A consensus would involve not only the political parties but also the KLA," Surroi said.
     Ethnic Albanian representatives first tried to convene a parliament in 1993 but were thwarted by a strong show of force by Serbian police, who surrounded their headquarters with armored personnel carriers to scuttle the gathering.
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Thursday July 16 4:52 PM EDT

Serb Cops Raid Ethnic Albanian HQ

ISMET HAJDARI Associated Press Writer

PRISTINA, Yugoslavia (AP) - In a warning to separatists, Serb police raided the headquarters of Kosovo's largest ethnic Albanian party Thursday, moments after their self-styled parliament swore in a president.
     Fighting was reported for the first time, meanwhile, in a strategic area south of Kosovo's capital, Pristina, where a two-hour gunbattle raged between Serb security forces and Albanian militants, Serb sources said.
     Police seized documents at the office of the Democratic League of Kosovo, moments after the province's self-proclaimed parliament - meeting for the first time - swore in party leader Ibrahim Rugova as president. There were no arrests during the half-hour operation.
     In Washington, State Department spokesman James Rubin called the raid "emblematic of the repressive nature" of Yugoslav rule in Kosovo "which sparked the current crisis" in the rebellious province.
     "Stripping away the legitimate rights of the Kosovar Albanian people" has "radicalized the ... population," Rubin said, making it more difficult to resolve the crisis in "the interests of both Yugoslavia and the people in Kosovo."
     Kosovo is in southern Serbia, the dominant of two republics that make up the remainder of Yugoslavia.
     The Serb police said in a statement that the raid "prevented an attempt to constitute the so-called parliament of the Republic of Kosovo," whose members were elected March 22 in an unauthorized ballot. It said the local prosecutor was considering filing criminal charges.
     Still, the fact that police did not enter the building until after Rugova was sworn in and the 20-minute session was over suggested the government was not seriously attempting to muzzle Rugova, considered the Albanian politician most capable of conducting future peace talks with the Yugoslav government.
     Rugova has called for an independent Kosovo, which the Americans and Europeans oppose. Instead, they support autonomy for Kosovo, a province of Serbia where Albanians make up 90 percent of the population.
     But despite his support for independence, Rugova's renunciation of violence has made him more acceptable to the United States and Europe as a negotiating partner than the militant Kosovo Liberation Army.
     Rugova's party holds 90 percent of the 120 seats in the self-styled parliament, because most of the 15 other Albanian parties boycotted the March vote.
     "The police action wasn't brutal, but it was very swift," Nekibe Kelmendi, the general secretary of Rugova's party, told reporters. "They gave us a two-minute ultimatum to hand them the documents from the constitutional session, which we did."
     Kelmendi said the formation of the Kosovo parliament was "a historic act and the result of a new reality in the region which the international community will have to consider."
     Although Rugova has international backing, his nonviolent stand has cost him considerable support among the Albanian community - angered by the five-month Serb crackdown on the KLA in which hundreds have died.
     Rugova apparently hoped that convening the parliament would bolster his political stature, even if the Serb government never permits it to function.
     Meanwhile, Serb sources reported new clashes Thursday between KLA fighters and security forces in several areas.
     The Serb Media Center said a "large group" of Albanians attacked a police patrol near Prizren, about 37 miles southwest of Pristina and withdrew after a two-hour gunbattle. There were no reports of casualties in the fighting, the first reported in the Prizren area.
     However, the Kosovo Information Center, close to Rugova's party, said Serb police set fire to three Albanian homes near the town and heavy gunfire could be heard in the area.
     Serb sources also reported a KLA attack on a Serb patrol late Thursday near Urosevac and one Albanian was killed. Urosevac controls the main highway between Pristina and the Macedonian capital, Skopje, and the fighting could signal a KLA attempt to block a major transportation artery.
     Elsewhere, Serb sources said Albanian fighters attacked a lead and zinc mine 25 miles northwest of Pristina but were driven off. Rebels control most of that area except for the mine itself.
     In their account of the mine clash, Albanian sources said police shelled seven KLA-controlled villages in the area late Wednesday but there were no casualties.
     In the Albanian capital of Tirana, meanwhile, a young Kosovo man armed with a knife was captured inside the downtown residence of Premier Fatos Nano, an Interior Ministry source said Thursday.
     The Kosovo Albanian, identified as 19-year-old Faruk Mazreku, was stopped by bodyguards Tuesday night after entering the residence through a back window, according to the source, who spoke on condition of anonymity.
     No other details were available. The premier was not at home at the time and nobody was hurt.
     Mazreku was reported to be in police custody. The Albanian intelligence service had launched an investigation.
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BBCNEWS

