Some ideas I consider important:  THAT'S MY OPINION

Dear ...
today I decided to let some older news unread and answer to others.
A week ago you wrote:
 
  Wolfgang if you do not mind, please explain further what this
  message means?
  I do understand what it says I just need a little more clarification
  on the meaning.

> I don't know the time it will happen,
> but it will happen:
>    (Kosova-) Serbian refugees will accure.
> Is the West and the East prepared for this ?

One day after this mail was sent I received first reports about muslim
refugees from Sandjak fleeing to Bosnia and Serbians fleeing to Hungary.
Serbian IDP's are reported by ICRC. UNHCR reports too.
(See today's news from these organizations)

> Is the "international community" prepared for helping
>    Serbia  a n d  Kosova  people
> to build a new land -  b y  t h e m s e l v e s  - within a
> peaceful Europe ?

There are some suggestions (nice words) now, but no sufficient
political,financial and economical will and no love really to do so
(just as behind the threats of NATO airstrikes to Serbia one year ago).
A  s e r i o u s  offer of help to the peoples (the familys, the farmers
and workers !) in former Yougoslavia  a f t e r  the war could help to
end the war.

> Or are the interrests - commercial - only directed on the mineral
> sources in Kosova ?

I don't think the airstrikes were planned and are going on now only by
reasons of human right's. There must be reasons of business too.
As much millions of dollars blown in the air now given earlier for the
right measures would have avoided the war now.

> G i v e  t h e  p e o p l e s  a  c h a n c e  - for a human beeing !

I fear something happening after the war has ended in Kosov@ similar as
happened in Germany as the wall was broken down in 1989: Who will take
the mineral mines and factories - the little people working there or the
mighty great combines ? Even in 1999 we have in former GDR (now the
east-territories of Germany) about 20 % without a job and work ! No
chance was given to develop a new thinking and new economical way for
everyone's welfare.

And I assume too, the interest by Serbia - and ethnic cleansing now - in
Kosov@ is not it's history. As statistics show: since decades Serbia
profits from the rich mineral sources there.

> Kosova - as suffering now - will get it's freedom.

There is no doubt to me, Kosov@ will get freedom (it will be autonomy or
republic within Yugolavia, protectorate or independence).

> Danger will be in future - if hatress reigns.

And against this danger I try to work: Hatress by Serbians to
NATO-nations, hatress by Albanians to Serbians and vice versa. Hatred
and revenge is not the ground a peacefull Europe will be possible to
build on it.

I hope these thought's help you better understand what I mean.

   Let us donate tools, machines and material
   from farmer to farmer, workman to workman,
   humanitarian and food aid
   - supported by the governments -
   to the humans living or wanting to go back to live
   in Kosov@, in Serbia, Montenegro
   and Bosnia, Macedonia and Albania too
   for reconstruction of their houses
   and developing their economical life by their own
   - as much as it will be possible
   and with aid by the World Bank and European Union
   for recovery of the economical and political structure.

   Let us offer a friendly hand to the peoples of the nations,
   but not to criminals - als long as they are doing crimes.

>And Bible says:
>
>2 Mo 22,21-27
>Thou shalt neither vex a stranger, nor oppress him: for ye were
>strangers in the land of Egypt.
>Ye shall not afflict any widow, or fatherless child.
>If thou afflict them in any wise, and they cry at all unto me, I will
>surely hear their cry;
>And my wrath shall wax hot, and I will kill you with the sword; and your
>wives shall be widows, and your children fatherless.
>If thou lend money to [any of] my people [that is] poor by thee, thou
>shalt not be to him as an usurer, neither shalt thou lay upon him usury.
>If thou at all take thy neighbour's raiment to pledge, thou shalt
>deliver it unto him by that the sun goeth down:
>For that [is] his covering only, it [is] his raiment for his skin:
>wherein shall he sleep ? and it shall come to pass, when he crieth unto
>me, that I will hear; for I [am] gracious.
>
>Please excuse my bad English.
>It is difficult for me to express my feelings and thoughts in a language
>that is not my mother-language.

Sincerly
                  Wolfgang

Many of my own thoughts and feelings I find expressed in the following
mail.  P l e a s e  r e a d  i t  t o  e n d.

If Love and Peace is the goal in living of the nations - and that means
primarily the peoples, but their leaders too - the way to reach that
goal will be in every occasion.

Sincerly
          Wolfgang Plarre
_______________________________________________________________________

Betreff:  OP Ed "A Win-Win Path to Peace in Kosovo and Yugoslavia"
Datum:  Tue, 27 Apr 1999 17:35:52 -0700
    Von:  David Hartsough <peaceworkers@igc.org>

Dear Friends,
Hope you may find the following op ed or article helpful.
Something major needs to change in the approach to finding a solution to
the Kosovo crisis if we are to get off the present dead-end course.
Clearly more of the same is not working and the violence and misery of
the people on both sides gets ever more horrendous.
Please send this on to others - including newspapers, magazines,
government officials, religious leaders and other key people if you feel
it deserves a wider audience. And feel free to put it onto web pages or
otherewise send it out over the internet. You are welcome to change or
adapt it to make it your own as long as the intent remains the same. I
hope in any case it will help get the creative juices flowing to help us
find a peaceful way out of this quagmire.
Thanks for your continued efforts on behalf of a peaceful resolution to
this war.

Sincerely in Peace,
                                 David Hartsough
 

A Win-Win Path to Peace in Kosovo and Yugoslavia
by David Hartsough

The Stick did not work. Lets try the carrot. How can we achieve what
former President Michael Gorbachev called the "Europeanization of the
Balkans rather than the Balkanization of Europe"?

Massive bombing has not brought Milosevic to the negotiating table, nor
has it stopped the violence against the Kosovar civilian population. On
the contrary, and some would say, predictably, it has all but destroyed
the one force that could have accomplished both these ends: the
democratic opposition to Milosevic inside Serbia. It has also
intensified the violence a thousand fold against the Albanians in
Kosovo. Most (over one million) of the Kosovars have been forced from
their homes if not otherwise terrorized or killed.

Meanwhile in Serbia millions of people, even those who opposed
Milosevic's dictatorial and nationalistic policies, are rallying to the
flag in support of their government. This is the normal response of
people everywhere to an outside threat. In Montenegro, one of
Yugoslavia's two republics, the democratically elected government has
been attempting to distance itself from President Milosevic to forge a
more democratic and peaceful future for its people, but that government
is in danger of falling if the war goes on much longer.

We are clearly, all of us on both sides, digging ourselves deeper and
deeper into a hole from which there is no good escape. What would a
different approach look like? How could we craft a win-win solution for
both sides? What would help build the foundation for a lasting peace in
this strife-torn area? We would like to recommend the following
proposals for international attention.

Remember, underneath the present tragic violence, the overwhelming
majority of the people in both Yugoslavia and in Kosovo do not want war
or violence or oppression. What they want in Serbia, in Kosovo and in
Montenegro is the opportunity to join Europe and live in peace. Instead
of economic sanctions and bombs and restrictions on travel and trade and
dictatorship, they want the opportunity to raise their children without
fear of violence and with dignity. The want a sense of being part of the
European community. They want to live normal lives and to travel freely,
to have convertible currency, and to have cultural exchanges with the
rest of Europe and the world. We put forward these proposals in a spirit
of appeal to those strong, legitimate wants and needs of the majority of
Balkan people.

1.
Yugoslavia, for its part, should grant Kosovo independence. The terms of
independence should include international safeguards for all the sacred
sites in Kosovo, including the monasteries and the battlefield of Kosovo
Polje (where the Serbs were defeated by the Turks in 1389,) and a
guarantee for the respect of the human rights of all people in the
province. In return there would be an offer for Yugoslavia to be
integrated into the European community.

2.
In return for withdrawing all Yugoslavian military, police and
paramilitary and military equipment from Kosovo, Kosovo would agree to
be a demilitarized state with NO military presence neither armed Kosovo
Liberation Army nor NATO nor Yugoslav troops or police or
paramilitaries. Instead, thousands of international civilian UN or OSCE
peace monitors, trained in peacemaking and peace-building, would monitor
this agreement and assure that all refugees were allowed to safely
return to their homes. These peace monitors would also guarantee the
respect for the human rights of all people regardless of their ethnicity
in an independent Kosovo.