Serbs break up Kosovo 'parliament'

Serbian security forces have broken up the first meeting of the self-styled Kosovo parliament - an ethnic Albanian assembly elected in a clandestine poll last March.
     The session had just got under way when armed police raided the building in Pristina, the provincial capital.
     Documents were seized from the meeting, which was chaired by Ibrahim Rugova, leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo party. But no arrests were made.
     The Serbian action was criticised by the US government - which described it as interference in the right of free assembly.
     But a police statement said they had "prevented an attempt to constitute the so-called parliament of the Republic of Kosovo."
     A local prosecutor is considering filing criminal charges.

No parliament since 1989

There has been no parliament in Kosovo since President Milosevic removed the autonomy of the Serbian province in 1989.
     The new assembly - dominated by the Democratic League of Kosovo - is considered illegal by the Serbian authorities. Its previous meetings have been held in exile in Germany.
     A BBC correspondent in Pristina says Mr Rugova is being marginalised by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), and the parliament session is a way of shoring up his weakening position.

Serbian crackdown

Over recent months Serbian soldiers have been conducting an offensive in the province against the KLA.
     The KLA, which does not recognise Mr Rugova's leadership, believes an independent Kosovo will only be achieved through violence.
     As fighting intensified in and around Kosovo towns their support from ethnic Albanians has also increased.
     Mr Rugova also wants independence but aims to reach it through peaceful means.

Ethnic cleansing

The West considers Mr Rugova to be the Albanian politician most capable of conducting peace talks with Belgrade.
     The US and Europe supports autonomy for Kosovo, a region of Serbia, which, in turn forms part of Yugoslavia, but not full independence.
     Serb actions in Kosovo have also sparked memories of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and prompted calls from the US and Europe for the withdrawal of Serbian soldiers.
     The State Department spokesman James Rubin said Washington did not accept the authority of the self-styled parliament, but condemned the Serbian action to close it down.
     "The kind of heavy-handed intimidation by the Serb police is emblematic of the repressive nature of [Yugoslav President] Slobodan Milosevic's regime in Kosovo, which sparked the current crisis," the spokesman said in Washington.
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Thursday July 16 10:05 AM EDT

Diplomats Plan Yugoslavia Mission

ISMET HAJDARI Associated Press Writer

PRISTINA, Yugoslavia (AP) - Serb security forces today stormed the headquarters of Kosovo's ruling party, moments after ethnic Albanian separatists convened their clandestine parliament for the first time.
     There was no official Serb explanation for the action by about 20 heavily-armed riot police and 10 plainclothes officers, who entered the drab makeshift building in the heart of Kosovo's capital.
     They impounded all documents from the first session of the clandestine parliament, which is considered illegal by the Serbian authorities.
     There was no violence or arrests, and the police withdrew after about 30 minutes.
     Ethnic Albanians, who compromise 90 percent of Kosovo's 2 million people, held elections on March 22 for their 120-seat self-styled parliament and president.
     Today's Serb police action was the first ever at the ruling Democratic League of Kosovo party headquarters, which also houses the office of their leader, Ibrahim Rugova. Rugova was inside the building during the raid.
     "The police action wasn't brutal, but it was very swift," said Nekibe Kelmendi, the general secretary of the ruling party, which holds 90 percent of seats in the new parliament.
     "They gave us a two-minute ultimatum to hand them the documents from the constitutional session, which we did," she said.
     During today's parliament session, Rugova took his presidential oath, pledging to "use all his powers for the formation and preservation of an independent Republic of Kosovo."
     Kelmendi said the formation of the Kosovo parliament was "a historic act and the result of a new reality in the region which the international community will have to consider."
     Serbia rejects any moves toward Kosovo's independence. Foreign powers have called for greater Kosovo autonomy, but also oppose independence of the troubled Serbian province.
     More than 300 people have been killed since late February, when Serbian police launched a crackdown against ethnic Albanian separatists. There were no fresh reports of fighting today.
     Attempts by world powers to rally the splintered Albanian politicians behind Rugova have been unsuccessful, and with political efforts to gain independence faltering, the militant Kosovo Liberation Army continues to gain support.
     The 54-nation Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which includes the United States and Canada, plans to go to Kosovo as part of its Yugoslav fact-finding mission that began Wednesday in Belgrade.
     Yugoslavia was suspended from the OSCE in 1992 for fomenting ethnic conflict in Croatia and Bosnia. It has refused to allow permanent offices to be set up in the country until its membership is restored and was likely to demand reactivated membership as the price for allowing a serious OSCE role in Kosovo.
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Thursday July 16 7:31 PM EDT