3.
The international community would:
*End all sanctions against Yugoslavia.
*Renew full diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia and open diplomatic
relations with Kosovo.
*Offer free trade, free travel and free flow of information and cultural
exchanges with Yugoslavia and Kosovo.
*Offer a new 'Marshall Plan' to help rebuild Yugoslavia and Kosovo,
focused on rebuilding the infrastructure of these societies.
*International Peace Corps volunteers could play an important role in
this rebuilding.
*Offer support to the Yugoslav and Kosovar people who want to build a
civil society - the non-governmental institutions and an independent
media - which can be the foundation for a democratic society.
*Finally, there is the matter of war crimes which have been perpetrated
in the heat of this wrenching conflict. While the International Court in
the Hague could be encouraged to try certain people regardless of rank
or nationality who have committed war crimes or crimes against humanity
in Kosovo, we believe that another mechanism would be far more effective
at healing the appalling wounds of this conflict and building a future
of stable peace: national 'truth and reconciliation' commissions for
each region, on the model of those employed with considerable success in
South Africa and Guatemala. In addition, non- governmental organizations
skilled in postwar reconciliation, some of which are already operating
to good effect in other parts of ex-Yugoslavia, can be brought in to
both regions. They can work toward interregional healing, with a strong
emphasis on working with young people to ensure a safer future.
Realistically, there might need to be a period of time in which Kosovo
would be an international protectorate under the United Nations for an
interim period. Perhaps, in addition to the above suggested unarmed
observer force, there would be need for an international peacekeeping
force (NOT NATO) to verify an end to hostilities, a return of all
refugees and respect for the human rights of all.

The assumption of this proposal is that even if President Milosevic did
not accept it, the people of Yugoslavia and of Kosovo would. Instead of
driving the people of Yugoslavia more and more into the arms of
Milosevic, this policy would help the people of Yugoslavia to see they
have an alternative (and a very positive one at that) to continuing the
war. Perhaps the one and a half million Serbian people who demonstrated
against Milosevic in the winter of 1996 and 1997 would again take to the
streets to voice their support and longing for such a peace proposal.

The implementation of these proposals may require major international
media support - in case the state-controlled Yugoslav media do not
cooperate. To get the specifics to the people of Yugoslavia through the
airwaves will need the involvement of international radio and TV as well
as the dropping of millions of leaflets from UN or Russian planes If
this proposal is implemented and Kosovo and Yugoslavia really do join
Europe, boundaries will increasingly make very little difference and
there will be free travel, trade, and cultural interaction between
Kosovo and Yugoslavia as well as with the rest of Europe.

In any case, we do not intend this proposal as the last word. Renewed
negotiations, hopefully under the auspices of the United Nations, and
with Russian participation, should begin immediately to move the peace
process forward. Hopefully this proposal will help get creative juices
flowing which will bring forth additional ideas for moving away from an
ever more terrifying escalation of the war to a political solution in
which everyone can win.
 

David Hartsough is the Executive Director of PEACEWORKERS based in San
Francisco and has worked in Kosovo and Yugoslavia over the past three
years. In March of 1998, after accompanying Albanians in their
nonviolent demonstrations in Kosovo, he was arrested, jailed and later
expelled from the country by the Yugoslav authorities.

PEACEWORKERS
721 Shrader St.
San Francisco, CA 94117 USA
Phone and fax 415-751-0302
email PEACEWORKERS@igc.apc.org
********************************************************************
Never doubt that a small group of committed citizens can change the
world. Indeed, it's the only thing that ever has...Margaret Mead
********************************************************************

Die heutigen Nachrichten sind für mich Hoffnungzeichen dafür, dass ein
guter Weg für das Zusammenleben der Völker und der Menschen miteinander
gesucht wird und auch gefunden werden kann.
Aber "ein kleiner Finger ist noch keine Hand"
      (Anmerkung zu den Äußerungen Draskovic's).
Dem serbischen Volk sollte eine freundschaftliche Hand angeboten werden,
nicht aber den sie regierenden Verbrechern, solange sie Verbrechen
begehen.
Wichtig für die Zukunft wird auch eine Einrichtung sein, die das
Bekennen von Schuld ermöglicht. Die Erfahrungen, die Südafrika damit
gemacht hat, könnten genutzt werden.
Ein meines Erachtens praktikabler Vorschlag zur Reduzierung der
Kampfhandlungen in Kosov@ ist in dem nachfolgenden mail beschrieben.
Ohne Einverständnis und Beteiligung Rußlands wird aber auch er nicht
umsetzbar sein.