U.S. defends rights of Kosovo Albanians

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The United States defended the right of assembly of the ethnic Albanians who inaugurated their first parliament in Kosovo on Thursday and advised Serbian forces to try gentler tactics in the province.
     But State Department spokesman James Rubin said Washington did not accept the authority of the self-styled parliament. The United States opposes independence for Kosovo, where 90 percent of the inhabitants are ethnic Albanians.
     "We do not recognize Kosovo's parliament as an official political institution. But we do recognize the right of free assembly and that this was engaging in the right of free assembly, and that right is vitally important," he said.
     "The kind of heavy-handed intimidation by the Serb police is emblematic of the repressive nature of (Yugoslav President) Slobodan Milosevic's regime in Kosovo, which sparked the current crisis," the spokesman told his daily briefing.
     "If Belgrade is ever going to be able to benefit the Serbs in Kosovo or its country in general, they have to learn to change their tactics," he added.
     In the Kosovo capital Pristina, around 90 deputies attended the meeting of the parliament, chaired by Kosovo Albanian "President" Ibrahim Rugova. They had already elected a speaker and sworn an oath of allegiance when armed police marched in and broke up the gathering.
     About 20 police with AK-47 automatic rifles then took up guard in their open vehicles outside while a dozen plainclothes officers went in and removed armloads of documents. The atmosphere was tense but the action ended with no arrests.
     The United States has been watching events in Kosovo closely, for fear that the conflict might spread to other parts of the Balkans, especially Albania and Macedonia.
     But U.S. defense and intelligence officials said on Wednesday that because of the military balance between the Serbs and Kosovo separatist guerrillas, NATO was far from acting on plans to intervene in the province.
     Rubin denied that NATO had changed its thinking. "NATO continues to pursue an accelerated military planning, continues to narrow and flesh out options for the possible use of force, and no option has been ruled out," he said.
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Thursday July 16 1:05 PM EDT

NATO Ready To Use Force in Kosovo

DONNA ABU-NASR Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON (AP) - NATO is ready to use military force in Kosovo if it would help lead to a diplomatic solution to the crisis in the Serbian province, Secretary-General Javier Solana said Thursday.
     "Everybody thinks that the solution of that conflict ... has to be a diplomatic solution," the NATO chief said. "NATO has never thought of solving the problem militarily."
     But he said: "If in order to get the diplomatic solution it is necessary to use the capabilities that we have, we will be prepared to act in order to help the diplomatic solution."
     Solana said the threat that NATO made last month to bomb the forces of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic if they did not halt their attacks on Kosovo's ethnic Albanian majority has already had its effect.
     "I do think that the restrain we see now in the Milosevic camp has a lot to do with the clear statement made by NATO that we are preparing to act if necessary," he added at a news conference.
     Solana was referring to reports that the Serb security forces have restricted their activities to trying to keep open key roads and industrial plants rather than mounting offensive operations against rebel-held areas.
     Solana declined to elaborate on the timing of any military action. But Pentagon officials said Wednesday that no decision is near on any of NATO's options to deal with the tumult in southern Yugoslavia and that diplomacy remains the preferred route.
     Serb-Albanian fighting over Albanian autonomy in Kosovo has killed several hundred people in the province since February and sent refugees streaming across the border into Albania and Montenegro.
     Solana spoke shortly before meeting Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and other State Department officials. On the agenda is the situation in Kosovo and preparations for NATO's April 1999 summit that will be held in Washington to mark the 50th anniversary of the 16-nation alliance and to induct three new member countries - Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.
     Solana said NATO will use the summit to send a "very clear message that NATO has been a useful organization for stability and peace ... in the last 50 years (and) is prepared to continue to guarantee the same values ... for the next 50 years."
     He also said the alliance will stress its open-door policy to further expansion.
     Solana said he will also discuss with U.S. officials ways to deepen NATO's relationship with Russia, a key player in resolving the Kosovo conflict. Russia and NATO signed a bilateral agreement last year.
     "I'm very pleased at how things are going" with Russia, Solana said. "Sometimes we may have different opinions and we have in our relation ups and downs but the important thing is that we are already engaged."
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Thursday, July 16, 1998
LA TIMES

Albanian Politicians' Split Foils Kosovo Peace Moves

Yugoslavia: Infighting frustrates U.S. hopes for civilian control of rebels and a quick start to talks with Serbs.

By DAVID HOLLEY, Times Staff Writer
 
PRISTINA, Yugoslavia--As Washington seeks to head off a new Balkan war, a bitter split among politicians here in breakaway Kosovo threatens to crush U.S. hopes for civilian control over a burgeoning ethnic Albanian guerrilla movement.
     Rancor is growing between two political camps divided over moderate leader Ibrahim Rugova, the most prominent figure among the ethnic Albanians who make up 90% of the population in this strife-torn Serbian province.
     The escalating struggle between the civilian camps--whose differences are based more on personalities than policies--undercuts U.S. hopes for a quick start to peace negotiations between ethnic Albanians and the Serb-dominated government of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic.
     The squabbling is contributing to a shift of political legitimacy and power toward the fighters in the field, who many observers fear have undemocratic tendencies.
     U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke, on a mission here in Kosovo's capital earlier this month, urged ethnic Albanian politicians to unite under Rugova, 53, who has long favored a nonviolent path to Kosovo's independence. Holbrooke made no progress, and, since his departure, the split in the leadership has worsened.
     "Mr. Rugova's policy is bankrupt. It has collapsed," Adem Demaci, chairman of the main opposition party in Kosovo, said at a recent news conference at which he virtually cut relations with Rugova.
     "He is a very weak man. He has not political knowledge, he has not enough will to work, he has not courage," Demaci continued, attacking his rival in expressive but slightly broken English. "It is impossible to work and collaborate with him. He must go, because the situation is very dramatic. In a dramatic situation, the weak men must go."
     Demaci, 61, who gained stature among ethnic Albanians by spending 28 years in Serbian jails as a political prisoner, said he has offered to serve as the rebel Kosovo Liberation Army's political representative--but only if its members accept his control over their policies and military activities.
     "They must agree that policy will lead gun, not gun lead policy," Demaci said.
     He said he made the offer to the guerrilla organization a month ago and is still waiting for an answer.
     Other politicians are also jockeying to become the guerrillas' political head. But that position might prove dangerous if Milosevic decides to use his overwhelming advantage in military force to arrest pro-independence civilian leaders and try to smash the guerrillas.
     The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is threatening military action if Milosevic chooses such a path. But the Yugoslav leader has been known to launch brutal offensives despite enormous international pressure. Many of his critics say that his political survival depends on creating a constant atmosphere of crisis, thus provoking ethnic Serbs to rally around him.
     So far this year, more than 300 people have died as Serbian security forces tried to crush the independence drive of Kosovo's Albanians--but succeeded only in triggering a dramatic flow of new recruits to the still-shadowy and loosely organized rebel army. There are widespread fears that far greater violence looms.
     The U.S. strategy for peace in Kosovo is based partly on hopes that a broad body, including Rugova, Demaci and other prestigious leaders, could represent not just civilians but also guerrilla forces in any negotiations with the government in Belgrade, the Serbian and Yugoslav capital. Under such a scenario, any cease-fire could then be enforced on the ground, and more permanent agreements could also be made to stick.
     From Washington to Moscow, the fear is that a failure to find a peace formula for Kosovo--roughly the size of Los Angeles County--could lead to a widening Balkan war that might drag in Albania, Macedonia and other countries as well.
     "I think that Mr. Holbrooke needs a negotiating team which is ready to negotiate with Milosevic at any time and also has control over the Kosovo Liberation Army," said Bajram Kosumi, the vice chairman of Demaci's party. "At this moment, it's impossible."
     Just a few months ago, U.S. officials and Rugova himself were calling the guerrillas "terrorists." Estimates of the army's size, which were in the hundreds last year, now run as high as 30,000.
     Rugova, a scholar of Albanian literature before he entered politics, initially denied the existence of the Kosovo Liberation Army. Then he said it lacked popular support. More recently, he said it consisted of "ordinary citizens who are defending their homes" but need to be "brought under control."