Schon darüber nachgedacht:

   Die Erfahrungen, die Flüchtlinge aus Kosov@ bei uns gemacht haben
   und machen, werden ihre Einstellung zu Deutschland
   und einem Europa der Zukunft prägen.

Mit freundlichem Gruß
                      Wolfgang Plarre
_______________________________________________________________________
erhalten von David Hartsough <peaceworkers@igc.org> am 26. April 1999

NEWSDAY (Long Island): April 4, 1999
SUNDAY FOCUS /

Kosovo Failures Show Path to Real Peace

Michael Klare.

Michael Klare is a professor of peace and world security studies at
Hampshire College and the author of "Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws"

THE TIME has come to acknowledge that the current U.S.-NATO strategy in
Yugoslavia is a failure. Not one of the air war's objectives - the
cessation of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, the weakening of Slobodan
Milosevic or the prevention of a wider conflict - has been achieved.
Instead, the atrocities are getting worse, Milosevic is stronger than
ever, and the war is spreading. Nor is their any indication that an
expanded air campaign will prove more successful. We must look for other
options.
Without alternatives, we could be doomed to involvement in a conflict
lacking any discernible conclusion. The United States and NATO launched
the air war under the naive assumption that Milosevic would quickly
succumb to a dramatic (and relatively cost-free) show of force.
Evidently, no thought was given to the possibility that he would not.
Now, it seems that the alliance's only option is to extend the bombing
to an ever-widening array of targets in Serbia.
Such attacks are not, however, likely to end the fighting, ensure the
safety of the Albanians in Kosovo, or produce a lasting and stable peace
in the Balkans.
Unless Milosevic loses his nerve - something for which he has shown no
prior inclination - the attacks will simply grind on with no visible end
in sight.
Meanwhile, the unity heretofore shown by the NATO countries is likely to
crumble and the prospects for a Dayton-like peace accord are likely to
vanish.
That a strategy based solely on air strikes would achieve all of NATO's
objectives was a dubious proposition from the start. By bombing Serbia,
we provided a pretext for Milosevic to silence his opposition at home
and to escalate the killing in Kosovo - an outcome that should have been
obvious to NATO war planners. It should also have been obvious that the
Serbian population - highly nationalistic to begin with - would respond
to the bombing by rallying around its leadership.
Many analysts have spoken of the practical obstacles to an effective air
campaign in Yugoslavia: the difficult terrain, the bad weather, the
interspersing of military and civilian installations and so on.
Certainly, these are important factors. But it was NATO's failure to
calculate the political outcome of the campaign that has proved most
calamitous: The more we have bombed, the stronger - not weaker -
Milosevic has become.
NATO officials now contend that the way to alter this equation is by
increasing the level of pain being inflicted on Serbia from the air.
This will be done by attacking government buildings in downtown Belgrade
and civilian installations-such as bridges and factories-throughout the
country.
Supposedly, this will erode public support for Milosevic and persuade
elements of the Yugoslav Army to seek peace with NATO. But it could
easily produce the opposite effect: intensifying Serbian hostility to
the West and provoking Serbian military incursions into neighboring
countries. We see the start of this already, with the shelling of
Albania and the seizure of U.S. soldiers in Macedonia.
NATO could also alter the equation by sending ground troops into Kosovo.
This would permit allied forces to engage those Serbian units most
directly involved in the slaughter of ethnic Albanians. It is doubtful,
however, that NATO forces could get there soon enough and in sufficient
strength to make a difference.
Once troops are deployed there, moreover, it may prove impossible to
bring them back. Given the Serbs' growing hostility to the West, any
hope of achieving a lasting peace in the region - one that does not
require the presence of a large, permanent NATO force to police it - has
all but disappeared.
One lesson we should all draw from this is that military force-and
particularly the frequently unanticipated political fallout from such
force-is very difficult to control. Once Clinton gave the go-ahead for
air strikes, he set in motion forces that are not subject to easy
manipulation. If Washington backs down now, the credibility of NATO will
be seriously impaired - hence the temptation to escalate the conflict
rather than to admit failure. With each new escalation, however, the
stakes grow higher and it becomes even more difficult to extricate
ourselves from the spiral of conflict. This is, of course, precisely how
the United States became so deeply ensnared in Vietnam.
There is also the issue of casualties - American, allied, Kosovar and
Serbian.
It is hard to conceive of any type of escalation, whether in the air or
on the ground, that will not produce a higher rate of casualties. It may
be, as some pundits have argued, that we have to risk higher casualties
in order to produce a desirable outcome. But it would be an unforgivable
mistake to incur higher casualties simply in order to rescue a strategy
that is flawed to begin with.
Rather than think about escalating the conflict, therefore, we have to
find ways of de-escalating it - of reducing the level of violence while
providing real protection to the remaining Albanians in Kosovo. Is this
a realistic option? There are still grounds to think so. The key to a
lasting peace in the Balkans is persuading the Serbs that they have more
to gain from participating in the stability and prosperity of the West
than from continued defiance and penury.
The way to do this, I believe, is to stop the bombing of Serbia proper
while deploying a NATO air umbrella over Kosovo and adjacent areas of
Serbia. NATO should resolve to allow safe passage to all Yugoslav
military units in Kosovo that elect to return to their bases in Serbia.
But any such forces that continue fighting in Kosovo, or that seek to
enter the region from Serbia, will be attacked on sight.
Likewise, any Serbian military aircraft that enter Kosovar airspace, or
that interfere with the operation of the NATO air umbrella, would be
shot down-as with the existing "no-fly zone" over southern Iraq.
To give this strategy some added teeth, NATO could infiltrate special
commandos equipped with air/ground communications systems and laser
target-designators.
These units would avoid battle themselves, but could pinpoint the exact
location of any Serbian forces still engaged in ethnic cleansing for
instant attack from the air. The ultimate goal should be a regime of
zero tolerance for Serbian assaults on civilians in Kosovo. This is
precisely the sort of operation at which the special units involoved in
the recent rescue of the downed American F-117 fighter pilot are
especially proficient.
At the same time, Serbia itself should be placed under a draconian trade
embargo, similar to that imposed on Iraq - allowing in nothing but food
and medical supplies. All roads and rail lines leading into Serbia would
be closely monitored, and any attempts to circumvent the embargo would
provoke a harsh response from NATO. Then we could offer the option of
negotiations. The choices for Belgrade should be framed as follows:

If you agree to a just settlement in Kosovo, the sanctions will be
lifted and Serbia will be allowed to rejoin Europe and benefit from its
prosperity; if not, you will be spared from further bombing, but you
will live in perpetual isolation and poverty. Such an approach would
deprive Milosevic of the political advantage he now enjoys from the NATO
bombings, while increasing the attraction of a permanent peace accord.
The lesson of recent international peace negotiations-including the Oslo
accords on Israel and Palestine and the settlement in Northern
Ireland-is that agreement is reached most easily when all parties
involved perceive a mutual advantage in reaching accommodation. Merely
threatening pain is not enough: The Serbs must believe they will enjoy
genuine benefits from granting independence or autonomy to the Albanian
Kosovars.
A strategy of this sort, resting on the de-escalation of violence, will
be much easier to sustain - and far more effective - than the present
policy of escalation. It can be implemented immediately, without
exposing the Albanian Kosovars to increased danger. Most of all, it
would allow the United States and NATO to articulate a lasting outcome
to the crisis that we can live with in good conscience.

Copyright 1999, Newsday Inc.
SUNDAY FOCUS / Kosovo Failures Show Path to Real Peace., pp B05.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
(Prof.) Michael Klare
Five College Program in Peace & World Security Studies
Hampshire College, Amherst, MA 01002 USA
>>>>NOTE NEW TELEPHONE EXCHANGE<<<<
phone: 413-559-5563; fax: 413-559-5611
mklare@hampshire.edu

   Kosov@-Politik: einige Gedanken und Fragen

1. Zusagen von Milosevic kann man nicht trauen, wie die Vergangenheit
   immer wieder gezeigt hat. - Und bekannt ist schon lange, daß von
   dem serbischen Regime Verbrechen begangen wurden und werden.