     Now, as Washington tries to bring the guerrilla force into a negotiating process, politicians here are competing for the rebels' favor. One possible outcome is that the guerrillas will control the civilian politicians rather than the other way around, as Washington hopes.
     "We're very far away from getting negotiations going between Milosevic and Kosovo Albanians, because in order to have that happen, we will have to have the political and military wings here speak with one Kosovo Albanian voice--but neither the insurgents nor the political class have a unified voice," said Anna Husarska, a Bosnian-based political analyst for International Crisis Group, an organization aimed at heading off trouble partly through research and education. "There is no unity inside each of those groups, nor between one and the other."
     Well-connected Albanians and foreigners in Pristina seem to believe that the Kosovo Liberation Army, or KLA, has a core hierarchy, with the top command based outside Kosovo in Western Europe, but that it also has disparate elements not fully integrated into the central command structure.
     "I think that the informed Albanians in Pristina hope that the [KLA] has a unified command. I don't believe they know [for sure]," Husarska said.
     Many guerrilla fighters are basically farmers who have taken up arms to defend their homes against attacks by brutal Serbian security forces, and others are political activists who live in guerrilla-controlled areas and have made common cause with the fighters without necessarily taking commands from them, Albanians here say.
     Political activists, including former political prisoners, who have fled Serb-controlled cities out of fear of arrest probably play a key role in the guerrilla hierarchy, some say.
     Among these figures, according to ethnic Albanians here, are Rame Buja and Gani Koci, both former political prisoners who were officials in Rugova's Democratic League of Kosovo before going to the countryside, and Murat Musliu, another former political prisoner who headed the local branch of a human rights organization before joining the guerrilla camp. But they are just a few of the many people who could provide links between political leaders in Kosovo and the guerrillas.
     "It's the same case with a hundred activists of the political parties," said Hydajet Hyseni, a leading politician who broke with Rugova early this year. "In the past, people who were at risk of being arrested had two choices: be arrested or leave the country. Today, we have a third option.
     "Even people who didn't want to go were under pressure to go [to the countryside], because the police pushed them. I know people who absolutely were not involved in this, but they were at risk of arrest by the police, so they went."
     Partly because of this, "we cannot view the Kosovo Liberation Army only as a military group," said Hyseni, who served about 10 years as a political prisoner. "All the political parties of Kosovo have their members with the KLA in the areas where the clashes are. Having these contacts with the KLA is very helpful. . . . I think the KLA is cohesive, and the KLA can unify our political life here. The KLA can be a catalyst for the future unification of Albanians."
     Kosumi, the Demaci ally, said in an interview that six parties--excluding Rugova's--are seeking to form "one political movement."
     "The Albanian movement in Kosovo today is moving on two tracks," Kosumi said. "One track is the KLA, the other is political parties. The political parties have some international legitimacy, but they have no real force. The KLA still has no significant international legitimacy, but it has real force. These two tracks must be united to cooperate with each other."
     If political parties fail to "meet their responsibilities" in this regard, then "they will be marginalized," Kosumi said.
     Kosumi predicted that Rugova will be the first to be pushed aside and said it will be far easier than outsiders expect for someone to replace him, despite the strong support Rugova has received in unofficial elections. "The logic of 'The king is dead, long live the king!' is still working here," he said.
     But Rugova's camp continues to insist that any broader body must be centered on Rugova and a shadow government he heads.
     Some politicians "think that without themselves, no one can do anything, and they thought this was a good time to push out Rugova," Fehmi Agani, a close associate of the moderate leader, said in an interview.
     "But it doesn't matter what anyone thinks of Rugova. The main thing is that without Dr. Rugova, no further steps can be taken," Agani said. "Yet he alone is not enough. There must be others too."
 

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