   · Wurden (werden) mit den Verbrechern aber nicht auch Geschäfte
     gemacht ?
             ("Arkan": Fußballverein "Obiliq")
             ("Milosevic-Vertrauter": Millionenbeträge in der Schweiz)

2. Kann man Zusagen und Lösungsansätzen westlicher Politik trauen?
   - die OSZE-Beobachter-Mission erreichte nie die vereinbarte
     Personalstärke
   - der Abzug bewaffneter serbischer Einheiten nach den Holbrooke-
     Milosevic-Vereinbarungen wurde nie konsequent eingefordert und
     durchgesetzt
   - bei der Betrachtung des Verlaufes der Rambouillet-Verhandlungen
     tauchen Zweifel am redlichen Willen zu einer friedlichen Lösung
     auf - nicht nur von serbischer Seite

   · Ist Frieden und Einhaltung der Menschenrechte wirklich das Ziel?

3. "humanitärer Krieg zur Wahrung der Menschenrechte" - aber

   · Wie sieht es mit der Wahrung der Menschenrechte auch des
     serbischen Volkes aus?
   · Wie steht es um die Beachtung der Menschenwürde und Menschenrechte
     a l l e r  Flüchtlinge?
     Wie "menschlich" wird zum Beispiel mit den Flüchtlingen aus
     Kosov@, Serbien und Bosnien in Deutschland umgegangen?
     Warum zögert man eine humane "Altfall-Regelung" hinaus?

4. Jetzt erst wird öffentlich von "ethnischer Säuberung" gesprochen
   und Milosevic deshalb angeklagt

   · Warum nicht schon letztes Jahr?
   · Warum wurden letztes Jahr noch Kosov@-Albaner abgeschoben?
   · Wie will man mit dem Unrecht umgehen, das vielen Asylbewerbern
     dadurch geschah, daß ihre Asyl-Anträge wegen Verneinung
     ethnischer Verfolgung abgelehnt wurden?
   · Warum wird immer noch daran festgehalten, für Kosov@-Albaner
     gebe es keine Gruppenverfolgung?
   · Warum werden derzeit selbst dann keine Einreise-Visa erteilt,
     wenn alle geforderten Voraussetzungen dafür erfüllt sind ?
   · Warum läßt man nicht zu, daß die in Deutschland angekommenen
     Kriegsflüchtlinge bei ihren schon hier lebenden Verwandten
     wohnen können?
   · Warum wird Asylbewerbern eine Arbeitserlaubnis verweigert?

Mehr Ehrlichkeit, mehr Konsequenz
mehr Achtung der Menschenrechte und der Würde des einzelnen Menschen
erscheinen mir nötig - sowohl in der Außen- wie in der Innen-Politik
 - und nicht nur in Worten, sondern in TATEN !
_____________________________________________________________________
     Ein Zeichen setzen: @ !   KosovO + KosovA = Kosov@ !
_____________________________________________________________________

Aufruf von PRO ASYL an die Bundesregierung:

  "Die im Koalitionsvertrag vereinbarte Altfallregelung droht
   ins Leere zu laufen. Selbst jede kleine Kompromißlösung wollen
   einige Länder-Innenminister blockieren. Wir fordern deshalb die
   rot-grüne Regierungskoalition auf, durch eine Änderung des
   Ausländergesetzes die versprochene Altfallregelung auf den Weg
   zu bringen: Wer länger als 5 Jahre in Deutschland lebt, muß eine
   Aufenthaltsbefugnis erhalten.
   Das sozial-liberale Rheinland-Pfalz hat sich bereits grundsätzlich
   für eine Altfallregelung ausgesprochen. Eine Bundesratsmehrheit
   ist also gegeben.
   Handeln Sie jetzt!"

Meine Meinung dazu im Blick auf Kosov@-Albaner:

   Man kann wohl davon ausgehen, daß hier lebende Kosov@-Albaner
   auch in Zukunft ihre Verwandten unterstützen und so
   zum Lebensunterhalt der Menschen und dem Wiederaufbau in Kosov@
   beitragen wollen - aus  e i g e n e n  Geldmitteln
   - wenn man sie ARBEITEN läßt !

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